Agency and Freedom in Neo-Functionalist Action

792 SOCIAL RESEARCH

instrumental rationality reduces eliminates the realm of freedom a this inconsistency in the neofun question of freedom, the fundame action is not the identity of o functionalism) and freedom, but and freedom. This implies that we definition of freedom from intern such a conclusion is based upon a so a transcendental, approach to th order to clarify the antinomy of f we should follow Durkheimian in theory. According to Kant, the e edge and morality fail to explain character of both objective know both human knowledge and m individual's experience of the consequences of practical action, th and the imperative nature of explained. Consequently, for Kan edge of the world and moral transcendental structure of mind which is not derived from the individual's experience or inclinations.41 However, as Durk- heim emphasized, Kantian theory failed to see (a) the historical variety of systems of knowledge and morality and (b) the similarity and commonality of the ideas and values of the members of the same society or cultural group.42 In Durkheim's theory, therefore, the necessity and universality of human norms and values are due to the fact that they are shared by the members of the society. In other words, the necessity of normative beliefs is derived from the cultural system and tradition of the society. In this theory, internaliza- tion of norms and values is precisely due to the fact that the

41 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Modern Library, 1958). 42 Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 152-297.

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