The Gazette 1964/67

interest of 4 per cent on the purchase money in Court sales or proceedings in a specific perfor mance. This is a decision of Mr. Justice Kenny in Law and Anor. v. Robert Roberts and Co. (No. 2) I.R. 1964, p. 306. Estate Agent's Authority "The defendants by letter, offered leasehold premises for sale through estate agents, H. Ltd. O'H. (an assistant employed by H. Ltd.) showed the premises to the plaintiff G., and his solicitor L. A copy of the lease was furnished to L., and L. was informed that the vendors would accept £5,000 for the premises. L., from previous ex perience, knew that the lessor held a good title. L., informed O'H. that he had instructions to offer £4,500 but would go to £4,750 and auction eers fees of 2£ per cent. O'H. telephoned C.G. the defendant's managing director who instructed O'H. to accept £4,750 and fees. O'H. then tele phoned L. and told him that the defendants would accept the figure. He subsequently tele phoned C.G. and told him that L. had agreed to give that figure and that he O'H. would write to both parties and confirm the offer. C.G. then told O'H. he would have to consult his other directors. Later the same day C.G. telephoned O'H. and told him that his directors had agreed to the sale. On 7th November, 1960 a director of H. Ltd., wrote to L. to confirm the offer and added : 'We have asked Messrs R to have the contract for warded to you immediately". On the same day he wrote a corresponding letter to C.G. and added : "Would you please be good enough to instruct your solicitors to forward a contract direct to Mr. L." C.G. on the same day wrote to the defendant's solicitors saying : "We have today sold the above premises ..." On 9th November, C.G. wrote O'H. to express regret that his direc tors have to call the sale off. In an action for specific performance it was held by Kenny, J. and affirmed by the Supreme Court (O'Dalaigh, C.J., Lavery, and Haugh, J. J.) that (1) O'H had been authorised by the defen dants to accept an offer of £4,750 and auction eer's fees; (2) the reference to a contract letter of 7th November, 1965 was not intended to create a term or condition of the agreement between the parties; (3) the correspondence between the par ties constituted a sufficient note or memorandum of agreement under the Statute of Frauds. Per Kenny, J. : The cases seem to establish the following propositions— 57

Parker, G. J., said that the appeal was centred round mitigating factors which could have per suaded the committee, had they heard them in full, to impose a lesser penalty. The appellant had been in practice on his own account, alone with one clerk and one secretary. He had, on the evidence before the court, always borne a very high reputation in his profession. The court was loth to interfere, in a case of professional mis conduct, with the penalty of the Disciplinary Committee. His Lordship thought that, on analy sis, that something had gone wrong here. Was the extreme penalty necessary in the case of a man of nearly seventy-four, unable one way or another to conduct his office in a businesslike way, but throughout a credit to his profession? Was it necessary, for the honour of the profession, to safeguard the public and to act as a deterrent, that he should end his life struck off the roll? Bearing that in mind, it seemed that the sentence was not warranted; the honour of the profession would be preserved, the public safeguarded and it would be a sufficient deterrent to others if this man, of no dishonesty, was suspended, bearing in mind that he had already once been suspended for a period of three years. If, at the end of three years, he was still minded to practise, it was open to the Law Society to grant a conditional licence on terms, maybe that he should not practise on his own account, but that was a matter for the Law Society. Ashworth and Widgery, J. J., agreed. Appeal allowed. Suspension for three years substituted accordingly, (re a solicitor—Solicitors' Journal (Vol. 109), p. 853. Untaxcd Bill of Costs Including Sum for Taxation WH had acted as solicitor to JH prior to the latter's death in 1959. Some costs were due to the solicitor by JH at his death and the solicitor pre sented a bill of costs for these items to the de ceased's personal representative. The bill included charges for taxing the bill. The personal represen tative paid the bill in March, 1961, and in De cember, 1961, petitioned the High Court for an order that the bill be referred for taxation. Held by Kenny, J., that the payment by a client of his solicitor's bill of costs which includes charges for taxation of the bill is a "special circumstance" which requires the Court to refer the bill for taxation (in re : Horan, I.R. 1964, p. 263). "Court Rate" of Interest There is no statutory provision or rule of Court which compels the Court to adopt the rate of