The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

He took us deep into the interior and we trudged many miles to the end of the

tunnel, visiting the crews and the guns of the emplacements we had seen on the

surface. Crews gave us their missions and detailed characteristics of their guns.

All was very professional. Later, we assembled in the command post. The

commandant gave a detailed account of how he proposed to defend the fort in the

event of an attack. I got the impression of tremendous power and first-rate

efficiency. I was convinced nothing could happen! (Dunstan 2005, 32)

Auftragstaktik versus La Bataille Conduit

Two fundamental tactical concepts clashed in these fateful beginnings of the campaign in

the west: Auftragstaktik (Mission-Oriented Tactics) and La Bataille Conduit (‘Methodical

Battle’). Auftragstaktik is an evolutionary concept that found its origin in the Prussian (1866)

and France-Prussian War (1870−1871). Commanders of the Prussian Army noticed that,

given increasing battlefield complexity and uncertainty, they found it challenging trying to

exercise control over their forces in detail. The Prussian Army asked themselves how to

prepare better for battles and campaigns characterised by the fog of war.

In 1888, the new drill regulations stipulated that commanders should provide

subordinates with an intent – what was to be accomplished and why – while equipping them

with the autonomy to act – to determine by themselves how to do it. This implies that

decision-making was less centralised. Subordinate leaders (such as non-commissioned

officers), being close to the problem, were encouraged to show initiative in action, all related

to a defined ‘intent’. If a commander was unable to make sound decisions – because they

were remote to the situation or perhaps incapacitated – subordinate leaders could continue

their mission, or even adapt the intent to an evolving situation.

Nevertheless, the concept of Mission Oriented-Tactics did not absolve the commander

from control over these empowered subordinate leaders. Commanders commonly placed

themselves at the front line, being sensitive to volatility on the ground. They would also

intervene if they believed that their subordinate leaders were making clearly incorrect

decisions.

[Text Box starts] Allied Joint Doctrine - Mission Command

A commander’s responsibility for mission accomplishment is total, but delegation of authority to

subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commander’s intentions are

included in the principle of decentralisation. Through mission command, commanders generate the

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