Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

MC16

4 - Near-optimal Ranking and Display Algorithms under Multinomial Logit Preferences Mohammed Ali Aouad, London Business School, London, United Kingdom We study the display optimization problem, that seeks to compute an optimal ranking over distinct items (ads, products, etc.) that are displayed to a heterogeneous audience. Each customer considers a subset of the items assigned to the most favorable locations, before picking one alternative through Multinomial Logit choice probabilities. Our main contribution is to derive a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the display optimization model, thereby improving on the best-known constant-factor approximation. We develop an approximate dynamic programming formulation based on a surprisingly compact state space representation of assignment decisions. n MC16 North Bldg 127B Socially Responsible Operations Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Sustainable Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Leon Valdes, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, United States 1 - Job Design and Work Allocation for Volunteers in Nonprofit Organizations Deishin Lee, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Fulton Hall 344, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, United States, Joy Field, Tingliang Huang The intent of this study is to understand how operational processes can be designed and managed to accommodate and leverage the distinct characteristics of non-profit organizations to maximize their performance. We first construct an analytical model and then use data from food banks to test the findings of our model. 2 - Curtailing the Improper Waste Disposal: Evidence from California and Florida Suvrat Dhanorkar, Pennsylvania State University, 466 Business Building, University Park, PA, 16802, United States, Suresh Muthulingam We exploit the development of electronic waste legislation and related infrastructure to study the impact on waste in the electronic industry. We find evidence for the presence of a virtuous cycle where there is lower electronic waste disposal, curb in electronic related manufacturing waste, and reduction of electronic consumption. Our results point out the essential factors that curtail the improper disposal of waste. 3 - Supply Risk Mitigation via Supplier Diversification and Improvement: An Experimental Evaluation Basak Kalkanci, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 30339, United States Firms are increasingly exposed to risks stemming from their suppliers such as health/safety violations or supplier failures. We use lab experiments to evaluate two sourcing strategies developed for supplier risk mitigation: dual sourcing and single sourcing with supplier improvement. With dual sourcing, human buyers do not diversify orders effectively and exhibit quantity hedging behavior. We propose and empirically validate a theory of order allocation error minimization to explain this phenomenon. In contrast, human buyers use supplier improvement relatively successfully, despite being subject to supplier selection errors. 4 - Sustainable or Not? Role of Valuation Uncertainty and Operational Flexibility in Product Line Design Weiqing Zhang, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, Saint Louis, MO, 63130, United States, Lingxiu Dong, Iva Petrova Rashkova The purpose of the paper aims at exploring a big food company’s optimal strategy structures when selling products incorporated with both sustainable and conventional quality dimensions to a market that has heterogeneous segments. By taking the features such as coupled cost structure, operational flexibility and consumer’s volatile preferences into consideration, we find out the interplay of cannibalization and product upgrade effect determines the company’s optimal strategies. Further, interesting implications such as wastes and consumer welfare can be explained.

n MC17 North Bldg 127C Information Management in Supply Chains Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Supply Chain Sponsored Session Chair: Shilu Tong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, 2001, Long Xiang Blvg, CUHK Shenzhen, Shenzhen, 518172, China 1 - Sharing Manufacturer’s Demand Information under Linear Wholesale Price Yunjie Wang, Renmin University of China, Zhongguancun Street, Beijing, 100080, China, Albert Y. Ha, Shilu Tong We study the incentive for a manufacturer to share private demand information with two retailers who compete on price and service effort under a linear wholesale price contract. Without information sharing, the wholesale price may be distorted upward or downward due to a signaling effect. Information sharing allows the manufacturer to alleviate the signaling effect and influence downstream competition. We derive conditions under which the manufacturer shares information with none, one or both of the retailers. We also conduct sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of some parametric changes on the information sharing equilibrium outcome as well as the firms’ profits. 2 - Incentives for Information Transparency under Vertical Information Asymmetry Hongyan Xu, Chongqing University, School of Economics & Business Admin, Chongqing, 400030, China, He Huang, De Liu, Sammi Yu Tang This paper studies the incentives for horizontal information transparency between competing downstream firms when upstream suppliers possess private information. Our findings enrich the understanding of horizontal information sharing under vertical information asymmetry and provide novel insights for managers to handle two-dimensional information asymmetry. 3 - Quality Score Information Sharing in Reverse Auctions Hedayat Alibeiki, California State University San Marcos, San Marcos, CA, United States, Mehmet Gumus In this paper, we focus on the buyer-determined (price-plus format) reverse auctions, where the buyers use quality scores (QS) to evaluate their suppliers in terms of the non-price attributes. Analyzing the informational and strategic effects of QS in a reverse auction setting, we evaluate whether or not it is beneficial for the buyer to share relative QS information with the suppliers. 4 - Information Sharing, Pricing Timing and Platform Selection Yulan Wang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Faculty of Business, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Yanli Tang, Baozhuang Niu In this study, we explore the information sharing decisions of two platforms, and the supplier’s platform selection decision by studying a four-stage game under two pricing timing scenarios. We show that it is never in the best interest of the supplier to direct sell on the hybrid platform under the late pricing, whereas under the early pricing, the supplier may prefer direct selling on the hybrid platform; and the chosen platform shares its information with the supplier voluntarily. Interestingly, the supplier direct selling on the agency platform may benefit the hybrid platform under the late pricing. Moreover, the pricing timing preference of the supplier and the hybrid platform may be aligned. n MC18 North Bldg 128A Academic Job Search Panel Emerging Topic: INFORMS Career Center Emerging Topic Session Chair: Warren Hearnes, Cardlytics, 4061 Water Oak Terrace SW, Lilburn, GA, 30047-7417, United States 1 - Academic Job Search Panel Warren Hearnes, Cardlytics, 4061 Water Oak Terrace SW, Lilburn, GA, 30047-7417, United States This panel discusses the academic interview process and do’s and don’ts associated with the job search. In addition to comments by current and former search chairs, time will be provided for questions and answers.

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