Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

MB50

n MB50 North Bldg 231A Behavioral Aspects of Project Management Emerging Topic: Behavioral Aspects of OR Emerging Topic Session Chair: Lin Wang, PhD, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China 1 - Modeling Human Behaviors in Project Management: A Systematic Review Lin Wang, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China To successfully implement projects, the significant role of “humans cannot be ignored. Stakeholders (project managers, senior managers, etc.), who make vital decisions alongside the project life cycle, are often influenced by behavioral biases and inducing great losses. These losses are observed as the project escalation phenomenon in the project management (PM) literature for decades, while some behavioral decision-making models have been built by operational research (OR) experts. This paper makes a systematic review of the literature originating from both communities, and discusses the why, the what and the how of the behavioral modeling to facilitate wise project decisions. 2 - Pricing Strategies Based on Consumers’ Shopping Preference for Sales Channels JieYu Lei, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, China, Ada Che E-commerce brings two new sales channels: online direct channel(ODC) and online retail channel(ORC) into market, which help consumers no longer stick to traditional offline channel (TOC) to buy what they need. In this paper, we mainly focus on how manufacturers make their pricing strategies when they adopt two or three channels to sell their products. According to the Stackelberg game theory, we design a sale model considering consumers’ preference for different channels and calculate the optimal pricing strategies of manufacturers and retailers. The result shows that the optimal price of a product in ODC is generally higher than that of the same product in ORC and TOC. 3 - Human Capital, Technological Progress and Structural Unemployment Chao Li, Shandong University, 180 Wenhuaxi Road, Weihai, 264209, China Technology progress makes old skills abundant, eliminate relevant job opportunities and create new job vacancies at the same time, thus threatening a rise in structural unemployment. The simulation results demonstrate that the quantity of structural unemployment brought about by technological progress is determined by the inequality of human capital. The more severe inequality of human capital in the labor force, the more people with lower human capital whose old skills will be replaced by new technologies, which are developed by those with higher human capital. Therefore, technology progress may not necessarily cause high structural unemployment. 4 - Network of Factors Influencing Green Buildings Performance from Perspectives of Stakeholders Du Qiang, Chang’an University, School of Economics and Management, Middle-Section of Nan’er Huan Road, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710064, China, Bai Libiao, Huang ning, Wang Hailing To accelerate the process and improve the efficiency of promoting green buildings in China, this paper filtrate 28 green building influence factors from 2-perspective of life cycle and stakeholders. And a questionnaire survey of 20 green building experts was used in social network for recognize quantitatively the critical influence factors. This paper filled the gap of previous research on green building that rarely measure the relationship between different influence factors in the project life cycle. Final, remarks include policy recommendations for promotion green building in China and suggestions for future research. 5 - Project Managers’ Paradoxical Leader Behavior in Construction Project Teams: Effects on Team Adaptation and Project Performance Wenqian Guo, Tianjin University, Building 25A, Tianjin University, No.92, Weijin Road, Nankai District, Tianjin, Tianjin, 300072, China Research on paradoxical leader behavior developed in the organizational field, has not been given adequate attention to the area of construction project management. Using a paradoxical lens, the empirical analysis of a survey of 187 Chinese general contractors clearly indicates that there is a positive relationship between project managers’ paradoxical leader behavior and construction project performance. Moreover, this relationship is mediated by team adaptation. The findings have significant theoretical and managerial implications for effective construction project management.

n MB51 North Bldg 231B Managing Risk in Complex Projects Emerging Topic: Project Management and Scheduling, in Memory of Joe Leung, Emerging Topic Session Chair: Gary Mitchell, University of Portland, Pamplin School of Business, Portland, OR, 97203, United States 1 - Improving Outsourcing Project Estimation Richard Kraude, University of Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, United States, Enno Siemsen, Sriram Narayanan Outsourcing is common, unfortunately, so too are delays in outsourced projects. Selecting outsource partners that will meet deadlines requires accurate estimation of the effort it will take to complete them. We conduct a behavior experiment to test how project planning differs for external estimates and how to improve them. 2 - Measuring a Project’s Schedule Performance: Earned Duration and Beyond Mikhail Gordon, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 15224, United States, Tim Lowe, Richard Wendell This paper gives some new results on Earned Duration, including a characterization of how scheduling metrics based on Earned Duration behave in late-finishing and early-finishing projects, and an explanation with examples on why it is susceptible to giving false negatives and false positives in measuring a project’s scheduling performance. The paper then notes how Critical Path methodology, when used appropriately, can by itself effectively assess and communicate schedule status of a project. 3 - Do IncentiveContracts Coordinate Decentralized Projects? Theodore D. Klastorin, University of Washington, ISOM Department, Box 353226, Seattle, WA, 98195-3226, United States, Shi Chen, Michael Wagner We consider a serial decentralized project where a client subcontracts the work to an independent contractor. Using a Stackelberg game, we analyze a general class of incentive contracts and show that setting the due date to zero defines an optimal contract for the client. Furthermore, we show that this contract coordinates the project under certain conditions. 4 - Optimizing a New Product Development Project Gary Mitchell, University of Portland, Pamplin School of Business, Portland, OR, 97203, United States, Theodore Klastorin An innovator firm is planning to start a new product development project consisting of n sequential stages or subprojects and learns of a rumor that an unknown competitor may enter the market with a competing product. Wishing to maximize the expected benefits of the new product, the innovator firm must decide how to respond to this potential competitive threat. We consider the optimal product introduction timing and the time-cost tradeoffs associated with accelerated project costs and market potential. 5 - Robust Management Optimization of a Portfolio of Interdependent Projects Marcus V. Poggi, Prof, PUC-Rio - Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, Rua M. S. Vicente 225, Rio de Janiero, 22591- 900, Brazil, Carlos Raoni Mendes, Bruno Flach Determining optimal activity execution modes and risk mitigation plans for a portfolio of interdependent projects subject to multiple sources of uncertainty are objects of this work. We model the uncertain environment as an adversary that selects worst-case combinations of risks for any action. Next, we present a robust optimization model and its reformulation scheme. The resulting model is solved by a cut-generation. Experiments over instances derived from PSPLIB are reported. They show how important integrated resource allocation decisions is when dealing with portfolios of interdependent projects. They also highlight the effectiveness and computational feasibility of the method.

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