The Gazette 1964/67

in having regard only to the importance of the case from the point of view of the defendant. He also erred in principle by having regard to the fact that the substantial point of law had already been argued in the District Court. The defendant's bill of costs was accordingly remitted to the taxing master for reconsideration. (The Attorney General v. Simpson, J.L.T.R. The plaintiff, a graduate with a third class honours degree in physics, brought an action against his university college for an order of mandamus for the grant to him of a first-class degree, claiming damages for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation of his examination results, and professional negli gence in lacking the necessary skill, or failing to exercise sufficient care and attention to his needs. The action failed, and the defendants applied, under the Supreme Court Costs Rules 1959, r. 28 ($), for an order that costs be taxed on the common fund basis, contending that, although there was little authority, such an order was justified in this case in view of the plaintiff's scandalous and unwarranted allegations and conduct. Marshall, J., said that, assuming the action to have been put forward by a person who appreciated fully what was happening, the defendants' submission would be a strong one. Since, however, the matter had become an obsession with the plaintiff, and the making of an order was discretionary, an order for only usual costs would be made, and the application for an order of taxation on the common fund basis would not be granted. Application refused. (Sammy v. Birkbeck College, Solicitors' Journal, Friday, November f}th, 1964 (Vol. 108, p. 897). Trusts—inspection of documents—rights of beneficiaries In re Londonderry's Settlement: Peat v. Walsh, Harman L.J. (Danckwerts and Salmon L.JJ. deliver ing concurring judgments), said that the court had to resolve the apparent conflict between two prin ciples ; the first, that trustees exercising a discretion were not bound to disclose to beneficiaries the reasons actuating them in coming to a decision and the second, that documents coming into existence and in the possession of trustees for trust purposes were trust documents and so open to inspection by beneficiaries as a proprietary right. Though it was irregular that the trustees, protected as they were (in this case) by an order of the court, should have brought this appeal, thereby putting on the court the difficult task of trying to define, as it were in the air and without any concrete instances to help them, the obligations of trustees, the court had decided to 64 Vol. XCVIII, p. 182.) Costs—common fund basis

be safe in such a case is to furnish separate bills because the provisions of the various rules differ. In the case of Land Registry business the Land Registration (Solicitors' Costs) Rules 1962 provide that the date of expiration of the time for requiring a detailed bill is one month after payment or twelve months after delivery of the Bill whichever date shall be the later (not earlier as provided by S.R.G.O. 1960). Neither the Solicitors' Remuneration General Orders nor the Land Registration Solicitors Costs Rules have any application to that portion of a bill of costs in an administration matter which relates to the extraction of the grant of probate or adminis tration. The costs for this work are regulated by the Rules of the Superior Courts 1962 as amended and appendix W. Costs—counsel's fees The defendant was charged with criminal offences in connection with a play produced by the defendant. At the taking of depositions in the District Court certain police witnesses claimed privilege for reports made by them and instructions given to them. This claim was challenged on behalf of the defendant and the district justice at the request ofthe attorneygeneral who stated a case for the High Court. The High Court found in favour of the attorney general and ruled that the documents were privileged. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court and the court held that the district justice had no jurisdiction to grant the case stated. The order of the High Court was accordingly reversed and costs were awarded to the defendant. The amounts claimed in the defendant's bill of costs for senior counsel's fee was £105 on the brief and £42 refresher and the fees of junior counsel were the appropriate amounts. The taxing master allowed reduced fees of £42 to senior counsel on the brief and -£2.6 53. od. refresher with the appropriate fees to junior counsel. He stated that in following this course that he had had regard to the importance of the case to the defendant and to the fact that the substantive point of law argued in the High Court and Supreme Court had been argued in the District Court already and that counsel's work had been accordingly reduced. HELD (O'Daly and McLoughlin JJ., Maguire C.J. dissenting) reversing Murnaghan J. 1. The case must be looked at from the point of view of both parties in order to correctly assess its magnitude. 2. If the case is observed from the point of view of one party only a distorted and incorrect picture may be presented. The taxingmasterwas thereforewrong in principle, CASES OF THE MONTH