The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

Among the plethora of possible explanations as to why one form of logic prevailed over

the other, the issue of communication and intelligence − the routine of procuring, analysing

and using information – stands out.

The Challenge: Capturing Fort d’Ében-Émael

A frontal assault by armour and infantry on the bridges across the Meuse and the Albert

Canal, and on the forts covering these bridges, was likely to lead to a prolonged standoff that

the Germans knew they could not win. Deployment of airborne troops was therefore

envisaged, delivering a surprise factor expected to paralyse the defender for long enough to

enable reinforcements to be brought in to exploit breaches in the Meuse front.

In October 1939, Kurt Student received the orders to prepare an airborne raid on Fort

d'Ében-Émael and the Meuse/Albert canal bridges. At his disposal were parts of an airborne

regiment − 1. Fallschirmjäger-Kompanie des Fallschirmjäger-Regiments 1, Fallschirmjäger

Pionierzug – as well as supporting units from the Luftwaffe.

The paratroopers were not supposed to parachute into their operating area but to be

landed on top of the fort, with the help of gliders. Their extensive training, under the

supervision of Hauptmann Koch, included in the use of shaped charges ( Hohlladung , also

often referred to as hollow charges): these were explosive charges with a cavity which

focused the blast into a small area, suitable for penetrating armoured casemates. The

physical training for this undertaking was unrelenting and even glider pilots, hand selected,

were trained in assaulting casemates and bunkers of various types.

The German forces were split into units each with its own objective. The Sturmgruppe

(assault group) Granit (Granite) was allocated the capture of Fort d'Ében-Émael, with

Sturmgruppe Beton (Concrete), Eisen (Iron) and Stahl (Steel) given the objective of taking

intact the bridges at Vroenhoeven, Kanne and Veldwezelt. Sturmgruppe Granit was led by

Oberleutnant Witzig and was composed of two officers and 84 men − a tiny force taking on

the most powerful fort in the world.

The Belgian defenders of Fort d'Ében-Émael could call upon 985 men, under the

leadership of Major Jottrand. Their fragmentation under different units led to an extraordinary

complexity in decision-making. For example, the crew of Maastricht 1 and 2 belonged to the

18e Régiment d’Infantrie d’Ligne, yet Visé 1 was manned by 2e Grenadiers Régiment and

Visé 2 by Secteur Meuse-Aval.

Being summoned to do duty in a fort was not seen as a high point of anybody’s career.

Most defensive preparation for an assault on Fort d'Ében-Émael involved guard duty or

rather mundane tasks such as the cleaning of anti-tank ditches or clearing fields of fire.

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