Concealment and Revelation

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Concealment and Reve lat ion

In another place, Bahá’u’lláh’s imperative construction in “Ponder and reflect [ Fikr va tadabbur nimúdih ], that haply all the hidden mysteries may be freed from the veils of nearness and remoteness” is translated as a third-person past tense: “It [the pen] pondered and thought about the river”—and the rest of the sentence is given the wrong tense to make it consistent with that mistake, obscuring the fact that Bahá’u’lláh is here urging Javád to grasp the monumental truth just imparted to him in the parable of the river. Elsewhere, Bahá’u’lláh’s statement: “Similarly, ponder upon the mysteries of divine decree [ qad. á ] and destiny [ qadar ]. Whatever hath appeared or will appear is like this river,” becomes translated as: “In the same way, consider the foreordained and predestined mysteries—what has appeared and shall appear,” thus losing the point that Bahá’u’lláh is speaking about the specific question of the mystery of qadar or destiny mentioned in the Four Valleys and other writings. However, translation errors that do not play a major role in Cole’s commentary on the tablet will not be pursued here. Miracles as Evidence According to Cole’s reading of the Book of the River, Bahá’u’lláh denies being a Prophet; instead, we are told, this tablet “gives us a humanist Baha’u’llah, who sternly denies being able to work any miracles, who defers humbly to the Mirrors of the Babi dispensation.” To further support this conclusion Cole adds: “Indeed, the argument seems to be made that just as plagues no longer break out in Iraq every 30 years as they had in past centuries . . . after the Bab’s death the age of miracles is over with. This is in turn an announcement of a profound secularization of sorts, isn’t it?” (“Commentary”). However, there is absolutely nothing in Bahá’u’lláh’s tablet indicating that he is unable to work miracles. Bahá’u’lláh begins by referring to specific rumors that had been circulating and says that they are not true: “Of the miracles mentioned, those which are ascribed to this humble one are fabrications contrived by impostors” ( Ánchih az z. uhúrát-i-mu‘jizát kih dhikr shud ánchih nisbat bih ín h. aqír ast kidhbun iftaráhu’l-mukdhibún ). It is obvious here that Bahá’u’lláh is in no way saying that he has not performed any miracle, nor is he saying that he is unable to work miracles. He is simply rejecting the rumor that he has performed the specific miracles Javád has asked about. But purely hypothetically, even if Bahá’u’lláh had denied performing any miracles, it does not follow that he was denying he was able to perform miracles. The equation of the two is invalid. But we are offered a stronger, although also invalid, inference. Cole argues that in the example of thirty-year cycles of plague, Bahá’u’lláh is rejecting the possibility that miracles will occur at all after the Báb. But that inference is unwarranted on three counts. First, the issue being discussed is not whether in the future miracles will or will not happen, but whether the accounts of miracles