PJC Business

C ONTRACTS

PJC 101.8

PJC 101.8

Question on Main Purpose Doctrine

QUESTION ______ Did Don Davis promise to be primarily responsible for paying the debt of [ name of third party ], and was Don Davis ’s main purpose for the promise, if any, to gain a benefit for himself ? Answer “Yes” or “No.” Answer: _______________ COMMENT When to use. The “main purpose” doctrine is an exception to the statute of frauds requirement that an obligation to pay the debt of another be in writing. See PJC 101.35. The doctrine requires that (1) the promisor intended to create primary respon sibility in itself to pay the debt of another; (2) there was consideration for the promise; and (3) the consideration was primarily for the promisor’s own use and benefit—that is, the benefit it received was the promisor’s main purpose for making the promise. Source of question. PJC 101.8 is derived from Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc. , 364 S.W.3d 817, 828 (Tex. 2012). Broad-form submission. PJC 101.8 is a broad-form question designed to be accompanied by one or more appropriate instructions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 requires that “the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 277; see Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. 2012) (rule 277’s use of “whenever feasible” mandates broad-form submission in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accomplished). Consideration essential. The promise to become liable for the debt of another must be supported by consideration. See Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus , 354 S.W.2d 378, 387 (Tex. 1962). To take the promise out of the statute of frauds, the con sideration must be primarily for the promisor’s own use and benefit. Gulf Liquid Fer tilizer Co. , 354 S.W.2d at 386–87. Whether a particular matter constitutes adequate legal consideration is a question of law for the court. Williams v. Hill , 396 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1965, no writ). The court’s determination, however, may be based on facts found by the jury. See, e.g., Houston Medical Testing Services v. Mintzer , 417 S.W.3d 691, 695–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Burden of proof. The party pleading the statute of frauds bears the initial burden of establishing its applicability. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94; Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates , 422 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. 2013). Once that party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish an exception that would take the verbal contract out of the

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