CYIL Vol. 4, 2013

MAX HILAIRE CYIL 4 ȍ2013Ȏ though Security Resolution 678 (1990) provided him with a broad enough legal mandate to allow him to match on to Baghdad and overthrow Saddam Hussein. 70 Following Hussein’s brutal response to Shiite and Kurdish simultaneous uprisings, Bush secured a resolution in the Security Council condemning the humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq as a threat to regional peace and security. 71 Although the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, hence it was not legally binding, the United States, the United Kingdom and France later invoked Resolution 688 (1991) to justify the establishment of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. 72 The resolution also called on the Secretary General to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping mission in northern Iraq, but the Secretary General questioned the legality of that request, and the United Nations Legal Counsel affirmed that it was indeed a violation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. 73 The Secretary General later negotiated an agreement with Saddam Hussein that allowed for the United Nations to deploy a group of unarmed monitors to assist in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. 74 President Bush presided over the demise of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, democratization in Eastern and Central Europe, and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. With the exception of the former Yugoslavia, the transition in the Soviet Union and Central Europe was orderly. Together with President Gorbachev, President Bush supported the United Nations in its efforts to settle several long standing regional conflicts in southern Africa, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Central America. 75 Following the failure of the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) to restore security in the capital, Mogadishu, and safely distribute humanitarian relief to the civilian population in light of a deteriorating security situation, the Bush administration offered to have the United States lead an international force to Somalia. The U.S.-led operation, code named “Operation Restore Hope”, was authorized by the Security Council and placed under a unified command. 76 The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was to provide security for humanitarian assistance to the civilian populations and to protect aid workers and convoys. 77 Operation Restore Hope was partially successful, 70 S.C. Res. 678 (1990), para. 2. 71 See Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (2001), p. 132. 72 Michael Byers, WAR LAW (2005); Anthony Aust, Statement before HC Foreign Affairs Committee, Dec. 2, 1992, in ‘United Kingdom Material on International Law 1992’ in LXIII British Yearbook International Law, 827. 73 James Cockayne & David Malone, The Security Council and the 1991 and 2003 Wars in Iraq, p. 389, in Lowe, et al ., eds. The United Nations Security Council and War, (2010). 74 ibid. , p. 390; See Michael Ignatieff, State-failure and nation-building, in J.L. Holzgrefe& Robert Keohane, eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, (2003), p. 308. 75 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (1994), p. 61. 76 S.C. Res. 794 of Dec. 3, 1992. 77 ibid. , p. 81.