PJC Business

T ORTIOUS I NTERFERENCE

PJC 106.4

PrinterOn, Inc. v. BreezyPrint Corp. , 93 F. Supp. 3d 658, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (citing Lazer Spot ). To be actionable, the inducement may have to breach some feature of the parties’ at-will contract or breach some other agreement. See Graham v. Mary Kay, Inc. , 25 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (tor tious inducement of Mary Kay consultants to breach the direct-sales clause in their consulting agreements with Mary Kay); see also Lazer Spot , 387 S.W.3d at 52 (noting that Marathon Oil’s justification defense in Sterner turned on whether its contract with Sterner’s employer precluded Marathon Oil from interfering with the employer’s man agement of Sterner and its other employees). In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges , 52 S.W.3d 711, 726 (Tex. 2001), the supreme court clarified that a claim for wrongful interference with a prospective contractual or business relationship requires proof that the defendant’s conduct was “independently tortious or wrongful,” but not in the sense that “the plaintiff must be able to prove an independent tort.” By “independently tortious,” the court “mean[t] only that the plain tiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct would be actionable under a recognized tort.” Sturges , 52 S.W.3d at 726. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has held that a tor tious interference claim arising out of a contract terminable at will or on notice involves primarily the prospect of a continuing business relationship and therefore is properly characterized as a claim for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, requiring proof of an independently tortious or wrongful act. Faucette v. Chantos , 322 S.W.3d 901, 914–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 cmt. g (1979)). In El Paso Healthcare System, Ltd. v. Murphy , 518 S.W.3d 412, 421 n.6 (Tex. 2017), the supreme court implied that this is correct by acknowledging that, in Sturges , it “suggested (without discussion) that Sterner [terminable-at-will employment contract] and Juliette Fowler [terminable-on-notice sales representative contract] involved claims for interference with prospective business relations.”

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