The Gazette 1958-61

point, on which the plaintiff had contended that the defendants should not be awarded any costs as their notice of payment in of the .£1,000 merely stated that this sum was "enough to satisfy the plaintiff's claim," and did not specify what sum was paid in respect of common law negligence and what sum in respect of breach of statutory duty. The plaintiff contended that the notice therefore failed to comply with the requirements of R.S.C. Ord, 22, r. i (2). The case is reported only on this point. Per Lord Somervell: On the conclusion to which I have come on the first point as to quantum, this point does not arise because the amount would then be in excess of the amount paid into court; but counsel on each side asked us, if we came to a con clusion on the point to express it; and although normally it is desirable not to decide matters which one does not have to decide, it is right to express the view which I and my brethren hold on this point, which may often arise. The claim here was a claim, as so often arises in these cases, for negligence, or alternatively for breach of statutory duty; and the point taken was that as the payment into court did not specify the cause or causes of action in respect of which the payment was made, therefore it was a bad payment in, and that leave ought to have been obtained from a court or a judge. One sees, of course, how the point arises on the wording of the rule ; but any rule, or indeed any document, falls to be construed in the light of its purpose to be gathered from its terms. The purpose of this rule is to avoid embarrassment in the tech nical sense, when damages are claimed under two or more independent causes of action in cases where the relief claimed is cumulative. A man is claiming under cause A and cause B, and if he wins on both, he gets X plus Y in damages. If a sum of money is paid into court, it is difficult for him to know what to do if he does not know how much is allocated to cause A and how much to cause B. If £250 is allocated to cause A, he may say : "That is all I hope to get under that, so I will take that sum out, and that will be the end of that." The case will then proceed on cause B. That obviously is the problem with which the rule is intended to deal. In cases such as the present, however, where the relief claimed is not cumulative, and where the two causes of action are alternative methods of claiming the same relief, the embarrassment which the rule is designed to prevent cannot arise, and, moreover, it would be impossible to comply with the rule by allocating part of the sum paid in to one, and part to the other, of the two alternative causes of action. Therefore, the learned judge was right in deciding that there had been no breach of the rule. (Graham v. Heinke (1959), 3. All E.R. 650.)

Person arrested in Court for non-compliance with a Court Order cannot claim privilegefrom arrest. Lord Parker, Mr. Justice Cassels and Mr. Justice McNair, refusing this application by Mr. Kenneth Hunt, chemist, of Ashford, Middlesex, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendume, held that a litigant's immunity (if any) from arrest while in the precincts of the court was a privilege of the Court to ensure that justice was done. The applicant was committed to Brixton Prison on November 4, 1958, by Mr. Justice Wynn Parry for contempt of court (The Times, November 5), and his appeal against Mr. Justice Wynn Parry's order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on November 27 (The Times, Nov ember 28). The Lord Chief Justice, giving judgment, said that Mr. Hunt had raised every conceivable point, but the one which had been developed at greatest length and with which the Court was really concerned was whether he was properly arrested. There was a motion by the defendants, Allied Bakeries Ltd., before Mr. Justice Wynn Parry, to commit the applicant to prison for contempt of court in failing to attend an appointment before an exam iner of the court. The Judge, having heard the case, came to the conclusion that the applicant had no intention of attending any examination that might be fixed, and thereupon ordered his committal. The Tipstaff, who had arrived in court, arrested him and took him to Brixton Prison. In those circumstances Mr. Hunt said that he was wrongfully arrested, and claimed that he had some privilege from arrest while he was in the court. He took some four or five other points, all of which admittedly had been raised by him on his appeal to the Court of Appeal. His Lordship found it un necessary to decide that the decision of the Court of Appeal was resjudicata in these proceedings. Whether it was or not, approaching the matter de novo and having heard all the arguments raised by Mr. Hunt, his Lordship saw no reason to come to any other view than that taken by the Court of Appeal and so far as the points other than that relating to privilege were concerned Mr. Hunt failed. The question regarding privilege was an interest ing one and one on which one would expect to find clear authority in the text books. Mr. Hunt said that except in the case of special contempt, by which he meant contempt in the face of the court and criminal contempt, a litigant properly before the court had a complete immunity from arrest while in the pre cincts of the court. His Lordship found it unnecessary to go through the history of the matter. It seemed perfectly clear from the authorities and text books that it was a misconception to talk about a litigant or a solicitor 86