The Gazette 1964/67

terest on the amount of a judgment should com mence to run from the date the order was per fected. There is, however, a difference between the 1905 and 1962 Rules. The former contained a provision (Order 41, Rule 2) that entry of the judgment should be dated as of the date when the judgment was pronounced and the judgment was to take effect trom that date. This particular rule does not appear to have been repeated in the 1962 Rules. Tne matter is of importance when judgment is given for a large amount where delay may postpone the date from which interest is to run. The remedy, however, appears to lie in the provisions of Order 42, Rule 15 of the 1962 Rules which concluded with the words 'unless the judg ment otherwise directs'. It would therefore appear to be advisable to instruct counsel to ask for a special order directing interest to run from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment and thus restore the position to what it was under the 1905 rules. Normally there should be no delay between the date of perfection of the judgment and the date of entry save in cases where the procedure is to have in the first instance a Registrar's Certificate which is then followed by an entry of judgment based upon it. In such cases it is a matter for the solicitor as to how soon he wishes to lodge the necessary papers for the purpose of having judg ment entered. Very often in cases such as where there is a pending appeal he may not wish to enter judgment until the outcome is determined. In the case of Chancery judgments and orders and on some Common Law orders there may be delay as to perfection of the order in difficult and complicated cases but there will never be any delay between the date of perfection when ulti mately arrived at and the date of entry, that is to say filing as per Order 41, Rule 6. This matter has been referred to the Society's representatives on the appropriate rule making committee for consideration by the committee." MEATH SOLICITORS ASSOCIATION At the Annual Meeting of the above Association held on 28th October, the following officers were elected: Donal Kearney, Oldcastle, President; Thomas Noonan, Kells, Hon. Secretary and Treasurer; Patrick Noonan, Athboy, Provincial Delegate. Committee: Nathaniel Lacy, Stephen Keaveny, Frank Reilly, Frank Thornton, Alan Donnclly and Michael Smyth. 55

Court. the registration of business matters and does not con tain any reference to costs. We apologise to mem bers for any inconvenience caused by our error. In fact this instrument deals with BANKING BUSINESS In the August/September 1965 the Gazette a report of the case United Dominions Trust Ltd v. Kirkwood extracted from the Law Times 23rd July, 1965, was published. A member- has written and suggested that a wrong impression of the effect of the judgment may have been given in the note published in the Gazette. The member states that it was a defence submission that the matters in question (i.e. the taking of money on current account, the payment of chccpcs drawn on oneself and the collection of cheques for customers were matters essential to the legal concept of banking) were essential to the carrying out of the banking business. The Judge adopted that for the limited purpose of the case before him. It seems a fair inference that he only did so to enable him to make the point that if they were definite requirements to a banking business they had been fully satisfied by the plain tiffs in the case. In an earlier part of his judgment he reviewed various authorities and deduced from them that it had not been clearly established that the re quirements in question were essential. The Judge expressly declined to define a banking business or to say that it was not possible to carry on a banking business without at least taking money on current account, paying cheques drawn on oneself or collecting cheques for customers. INTEREST ON JUDGMENT The following information appeared under the above heading in the April 1965 issue of the Gazette. The matter is of importance and is republished lest overlooked on the previous oc casion : "Order 41, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Superior Court, 1962, provides that every judgment or order when filed shall be deemed to be duly entered and the date of such filing deemed to be the date of entry. Under the 1905 Rules provision was made that interest should run from the time the judgment was entered or the order was made. A similar provision is to be found in the 1962 Rules. The 1905 Rules did not provide that in­ issue of