PJC General Negligence 2024

PJC 31.12

E XEMPLARY D AMAGES

Culpable mental state. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §41.008(d) states that “knowingly” has the same meaning assigned in Tex. Penal Code §6.03(b). No civil court has clarified the mental state to be applied to the jury instructions to be used under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §41.008(c). However, criminal courts have in some instances applied a narrower definition of knowledge based on whether the offense is result- or conduct-oriented in nature. See McQueen v. State , 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (explaining difference between result- and conduct-ori ented crimes); Alvarado v. State , 704 S.W.2d 36, 39–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (op. on reh’g) (result-oriented crime; reversible error to instruct jury to find guilt based on intent either to engage in conduct or for result to occur, or both). “If the gravamen of an offense is the result of conduct, the jury charge on culpable mental state should be tailored to the result of conduct and likewise for nature-of-con duct offenses.” Price v. State , 457 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Accord ingly, if the gravamen of an offense is the result of the conduct, the definition of “knowingly” might be modified as follows: A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. If the gravamen of an offense is the nature of the conduct, the definition of “know ingly” might be modified as follows: A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a nature of his conduct or circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. Because section 41.008(d) does not indicate whether the definition of “knowingly” as narrowed in these examples should be used, and civil courts have not spoken on the issue, the Committee has adopted the complete statutory definition of knowingly from Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(b) for use in the charge. Note that the Committee interprets Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(e) to pro hibit the naming of the specific offense at issue in a “cap-busting” jury charge submit ted under section 41.008. Accordingly, with respect to subparts 1, 3, 5, and 7, the charge should be drafted with reference to the elements of the particular offense, rather than by identifying the name of the offense. Alternative language for “transport.” In an appropriate case, the terms entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or otherwise obtain may be substituted for the word trans port . See Tex. Penal Code § 20A.01(4). “Forced labor or services.” In an appropriate case, submit the following defini tion of “forced labor or services,” as provided in Tex. Penal Code § 20A.01(2):

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