The Gazette 1958-61

applied were those laid down in the authorities to which the Court had referred, the plaintiff submitted that to come within those principles the committee must be a tribunal which was equivalent to a court of law, that is, a tribunal which acted in a manner similar to a court of law and which had similar attributes to those of a court of law. On considera tion of the matters dealt with by the authorities, the committee was not a tribunal to which the protection of absolute privilege should attach. In particular, by r. 21 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1957, the committee must hear all application in private. In judicial tribunals the judge was independent and took an oath ; but the members of the committee were not independent of the Law Society, nor did they take an oath. The test whether the proceedings were judicial was the rule which forbade tribunals to have self-interest, but the committee, as solicitors, had an interest in the proceedings before them. In view of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over solicitors, proceedings before the committee should be treated as adminis trative proceedings. He said that it was a fundamen tal principle of justice that a person should be allowed to reply to allegations, but that his applica tion to give evidence before the committee was refused. He commented on the fact that the committee had no power to issue a writ of subpoena, and referred to r. 27, r. 29, r. 30, r. 31 and r. 34 which latter rule expressly applied the Evidence Act, 1938, and the Evidence and Powers of Attorney Act, 1940, to proceedings before the committee. He contended that, in substance, the committee was a domestic disciplinary court, similar to that of a club, and that the word " court" was nowhere used to refer to the committee. Summarising his case, the plaintiff contended that, at the highest, the committee was an administrative tribunal, administering in private discipline over solicitors, with powers which were limited to imposing fines, striking off, or suspending, solicitors from the roll; the committee had no power to imprison. His Lordship continued :—I do not propose to go through the plaintiff's other submissions ; I have them all in my mind. Bearing in mind the fact that the onus is on the defendants, I have to decide which of these conten tions is right. I have no doubt at all, having thought over the matter carefully, and having considered the authori ties and the submissions, that the submissions made to me by the defendants are right. The publication of the words complained of in para. 5 of the 37

words in their context, and one which should in the circumstances be adopted to avoid inconvenience and inconsistency with the charters. (Knowles v. Zoological Society of London—(1959) 2 All E.R. 595)- Defamatory statements made before a Disciplinary Committee are absolutely privileged. For the purposes of privilege against liability for defamation in respect of statements made on a privileged occasion, proceedings before the Discip linary Committee constituted under s. 4(5 of the Solicitors Act, 1957, are judicial in character, and the privilege attaching to the publication of the findings and order of the committee is absolute privilege. Per Gorman, J.,—In the course of the case of " Royal Aquarium & Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson, (L. R. (1892) i Q.B. 431) the principles governing the position of courts or tribunals which are concerned with matters of the kind with which I am now concerned were set out, and Lord Esher, M.R., said ((1892) i Q.B. at p. 442) : " It was argued, in the first place, on behalf of the defendant, that he was exercising a judicial function when he spoke the words complained of, and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity in respect of anything he said. It is true that, in respect of statements made in the course of proceedings before a court of justice, whether by judge, or counsel, or witnesses, there is an absolute immunity from liability to an action. The ground of that rule is public policy. It is applicable to all kinds of courts of justice ; but the doctrine has been carried further ; and it seems that this immunity applies wherever there is an authorised inquiry which, though not before a court of justice, is before a tribunal which has similar attributes." Based on.those authorities, it was the submission of the defendants that the Disciplinary Committee was not an administrative tribunal; that this was an authorised inquiry which was by nature a judicial inquiry; that, as such, the committee was not merely performing administrative functions, and that it was right that the findings of the Committee should be subject to absolute privilege. I do not intend to go through all the references made by counsel for the defendants to the various sections of the Solicitors Act, 1957, and to the rules ; I have them in my mind. Having regard particularly to the fact that the plaintiff conducted his case alone, I shall quite shortly set out his submissions on the sections of the Act of 1957 and the various rules which were made under the Act. The following were the submissions made by the plaintiff. While accepting that the principles to be