CYIL Vol. 4, 2013

THE PROTOCOL OF 1997 TO AMEND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR LIABILITY… 1 July 2006 on the date on which they expect their parliamentary procedures required for ratification or accession to be completed. The date and arrangements for simultaneous deposit shall be determined on that basis.” On one hand, the European Union is not able to accede to the nuclear liability conventions of the “second generation”; on the other hand, by setting a binding time framework for the ratification of the Protocol of 2004, it clearly intervenes in the development of nuclear liability law in its territory. It is a matter of fact that the Signatories have failed to reach this goal so far. Seven years after the deadline imposed by the Council decisions, the Protocol still did not enter into force. 32 For most of this time, the Union had remained silent towards the issue of Protocol ratification. 33 However, after the accident in the Japanese nuclear power plant Fukushima Dai-ichi , the European Union renewed its interest in the issues of nuclear third party liability. Subsequently, the Commission addressed governments of several Member States 34 in order to fulfil their obligations arising from the Decision of 8 March 2004. Such a step may lead in forthcoming months to an infringements proceeding against certain Member States in this regard. 3.2.3 Requirement of simultaneous deposit of ratification instruments Last, but not least, the decisions requires simultaneous deposit of ratification instruments. The ratio of such a requirement was to ensure that the Amended Paris Convention will come into force in all Member States which are Signatories to the Protocol of 2004 simultaneously. At the same time, the Paris Convention stipulates in its Article 20 that any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by mutual agreement of all the Contracting Parties and that they shall come into force when ratified or confirmed by two-thirds of the Contracting Parties. For each Contracting Party ratifying or confirming thereafter, they shall come into force at the date of such ratification or confirmation. Consequently, it is a matter of fact, that the authorisation decisions do constitute a requirement of ratification, which is stricter, that requirement as laid down in the international convention. Therefore, the requirement of simultaneous ratification became a matter of criticism among the international scientific community. 35 The key objection against this requirement is that, under the provisions of the Paris Convention, the Protocol of 2004 would eventually already be in force. Consequently, the Union’s requirement 32 For further details regarding this situation see Schwartz, J.: Great Expectations:Where DoWe Stand with the International Nuclear Liability Conventions?, in Pelzer, N. (ed.): Europäisches Atomhaftungsrechtim Umbruch , Nomos Verlag, Baden Baden, 2010, pp. 43 et seq. 33 Some authors pointed out, that one of the reasons has been the strict requirement to deposit their instruments of ratification of the Protocol simultaneously . It is a matter of fact that the only states which did ratify the Protocol since its adoption have been Switzerland and Norway, which are not Member States of the European Union. 34 Belgium, France and Italy. 35 Will singular deposit of ratification instruments also lead to an infringement proceedings from the side of the European Union? This question has also been a matter of discussions among the scientific community, but has not been addressed by the European Commission yet.