The Gazette 1964/67

the court had inherent jurisdiction to make such order rather than on any of the provisions of the Army Act, 1955. The court held that it had such jurisdiction, and ordered accordingly. Held, (i) that in criminal proceedings evidence which has been improperly obtained is not there by rendered inadmissible; Kuruma v The Queen, (1955) A.C. 195 applied ; (ii) that the court has nevertheless a discre tionary jurisdiction to reject evidence which, though admissible, would operate unfairly against the accused; and this discretion is not spent at the time when the relevant evidence has been admitted ; (iii) that in the present case the court-martial which tried the appellant was entitled in its dis cretion to admit the evidence of the police officers, and in the circumstances it had been right in doing so. (Regina v Murphy (1965) N.I. 138). The General Council of Provincial Solicitors has invited the Society of Young Solicitors to run a Joint Seminar Week-end. At discussions between the representatives of the two bodies, it was decided to hold this seminar on Saturday and Sunday, the 26th and 27th March, 1966, in the Midlands. By the kind permission, with the assistance, of the Midland Bar Association, the week-end will be held in the Greville Arms Hotel, Mullingar. The subjects will include the Succession Act, 1965, the Finance Act, 1965, Companies and Finance Legislation, Registristration of Title and the Land Act, 1965. Lecturers will be announced at a later date, and full details of the week-end will be given at the same time. All applications for bookings should be sent to Mr. T. Shaw, Solicitor of c/o J. A. Sahw & Co., Solicitors, Mullingar, Co. Westmeath. Enquiries regarding the week-end can be made to any of the following :— Patrick Noonan, Hon. Treasurer, General Council of Provincial Solicitors, Athboy, Co. Westmeath. T. Shaw, Hon Secretary, Midland Bar Associ ation, Mullingar, Co. Westmeath. Norman T. J. Spendlove, Hon. Treasurer, Society of Young Solicitors, 2 Clare St., Dublin 2. 80 JOINT SEMINAR WEEK-END General Council of Provincial Solicitors and Society of Young Solicitors

Courts dealing with third party procedure are not limited in their application to a party which is a third party in the numerical sense but give the court jurisdiction to grant to a third party leave to join a fourth party, and, where appro priate, to direct that the defendant shall pay to the third party the costs for which the third party has become liable to the fourth party. In an action for damages for negligence and breach of contract, brought by a customer against a retailer in respect of coal supplied by the re tailer which was alleged to have been defective and dangerous, the retailer joined as third party the firm from whom he had obtained the coal, and the third party in turn joined as fourth party the National Coal Board. Before the hearing of the action, the defendant agreed to pay a sum for damages to the plaintiff, together with his costs. The defendant did not pursue his claim against the third party and accepted liability for the third party's costs. The third party claimed in addition to his own costs the costs for which he had become liable to the fourth party. Held that the court had jurisdiction under Rules of the Court, to order that the defendant should pay to the third party the costs of the fourth party; but that in the circumstances of the case no such order should be made. (Kelly v McCurdy (1965) N.I. p. 124). The appellant, a soldier serving in the Army, was charged before a district court-martial with the offence of disclosing information useful to an enemy. The substance of the case against him was contained in the evidence of police officers who had posed as members of a subversive or ganisation with which the authorities suspected the appellant to have sympathies, and had elic ited the information the subject of the charge by asking the appellant questions concerning the security of his barracks. The appellant was con victed, but appealed to the Courts-Martial Ap peal Court against his conviction, on the ground that the Court-Martial which heard the case ought in its discretion to have rejected the evidence of the police officers because of the manner in which it was obtained. At the opening of the hearing of the appeal the Crown, on security grounds, sought an order that the proceedings be heard in camera, the application being bases on the submission that ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE —AGENT PROVOCATEUR