The Gazette 1964/67

instalments, and the solus agreement operated for twenty-one years. The tie for so long a period was unreasonable and void, and the mortgagor should be allowed to redeem although that period had not expired. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Sourport) Ltd. (1966) All E.R. 725. Infant—Rights of Putative Father—Religious Education The father, a married man with two children by his first wife who had divorced him, had an affair with the mother as a result of which the father's second wife instituted proceedings and obtained a decree nisi. The father and mother decided to marry, but after the mother had be come pregnant differences arose and the mother informed the father that she would not marry him. The father was subsequently reconciled with his second wife and the decree nisi was rescinded. When the child was born to the mother, she placed it with an adoption society for adoption by a Roman Catholic family, and when the child was a few weeks old it was sent to the adopters, a childless couple. The father was at all times anxious to bring up the child, and his wife, who was deeply in love with the father, was also very anxious to bring up his child. The father applied for custody and although he and his wife were not Roman Catholics, they were prepared to give an undertaking to bring up the child in that faith. The adopters applied for an adoption order. At the date of the hearing the child was eighteen months old, the father and his wife were forty- ^even, and the adopters were thirty-seevn. The Coury of Appeal held that custody should be granted to the father. Re C. (M.A.) (An Infant) (1966) 1 All E.R. 838, 849. In the Matter of the Solicitors' Acts 1954 and 1960 Members please note that the Society have in their possession deeds and documents formerly held by Mr. Richard J. Elgee of George Street, Wexford. Members acting for clients of the former clients by communicating with the Secretary of solicitor may obtain documents on behalf of the Society. Struck by Lighting The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dismissed the appeal brought from the judgment of the High Court of Australia dated November 22, 1963, which allowed the respondents' appeal and set aside the Order and judgment of the 25

Order as the Minister was acting judically or quasi-judically and should have notified the school of the charges against it. The Minister's broad cast (which was in evidence) shows that the Ministerial Order rested largely on ground (b), of which the school had not notice. Maradana Mosque v. Badi-ud-Din Mahniud (1966) 1 All E.R. 545. Conflict of Laws The plaintiffs brought an action in England on a judgment for payment of money obtained against the defendant in the State of New York. The defendant did not reside in England and the writ was issued and served upon him whilst he was staying in a London hotel for a few days for reasons not connected with the litigation. Lyell J. held that such service gave the English Court jurisdiction to hear the action. Colt Industries Inc. v. Sarlie (1966) 1 All E 673. Negligence—Collision at Road Junction The Court of Appeal held that although there is no rule as to the priority of traffic at a difficult road junction, "it is a well-recognised and con ventional practice, rather than a rule, that where vehicles are approaching ... in risk of collision or where there is doubt as to the priority, the vehicle which has the other on its right-hand side is the vehicle to give way." The deceased motor cyclist having failed to do so, his widow's action against the driver, of the lorry which knocked him down failed, the deceased having ridden straight in front of the lorry the driver of which had given a proper signal and was using due care. Maclntyre v. Coles (1966) 1 All E.R. 723. Restraint of Trade The Court of Appeal in a recent case followed the decision of Petrofina (Great Britain) Ltd. v. Martin (quoted in an earlier issue of the GAZETTE). He considered that some restraint may be reason ably in order to protect petrol company's con tinuity of outlet in an area. But (1) as to the garage on which there was no mortgage to the petrol company, the restraint for four years and five months, having reagard to all its terms, was void as being in unreasonable restraint of trade. (2) As regards the garage on which the solus agreement was linked to a loan agreement and a mortgage, the doctrine of restraint of trade applied to covenants in a mortgage as well as to agreements merely for the sale of goods. In the case under consideration the mortgagor was pro hibited from redeeming except by the specified