The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

shaped charge into the embrasure of the left-hand 75mm gun. The explosion of this smaller

hollow charge – the larger is 50kg – blew the gun, with its gun carriage, into the casemate.

Hand grenades and small arms fire followed, and Maastricht 1 was also out of action.

The effect of a hollow charge on Mi-Nord and Eben 2 (Obj 19). (BArch, n.d.)

Between 07:30 and 08:00 – at a time when most observation cupolas and fighting

casemates facing inwards had already been knocked out – the Belgian defenders ordered

the surrounding forts to shell the surface of Fort d'Ében-Émael. Heavy artillery rained down

fire. Nevertheless, at that stage most Germans had taken shelter in already breached

casemates. In its new improvised headquarters in Mi-Nord, Oberfeldwebel (Sergeant)

Wenzel – Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Witzig had not reached the fort yet − took

over command and radioed back: ‘ Target reached. Everything in order’ (McNab 2013, 51) .

But not everything was ‘in order’. The outer periphery of the fort remained in Belgian

hands, and Coupola 120 – with its double-barrelled 120mm guns – had not yet been

silenced, because it had been allocated to a German unit that had not made it to the fort. Its

commander – Maréchal de logis Cremers – was keenly aware of the Germans milling

around his cupola. The initial attempt to knock out his position with demolition charges failed,

giving Cremers an opportunity to at least disrupt the German attempts to cross the river

Meuse. However, like so many other occupants of Fort d'Ében-Émael, he had not received

the order to open fire. He would not receive these orders until another hollow charge finally

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