PJC Business

PJC 106.2

T ORTIOUS I NTERFERENCE

The law uses different definitions of “good faith” in different contexts. Compare Wich ita County v. Hart , 917 S.W.2d 779, 784–85 (Tex. 1996) (acknowledging variations in “good faith” definitions and adopting objective and subjective component of “good faith” under Whistleblower Act), with City of Lancaster v. Chambers , 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994) (objective good faith required for official immunity), and La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank of Mercedes , 673 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1984) (“actual [subjective] belief of the party in question, not the reasonableness of that belief” under UCC). If a definition of “good faith” is necessary to guide the jury, the Committee expresses no opinion on the proper definition of “good faith” in the justifi cation context. See Bennett v. Computer Associates International , 932 S.W.2d 197, 202–03 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (recognizing that the supreme court has not given a clear definition of good faith in this context); see also OakBend Medi cal Center v. Simons , No. 01-19-00044-CV, 2020 WL 4457972, at *4 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4, 2020, no pet.) (discussing “honesty in fact” as an element to proof of good faith). Defenses to interference with prospective business relations. In Sturges , the supreme court held that “[j]ustification and privilege are defenses in a claim for tor tious interference with prospective relations only to the extent that they are defenses to the independent tortiousness of the defendant’s conduct. Otherwise, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s conduct was not justified or privileged, nor can a defen dant assert such defenses.” Sturges , 52 S.W.3d at 727. Exercise of privilege by illegal or tortious means. “A party may not exercise an otherwise legitimate privilege by resort to illegal or tortious means.” Prudential Insur ance Co. of America v. Financial Review Services, Inc. , 29 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex. 2000). Thus, even if a defendant establishes a legal right or privilege, “if the plaintiff pleads and proves methods of interference that are tortious in themselves, then the issue of privilege or justification never arises.” Prudential Insurance Co. of America , 29 S.W.3d at 81; see also Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. 2002) (exercise of contractual right of first refusal that violates statutory prohibition may establish lack of justification). The Committee expresses no opinion on whether in the context of a claim for intentional interference with an existing contract a defendant may nevertheless raise “defenses to the wrongfulness of the alleged [tortious or wrongful] conduct.” Sturges , 52 S.W.3d at 727.

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