The Gazette 1964/67

inspector's unwillingness to go into the alternative proposals made by the objectors. Both those points had been taken before the inspectors and reported to the Minister. The question before the Court arose on discovery as to what documents the Minister should disclose to the plaintiffs which were relevant to the action. When the Minister made a list of the relevant documents he said that he objected to produce in particular three kinds on the grounds set out in his affidavit that it would be injurious to the public interest to produce them, because " each such docu ment belongs to a class which it is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold from production ". The documents were :—(i) departmental briefs for the guidance of inspectors appointed by the Minister to hold local inquiries under section 23 ; (2) a departmental brief for the guidance of the inspectors appointed in relation to the Black Country ; and (3) correspondence between the Ministry officials and the inspectors in relation to the Black Country inquiry. Denning M. R. Referred to his judgment in the Grosvenor Hotel case and stated that he stood by all that he had said in that case and that it was quite apparent that the Government Department attached an overwhelming importance to imposing secrecy for their own documents. His Lordship could not accept that contention. In the case where a Minister claimed privilege for a class of documents, he must justify his objection with reasons. He should describe the nature of the class and the reason why the document should not be disclosed, so that the Court itself could see whether the claim was well taken or not. In this case the affidavit in common form was to his Lordship's mind insufficient in itself to carry the protection which the Minister claimed. If a case should come before the Court where the interests of justice did require it and the claim for privilege was not well taken, the Court would not hesitate to order disclosure. This, how ever, was not such a case. Harman L. J. concurring, said that the right of the Crown to withhold docu ments from disclosure was a relic from days not far distant when the Crown never had to make any discovery at all; and not unnaturally they now fought trench by trench in seeking to preserve the system of immunity which they had for so long enjoyed. Salmon, L. J. in concurring said that the Court had been told, and, of course, accepted, that all Ministers always " anxiously considered" the documents when any question of a claim for privilege arose. However, in the present case His Lordship agreed that in view of the nature of the inquiry under the Act of 1958 the Court should not order these documents to be disclosed.

Wednesbury Borough Council & Others v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government. (1965) i All. R. 186.) Taxation of costs The Plaintiff was ordered to pay costs on a party and party basis. The action raised difficult points of law, and the sum at stake was £16,000. Both sides engaged leading counsel. The taxing master allowed the corporation's fees for leading counsel in the Chancery Division and the Court of Appeal. The plaintiff's fees for leading counsel were somewhat less. On taxation in the House of Lords the corpor ation was allowed less fees for leading counsel. The plaintiff lodged objections to the amounts allowed by the taxing master for fees paid by the corporation in respect of the proceedings in the Chancery Division and the Court of Appeal. The master rejected the objections. The plaintiff applied under the Supreme Court Costs Rules, 1959, r. 35, for a review of the taxing master's decision. Pennycuick, J., said that in a taxation of costs on a party and party basis under r. 28 (2) of the Supreme Court Costs Rules, 1959, there was no precise standard of measurements of the necessary and proper sum to be allowed for counsel's fees which was applicable to all cases. The taxing master must determine what he considered to be the proper figure, employing his knowledge and experience, and on a review the judge must apply his own knowledge and experience. However, in the present case, the measure applicable was the estimated fee of a hypothetical counsel who was capable of conducting the case effectively but who was unable or unwilling to insist on the particularly high fee sometimes demanded by counsel of pre-eminent reputation. In all the circumstances this case was one which could only have been effectively con ducted by leading counsel of high calibre, and the fee paid to the leading counsel was not excessive to the requirements of the particular action and should be allowed. In determining the correct figure the fact that opposing counsel was content to accept a lesser fee and the fact that on taxation in the House of Lords a lower figure was allowed were factors of weight but were not conclusive. It was, however, clear that the corporation could not throw upon the plaintiff any costs incurred for a purpose other than the defence of the particular action. Application dismissed. (Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd. v. Hendon Corporation (No. 2) (1964) 3 All R. 833.) Charging Orderfor untaxed costs. Set off. The wife obtained a divorce from the husband with an order for costs. While the suit was pending, 72