The Gazette 1952-1955

o f the High Court and his jurisdiction in this respect has not been affected by the Circuit Court Rules, 195°. The difference between taxation as between solicitor and client and solicitor and own client is not always understood. The latter term refers only to costs due by this client personally to his solicitor, either in or out o f Court, and taxed on a requisition signed by the client. The term solicitor and client is used in a limited and a wide sense. In the limited sense it is used to indicate costs awarded in an action to one party against another to be taxed as between solicitor and client. In the wide sense it is often used where the term “ solicitor and own client ” would be strictly appropriate. The question remains as to -the effect on the taxation o f solicitor and own client costs o f the absence o f a scale off costs for this purpose. A case was recently submitted to learned Counsel who advised drat having regard to Order 58, Rule 13 o f the Circuit Court Rules, 1950, the right o f a solicitor to charge costs as between solicitor and own client for work done or professional services rendered cannot be defeated by the omission o f the rules o f any scale o f costs as between solicitor and own client. In, the Bank o f Ireland to Merrick, 1937 ) I- R -> 389 at Page 4*4, Fitzgibbon J. said— “ For over a century orders have been in force by which a Master has been authorised to tax costs between attorney or solicitor and client without any rule or order for the purpose, upon the applica­ tion o f the client and upon the written undertaking to be lodged with the Master to pay any balance which the Master shall certify.” In Counsel’s opinion this is clear authority for the jurisdiction o f the Taxing Master to tax costs as between solicitor and own client in connection with Circuit Court proceedings upon the requisition o f die client. In the course o f his judgement in Quin and White v. Stokes and Quirke, 1930, I.R ., 182, at Page 186, Sullivan P. said that in the absence o f any scale o f costs the Taxing Master must only tax reasonably. On appeal the Supreme Court varied the order of the High Court but did not disagree with the President’s statement that in the absence o f a scale o f costs the Taxing Master must tax reasonably. Counsel also held that the Taxing Master in a solicitor and own client taxation is not bound by the party and party schedule o f costs or fees set out in the Circuit Court Rules, 1950, and referred to the judgement, in Ryan v. Dolan (1872, I.R. 7 E.Q., 92) o f Warren J . who said—“ In my opinion the schedule may guide but does not control the dis­ cretion o f the officer when taxing costs as between solicitor and client.” The question remains as to the considerations by which the Taxing Master

should be guided in taxing a solicitor and own client bill in the absence o f a prescribed scale o f costs, having regard to his duty to tax reasonably. The Master will no doubt consider the scale o f costs for proceedings in the High Court on taxations between solicitor and own client and between party and party, and the party and party scales o f Circuit Court costs including the provision in Section B o f the 3rd Schedule o f costs that where the amount recovered, or in the case o f a dismiss the amount sued for, exceeds £ 100 the costs shall be taxed on the scale obtaining in the High Court on 1st January, 1932, less one-fifth. Counsel was o f the opinion that the Taxing Master would be acting reasonably if he adopted for the purpose o f solicitor and own client taxations the scale laid down in Section B o f the third Schedule to the Circuit Court Rules, 1950, namely High Court, 1932, less one-fifth. It. is understood that the present practice in the Taxing Masters’ Office on solicitor and own client taxations is to adopt the last mentioned scale for work done in court in all cases including malicious injury cases. For work done outside court prior to action the costs are taxed on the full High Court scale. The plaintiff claimed damages from the defendants , fo r personal injuries and his solicitors wrote to the defendants insurers offering terms o f settlement. A w rit was subsequently issued and in the defence it was pleaded that the terms o f settlement offered by the plaintiff’s solicitors bad been accepted and that the claim had been compromised hy way o f accord and satisfaction. This was denied by the plaintiff who pleaded that i f any such agreement had been made his solicitors had no authority to make it. The defendants administered interrogatorys asking whether the plaintiff had not authorised his solicitors to negotiate the settlement or to hold themselves out as having authority to do so. Was the p la in tiff entitled to refuse to answer the interrogatorys on the ground that the enquiries related to conpdential communications between solicitor and client which were protected by the client’s privilege ? No. The Court held that the protection o f privilege did not extend to communications between a client and his solicitor which the solicitor was instructed to communicate to the other side, and that if a solicitor acting on his client’s instructions tells the solicitor acting for the defendant “ I have my client’s instruction to accept £1,000 and costs,” and as a result o f that an agreement is reached between the two solicitors in complete accord and satisfaction o f the claim, the plaintiff cannot claim DECISIONS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST.