The Gazette 1964/67

tion of one month from his death. The Crown claimed estate duty on the policies or their pro ceeds under Section 2(1) (d) of the Finance Act, 1894. It was common ground that the policies were "interests provided" by the deceased within section 2 (1) (d). The Grown would be entitled to some duty if a beneficial interest in the policies of any measurable value arose either on K's. death or at the expiry of one month from his death in view of Section 22 (1) (1) of the Finance Act, 1894. Held : No estate duty became payable on the death of Mrs. K. in respect of the policy moneys because : (1) Under the trust declared by Section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, Mrs. K. took a vested interest in the policies liable to be divested on her death before the expiry of one month from K's. death, and this vested interest would entitle her to receive any income arising from the policies before they vested indefeasibly, with the consequence that her beneficial interest was not changed in any way by K's. death. (2) Even if the mere change from defeasibility to indefeasibility rendered applicable Section 2 (1) (d) of the Finance Act, 1894, the difference in value between Mrs. K's. interest immediately before the expiration of one month from K's. death and its value immediately thereafter (when it became indefeasible) was admittedly nil. (In re. Kilpatrick's Policies Trusts. Kilpatrick and Another v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Law Times, July 2, 1965 [Vol. 236] p. 375). Receiving Stolen Property The appellant was charged with others with conspiring to steal bricks, and also with receiving (contrary to Section 33 (1) of the Larceny Act 1916), stolen property, viz. two separate sums of £7, the proceeds of the sale of two loads of the bricks stolen pursuant to the conspiracy. The prosecution case rested substantially on voluntary statements made by the appellant admitting the receipt of the money; but there was no evidence that he had either seen or been near the two stolen loads or was aware that these particular bricks had been stolen before the theft was com pleted. On appeal on the ground that the appel lant, a party to the conspiracy to steal, could not also be convicted of receiving the two sums of £7 being property into which the stolen bricks were converted within the definition of "property" in Section 46 (1) of the Larceny Act 1916. Held : There was no evidence from which an inference that the appellant was constructively present at one or other or both of the thefts 58

"(1) When a contract for a sale is made between a purchaser and an estate agent retained by the owner, the onus for proving that the estate agent had authority to make a con tract is on the purchaser. (2) An estate agent as such has no implied authority to conclude a contract for sale. (3) An owner who puts his property on the books of an estate agent and authorises him to find a purchaser and to negotiate a sale does not thereby authorise him to complete a contract. (4) An owner who puts his property on the books of an estate agent and informs him of the lowest price he will accept does not thereby authorise him to conclude a con tract. (5) An estate agent who is instructed to sell at a defined price has authority to conclude a contract for sale, at that defined price if the contract is an open contract. (6) The estate agent may be expressly authorised to accept on behalf of the owner an offer made to the agent and, in that event, has authority to conclude a contract. (7) If an offer is made to an estate agent and if he communicates it to the owner and is authorised to accept it or if the owner states that he will accept it the agent has authority to make an open contract with the purchaser." (Law and Another v. Robert Roberts & Go. [Ireland] Limited [1965] I.R., p. 292). Estate Duty—Passing of Property On various dates between February 28th and April 28th 1952 K. affected 14 single premium policies on his life, each under section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 for the bene fit of Mrs. K. if she should survive him for more than one month. If she should not so survive him, the policies were to be for the benefit of the two sons of K. in equal shares. The trusts thus created were trusts of the policies, not merely of the moneys to arise from them. The provisions of the trusts showed that the trustees were under no obligation to retain the policies in specie; and it was in K's. contemplation that the policies might be sold or surrendered or money raised on them for the purpose of investment and that the trust fund might come to consist of or include income producing securities. K. died in October 1961. All the policies were subsisting at his death and an aggregate sum of £66,638-19-2 became pay able thereunder. Mrs. K. was living at the expira­