Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

SC14

for maximizing firm’s profits as well as consumer and social welfare. 2 - Persuading Customers to Buy Early Ramandeep Randhawa, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, United States, Shobhit Jain, Kimon Drakopoulos Retailers tend to have more information than customers on product availability. This leads to the natural question of how can a firm communicate this information in a profitable manner. We use a Bayesian Persuasion framework to model this information provisioning game. We find that public information provisioning has limited value, however, personalized information provisioning has significant value. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that personalized information provisioning has attributes very similar to personalized pricing. 3 - The Boundaries of Operational Transparency Laurens G. Debo, Dartmouth College, 100 Tuck Hall, Hanover, NH, 03755, United States, Cuihong Li, Ryan Buell Recent research has suggested that providing operational transparency from customers to employees can increase customers’ perceptions and appreciation of employee effort, which in turn boosts customer perceived value. In this talk, we discuss mechanisms through which operational transparency might backfire. We test our the strength of these mechanisms in a controlled laboratory setting. n SC16 North Bldg 127B MSOM Sustainable Operations: Daniel Ying’s Session Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Sustainable Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Yen-Ting (Daniel) Lin, University of San Diego, San Diego, CA, 92110, United States 1 - Supplier Development in a Multitier Supply Chain Timothy Kraft, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA, United States, Ozgen Karaer, Pinar Yalcin We study a buyer’s strategy to develop the quality capabilities of a tier-1 and a tier-2 supplier. We consider how the buyer’s cost-sharing decisions and the suppliers’ quality decisions are impacted by the market opportunity for improved quality and the division of the supply chain margin between the three parties. We find if the market opportunity is such that the buyer develops only one supplier, then he should share costs with the supplier that captures the higher portion of the margin. If instead the market opportunity is greater and he invests in both suppliers, then he should instead share a larger fraction of the cost to build quality with the supplier that captures the lower portion of the margin. 2 - The Danger of Tightening Standards in Driving Carmakers’ Non-compliance Behavior Kejia Hu, Vanderbilt University, 300 Ashcroft Pl, Nashville, TN, 37215, United States, Sunil Chopra, Yuche Chen Using a 14-year on-road vehicle emission dataset, we confirm a causal impact from tightening emission standards on carmakers’ noncompliance behavior. 3 - The Environmental Impact of Online Grocery Retailing Ekaterina Astashkina, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, Fontainebleau, 77305, France, Elena Belavina, Simone Marinesi We explore the environmental impact of the online grocery retailing. We build a stylized three-echelon model of traditional and online fresh grocery chains. We identify the drivers of grocery retail carbon footprint at the consumer, retail, and supplier tiers, incorporating food waste and transportation emissions. We analytically characterize when online presence is environmentally bene?cial or detrimental, and isolate the three drivers by which online presence can hurt the environment: retail inventory decentralization, excessive household food waste, or last-mile travel. Calibration of the model suggests that, in all practical cases, online presence reduces total emissions. 4 - Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-responsible Supply Chains Jiayu Chen, The University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Road, Richardson, TX, 75080, United States, Anyan Qi, Milind Dawande Most supply networks are characterized by firms sourcing from multiple suppliers and suppliers serving multiple firms, thus resulting in suppliers who differ in their degree centrality, i.e., the number of firms they supply to. In such networks, any negative publicity from suppliers’ noncompliance of socially-responsible practices can significantly damage the reputation of the buyers. To mitigate this impact, firms preemptively audit suppliers, although resource and time considerations typically restrict the number of suppliers a firm can audit. We explore how the degree centrality of the suppliers affect the socially-responsible supply chains and offer several novel and useful insights.

n SC14 North Bldg 126C Joint Session MSOM/Practice Curated: Empirical OM in Services Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Carri Chan, Columbia Business School, New York, NY, 10027, United States Co-Chair: Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University, New York, NY, 10027, United States 1 - Component Sharing and Recalls: An Empirical Study in the Auto Industry Kamalini Ramdas, London Business School, A215 Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom Automakers often share components - such as brakes, engines or outer body panels - across models in their product lines, in any year and across years. We examine how such component sharing impacts product recalls, using US government recalls data and detailed data on automakers’ component sharing strategies in the US market. 2 - The Combined Effect of the Information Provision and the Randomized Reward on Patients’ Satisfaction Danqi Luo, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA, 94305, United States, Mohsen Bayati, Erica Plambeck This work looks at the problem of information provision on wait time in the emergency department. What kind of information schemes should be provided to the low-acuity patients, considering patients’ own satisfaction and the waiting externalities on other patients? The effect of varies delay announcement schemes on patients’ satisfaction level and pain level will be looked. 3 - The Impact of Primary Care Provider Availability on Patient Care Hessam Bavafa, Wisconsin School of Business, 4284C Grainger Hall, 975 University Avenue, Madison, WI, 53706, United States, Christian Terwiesch Emergency room (ER) overcrowding and overuse are significant problems in the United States, and prior studies have shown that a large portion of ER patients could have been treated by a primary care provider. If this is the case, why do patients spend hours waiting in the ER for a problem that their primary care physician could have addressed? One common answer is that primary care providers are too busy to provide timely appointments, making the ER a more attractive alternative for their patients. In this paper, we use a large dataset from the Veterans Health Administration to shed light on this claim. 4 - Structural Estimation of Intertemporal Externalities on ICU Admission Decisions Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University, Columbia Business School, 412 Uris Hall, New York, NY, 10027, United States, Carri Chan Patient care in capacity-constrained hospital units sometimes results in scenarios where the demanded quantity and level for care exceeds immediate availability, which may impact patient outcomes as well as economic outcomes. In this paper, we study the intertemporal externalities on Emergency Department patients’ Intensive Care Unit admission decisions. In particular, we study how admitting a patient in the current period affects the system status, and, in turn, its ability in admitting another patient with possibly more severe conditions in the next period. We take the structural estimation approach which allows us to estimate the intertemporal externalities from data. n SC15 North Bldg 127A Innovation in Services Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Pnina Feldman, Boston University, Boston, MA, 02215, United States 1 - Controlling Congestion when Consumers Choose Their Service Time Pnina Feldman, Boston University, 595 Commonwealth Ave, Boston, MA, 02215, United States, Ella Segev In many service environments consumers have a need for service and choose how long they want to use it. We propose alternative mechanisms, such as imposing a limit for the time spent in service and charging a price per unit of time, for controlling congestion in such settings. We investigate their optimality

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