The Gazette 1964/67

passage, even although they disclose that they are doing so for a principal, even for a named principal, they incur a personal liability to the shipping company for the freight: Perishable Transport Company Limited v. N. Spyropoulos (London) Limited ((1964) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 379) (Salmon L.J., sitting as an additional judge of the Queen's Bench Division). Extract taken from the Law Times of Friday, August 6th, 1965. Road traffic—negligence—skid Between 10.30 p.m. and n p.m. on 2jth Novem ber, 1962, two cars were approaching each other, going in opposite directions, each on its proper side of a main road, which was some 25 feet wide. It was wet, but there was no other reason for the road to be slippery. When only a short distance separated them the defendant's car skidded across the road into the path of the car driven by the third party, and ended up on its wrong side facing in the opposite direction. The third party's car collided with the back of the defendant's car. The defendant gave no explanation of why the car skidded, but stated in evidence that the car had skidded across the road on an occasion two years earlier, for which also he was unable to give a reason. The third party gave no acceptable explanation of the collision. HELD—The defendant had failed to prove that the skid happened without his fault and an unex plained and violent skid was itself evidence of negligence ; in the circumstances the defendant had not satisfied the court that the third party had contributed to the collision by negligent driving. (Richley v. Faull (Richley, Third Party) (1965) 3 All E.R. 109.) Evidence — duty ofprosecution R. was attacked at n p.m. in a passage leading from a street into a club in Soho. The prosecution's case depended on the evidence of three girls, hostesses at the club. According to their evidence the appellant and another man had jumped on R., kicking and hitting him. H., a doorman at the club, was called to the scene. R. and H. made statements to the police. At the committal proceedings R. initially gave evidence in accordance, substantially, with the girls' evidence. He said that it was the appellant who kicked him. The committal pro ceedings were adjourned before they were concluded. In the interval R. made a declaration to a solicitor that his statement and evidence had been untrue and that the appellant had not participated in the attack. On the day before the adjourned hearing of the committal proceedings H. similarly made a declara tion to a solicitor that the appellant had not attacked

indemnity and rendered him liable on the counter claim. (Liverpool Corporation v. T. & H. R. Roberts (A Firm) and Another, Garthwaite, Third Party (1965) i W.L.R. 938.) Trade Dispute At a factory, some 40 pickets, acting under orders of the appellant, who was the chairman of the strike committee, began to move in a continuous circle outside the main entrance to the premises. This action took place on land forming part of the high way and across the route in and out of the premises. Although the intended procedure was to open the circle for vehicles seeking access to the factory, the practical effect would be to bring approaching vehicles temporarily to a halt, and to cause foot passengers either to thread their way through the circle or to find a way round it. The strike was well conducted and there was never any risk of violence either to vehicles or human beings. A police constable on duty outside the premises informed the appellant that in his view the circling constituted an obstruction and an intimidation, and asked him to stop it. He refused to do so and was arrested and subsequently convicted of wilfully obstructing the constable in the execution of his duty. HELD (inter alia) that the power of the police to interfere with picketing in the course of a trade dispute was not restricted to cases where a breach of peace was anticipated. Dictum of Lord Parker, C. J. in Piddington v. Bates ((1960) 3 All E.R. 660, 663) applied. Furthermore the circling was not justified by section 2 (i) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, as the number of pickets was far in excess of that required for the purposes of that enactment (viz. peacefully obtaining or communicating information or peacefully persuading people to abstain from working) and the circling hindered, rather than facilitated, the obtaining or communicating of information and its power of persuasion was nil. (Tynan v. Chief Constable of Liverpool (The Lan> Times, August 6th, 1965, Vol. 236, p. 444).) Agency In cases in which the principal not only puts an agent in possession of the goods and indicia of title but also expressly authorises him to sell as principal, the question whether the agent sold in the ordinary course of business is relevant only in so far as it throws light on the bona fides of the buyer : Lloyds and Scottish Finance Limited v. Williamson ((1965) i All E.R. 641) (C.A.—Harman, Danckwerts and Salmon L.JJ.) Air agents are in the same position as shipping, agents. If they arrange for the shipment or air