The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

front’, rushing between their headquarters and the developing events. Rommel, for example,

tried to be always in the ‘picture’ of developing events by crossing the Meuse with one of the

first wave of assault teams. His skepticism about initial success turned into curiosity to know

what was going on and only to share such oversight with his chief of staff if necessary.

From a German perspective, ambiguity was less of an issue, given the closeness of key

decision makers to the unfolding events. Nevertheless, the Germans managed quickly to

relay intelligence beyond their regimental or divisional boundaries. This was not done to

enable others to make decisions from afar, but to ensure that the higher echelons could

monitor the situation at hand and to give them updates so that they, as key decision makers,

could retain oversight.

The Belgian decision makers at Fort d'Ében-Émael were remote to the ongoing events

on top of the fort. Hence, Major Jottrand relied on those personnel manning the observation

cupolas who provided him with status reports indicating what was happening and whether

his orders had any effect on battling the German paratroopers. He relied very much on

verbal cues, unable to ‘see for himself’. The resulting confusion was amplified by the wrong

signal indicating an attack occurring from the outer perimeter of the fort, rather than from

above.

Without such crucial sensitivity, and amplified by the complexity of authority, Major

Jottrand was acting upon ambiguous, and in most cases already outdated, information. From

the outset, he was partially ‘blind’, relying on indefinite or unclear meaning in verbal cues;

and he was ‘shackled’, constrained from requesting autonomy from a variety of higher level

authorities. His fort was at the mercy of the Germans.

The lack of sensitivity was not only limited to the occupants of fortresses. Throughout

the Allied forces, key decisions were mostly based on ambiguous, out-of-date information. For example, on 13 th May 1940, at the time when the Germans had already successfully

crossed the river Meuse and were close to breaking through the French defences, Colonel

Henry Lacaille, chief of staff of the French Second Army, reported to headquarters, Allied

Forces, north-eastern front: There has been a rather serious hitch at Sedan (May 2009,

391) . An understatement with serious consequences.

Reserves were committed prematurely, on the basis of ambiguous intelligence, to the

theatre in the north of the French Front, and much of the battle for France was fought in

something of an information vacuum. Transmitted information lacked details and meaning.

French Generals truly believed that the situation at the front was under control given the

ambiguous messages they received; messages that – by default – obscured the true picture.

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