Informs Annual Meeting Phoenix 2018

INFORMS Phoenix – 2018

SD15

2 - The Impact of Animal Welfare Regulation on Firms’ Product Offerings: Humane or Organic Product Wenli Xiao, University of San Diego, 5998 Alcala Park, Olin Hall 335, San Diego, CA, 92110, United States, Yen-Ting Lin, Yinping Mu We consider two competing supply chains with a supplier and a retailer. We examine the retailers’ choice between offering an organic product and a humane product, when an animal welfare regulation is introduced. By offering an organic product, the retailer improves both animals’ living conditions and the product’s nutritional benefits, while offering a humane product only improves animals’ living conditions. We provide the conditions under which the retailer would choose to offer the organic versus humane product. In addition, we show that subsidies offered by regulators to encourage the consumption of humane product in general hurts social welfare. 3 - Impact of Carbon Pricing on Supply Chain Energy Efficiency and Social Welfare This paper analyzes the trade-off between the intended benefit of carbon pricing in making emitters internalize the negative externality of emissions and its adverse effect on business competitiveness against external jurisdictions with a laxer policy. We study the policy decisions of a regulator who wishes to use carbon pricing to regulate emissions and encourage supply chain energy efficiency investments. Through a series of game theoretic models, we show that when it is important to maintain domestic business, social welfare could be reduced by the recommended practice of setting the carbon price equal to the negative externality from energy as well as by external jurisdiction competition. 4 - Fair Labor Practices in a Sustainable Supply Chain: Buyers and Suppliers Managing Risk Susan A. Slotnick, Cleveland State University, OSM Department, BU 542, Cleveland, OH, 44115, United States, Matthew J. Sobel This paper investigates the collaborative decision making of a buyer and supplier, when the buyer’s reputation in the market affects retail demand. Both buyer and supplier make decisions about managing the risk of an adverse event. The buyer maximizes profit by choosing among financial incentives to induce fair labor practices at the supplier, and the supplier manages its workforce and other resources to maximize its profit, considering the incentives and the risk. Economic Models in Supply Chain Management Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Supply Chain Sponsored Session Chair: Abhishek Roy, Temple University, Fox School of Business, Philadelphia, PA, United States Co-Chair: Guoming Lai, Austin, TX, 78712, United States 1 - Price Distributions, Store Sequencing, and Opportunistic Shopping Behavior Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran, Southern Methodist University, Cox School of Business, P.O. Box 750333, Dallas, TX, 75275, United States, John H. Semple This paper investigates the optimal sequence of store visits for items whose prices are unknown. We find that the shape of the price distribution plays an influential but sometimes non-intuitive role in lowering expected costs for the buyer. 2 - Supplier Audit Information Sharing and Responsible Sourcing Yunjie Wang, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China, Albert Y. Ha, Weixin Shang We develop a game-theoretic model to study the incentive for competing manufacturers to share supplier audit information in a market with some consumers who boycott a manufacturer if supplier responsibility violations occur. Based on the audit information, each manufacturer either continues to source from an existing common supplier who has uncertain responsibility risk, or switches to a new supplier who has no responsibility risk but charges a higher price. We characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium audit information sharing decisions and sourcing strategies, and show how they depend on the model parameters. Jason Quang Nguyen, University of New South Wales, Kensington, Sydney, 2052, Australia, Karen L. Donohue, Mili Mehrotra n SD17 North Bldg 127C

n SD15 North Bldg 127A Joint Session MSOM/Practice Curated: Managing Customer in Service Systems: Emergency Department and Call Center Applications Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Service Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Laurens G. Debo, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, 03755, United States 1 - Modeling and Improving Emergency Department Operations Tava Olsen, University of Auckland, ISOM, Business School, University of Auckland, Auckland, 1142, New Zealand This talk presents a number of different streams of my research on modeling and improving ED operations. I consider issues of modeling patients leaving without being seen (with Bolandifar, DeHoratius, and Wiler), key drivers of ED performance (with Shaw, Parsons, and Walker), and issues in patient prioritization (with O’Sullivan, Walker, and Ziedins). 2 - Dynamic Resource Allocation in an Emergency Department: A Tandem Queueing Model with Time-varying Arrivals Ling Zhang, North Carolina State, Raleigh, NC, United States, Serhan Ziya, Sukriye Nilay Argon, Yunan Liu Motivated by daily operations in an emergency department of a hospital, we study a multi-server tandem queueing system with a time-varying arrival rate. We are particularly interested in the optimal allocation of resources (such as nurses, doctors, and beds) among patients at different stages of service within a given cycle (e.g., a day). We solve an optimal control problem with an objective of minimizing the overall operational costs (including holding and staffing costs). Asymptotic analysis and numerical experiments are conducted to provide useful insights. 3 - The Reference Effect of Delay Announcements: A Field Experiment Presenter Qiuping Yu, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 1309 E. Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN, 47405-1701, United States, Gad Allon, Achal Bassamboo We explore whether customers are loss averse in time and how delay information may impact such reference-dependent behavior via a field experiment at a call center. Customers are provided with delay announcements or no announcements in a quasi-randomized manner in our field experiment. We show that customers are loss averse regardless of the announcements. While delay announcements do not alter the nature that customers are loss averse, they do facilitate more granular learning of the offered waiting time and thus impact the reference point customers use. Through counterfactual studies, we demonstrate how customers’ loss aversion behavior impacts the value of providing delay information. 4 - Patients Waiting Experience in an Urban Emergency Department Sina Ansari, Northwestern University, McCormick School of Engineering, 2145 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208, United States, Laurens G. Debo, Seyed Iravani Excessive wait time is the most common reason patients become unsatisfied and leave the emergency department before being treated. In this study, we determine the impact of announcing patient’s waiting times on patients satisfaction. n SD16 North Bldg 127B Topics in Sustainable Operations Sponsored: Manufacturing & Service Oper Mgmt/Sustainable Operations Sponsored Session Chair: Ximin Huang, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, United States 1 - Network Architecture in Joint Liability Contracts Bahar Rezaei, UCLA Anderson School of Management, CA, United States, Sriram Dasu, Reza Ahmadi Joint liability contracts depend on the structure of the borrower network. We develop a model, in which connections between borrowers serve as monitoring tools, and examine the effect of various network structures on the performance of a jointly liable group. Our results show that a higher degree of connectivity has two counteracting effects on the group performance and consequently on the contract they are offered. Although, strong links between borrowers improve the group repayment insurance, it increases the repayment obligation of individual borrowers. We argue that for handling projects with average risk of failure, network structures with average connectedness are the best.

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