The Gazette 1964/67

and Russell L.JJ. late January). The Court held that the defendants were accountable for the whole of the profit they had made when they were acting as agents of a trust using information they had obtained from a trustee to make a profit. (Phipps v. Boardman & Ors. (1965) (All E.R. 849.) No tax advantage The English High Court dismissed an appeal by the Revenue against a decision of the Special Commissioners dischargingan assessmentof tax made under section 28 of the British Finance Act, 1960 The question at issue was whether the sale of certain shares by the taxpayers amounted to a transaction in securities giving rise to a tax advantage, which advantage the section was designed to cancel. Two sisters held the whole share capital of two companies Gleeson Developments Ltd. and M. J. Gleeson Ltd. which carried on business as property holding companies. Gleeson Developments had a balance on profit and loss account of £180,000 of which £130,000 was represented by cash at bank. In July 1961 the sisters sold all the shares in M. J. Gleeson Ltd. to Gleeson Developments Ltd. for full con sideration and received £121,000 in cash from the company. It was contended by the Revenue that this sum represented money available for distribution by way of dividend which would otherwise have been subject to tax in the hands of the shareholder and that a tax advantage arose which was caught by section 28. The taxpayers argued that the payment of cash by the company did not amount to a transfer of assets within the meaning of the section. The Court held that one could not look at a complete transfer by way of sale whereby a member trans ferred shares to a company in return for cash and compare it with a single receipt by the member from the company without consideration. The words "tax advantage" should be given a restricted meaning and clear words were required to justify treating a sale by a member to a company as a gratuitous disposition by the company so as to bring the receipt within the scope of the Act (Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Clery. Com missioners of Inland Revenue v. Perrens. (S.J. [Vol. 109] (1965), p. 357.) Solicitor's income tax allowances A Lancashire solicitor was accompanied by his wife and went to the United States and Canada to attend the American Bar Association and the Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference. It was a six-week trip and when not actually attending the conferences the solicitor visited several places with his wife, sightseeing and staying with solicitors

and examining their methods. In his evidence he stated that his purposes of attending the conferences was to maintain his status as a solicitor and to improve his reputation in the United Kingdom, to increase his clientele, and to have a holiday with his wife at the same time. He claimed that he had gained much valuable information on studying the methods of other solicitors and had improved his office equipment as a result and was contemplat ing further improvements. He sought to deduct his own expenses of attending the conferences in computing the profits and gains of the firm for tax purposes. The inspector of taxes disallowed the expenses on the ground that they were not wholly and exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of his profession. The solicitor appealed against the assessment to the general commissioners and the commissioners allowed the appeal and discharged the assessments. The Inland Revenue appealed, and Pennycuick, J., in his judgment stated that where a person had two distinct purposes in mind when incurring such expenditure and one was a purpose which was wholly distinct from the carrying on of trade or profession, then Section 137 (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1952 (a) prohibited that expense as a deduction for tax purposes. The solicitor's admission was to the effect that the expenses were incurred for a dual purpose; accordingly on that ground the Commissioners had reached a conclusion which was wrong in law. The Inland Revenue's contention that the expenses were too remote was a question of wide importance and it would be undesirable for him to express any unnecessary observations. Appeal allowed with costs. (Solicitors Journal, Friday, March 26, 1965. (Vol. 109) pp. 254, 255.) (Bowden (Inspector of Taxes) v. Order 41, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Superior Court, 1962, provides that every judgment or order when filed shall be deemed to be duly entered and the date of such filing deemed to be the date of entry. Under the 1905 Rules provision was made that interest should run from the time the judgment was entered or the order was made. A similar provision is to be found in the 1962 Rules. The 1905 Rules did not provide that interest on the amount of a judgment should commence to run from the date the order was perfected. There is, however, a difference between the 1905 and 1962 Rules. The former contained a provision (Order 41, Rule 2) that entry of the judgment should be dated as of the date when the judgment was pronounced and the judgment was to take effect from that date. This particular rule does not appear to have been RusseU & Russell.) Interest onjudgment