Agency and Freedom in Neo-Functionalist Action

Agency and Freedom / in Neofunctionalist / Action Theory: / A Critique / BY NADER SAIEDI

1 he recent resurgence of interest in Parsonian function theory in what is called neofunctionalism has created con dictory responses. For some theorists, neofunctionalism rep sents an ultimate and foundational discovery of the trans dental presuppositions of the problems of order and rationa in action theory. In contrast, for most conflict theo neofunctionalism is merely a restatement of the conserv and idealist political standpoint which cannot make any seri claim to theoretical novelty and complexity. An alterna strategy is to compare and contrast neofunctionalism w neo-Marxism and try to come up with a new and nondeter nistic synthesis. The author believes that neo-Marxism learn from neofunctionalist emphasis on the concept multidimensional determination of human actions. In this sense neofunctionalism can provide a further challenge against usually criticized the economistic and unidimensional interpre- tations of Marxism, and in various forms has emphasized th relative autonomy of cultural and ideological structures an processes from economic institutions. But the ghost o materialism in the last analysis has been so overwhelming i the neo-Marxist tradition that the concept of multidimension- ality has remained largely a negative and residual categor the reductionistic and economistic stances of orthodox Marxist and neo-Marxist theories. It is true that neo-Marxism has

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter 1988)

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From Lukács1 and Granisci2 to Althusser3 and Poulantzas4 the tension between historical materialism and economism has remained problematic and unresolved. The only major exception to this dominant reductionistic discourse of neo- Marxism is probably to be found in the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas.5 But just as neo-Marxism can learn from neofunctionalist theory of multidimensionality, similarly neofunctionalism can attain a higher level of theoretical self-consciousness and complexity by incorporating the notions of domination and ideology which are central to Marxist and neo-Marxist theories. This paper concentrates on neofunctionalist action theory and its account of the problems of agency and autonomy of human actors. It will be argued throughout the paper that neofunctionalism, and the functionalism of Parsons alike, reduce the issue of freedom and agency to the category of order and equate autonomy with normative commitment and internal persuasion. Such a theory suffers two fundamen- tal theoretical problems: First, it cannot explicate the reality and the role of domination and ideological manipulation in human actions. Second, it cannot fully recognize the actual freedom and active autonomy of individual actors. In other words, neofunctionalist theory is too deterministic and does not leave adequate space for individual freedom.

From Parsonian Functionalism to the Emergent Neofunctionalism

In the analysis of Parsonian action theory I concentrate on

1 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971). 2 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Granisci, ed. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1977). 3 Louis Althusser, Reading Capital (New York: Pantheon, 1971). 4 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB, 1975). 3 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

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Parsons's early work, The Structu I am departing from the pr writings of Parsons, which incl functional prerequisites and p system and the network of subsystems. This is a reflecti Structure of Social Action ove preference contrary to that o early work of Parsons is the firs voluntaristic theory of action, recent neofunctionalism. This masterpiece in sociological the analytical realism7 and Halévy's century British utilitarianis philosophical radicalism), Pars which analyzes the structure of the aggregation of the unit acts complexity. According to Par four analytical elements. In his By a theory of action is here m reference of which is to a con considered to be composed of the acts." In a unit act there are identifiable as minimum characteristics the following: (1) an end, (2) a situat analyzable in turn into (a) means and (b) conditions, and ( least one selective standard in terms of which the end is related to the situation.9 As Parsons points out, alternative social theories can be classified in terms of their concept of the unit act and the interrelationships among the elements of the unit act. In this way Parsons distinguishes two grand action theories in the history of modern social and political thought which he calls 6 Talco« Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Free Press, 1949). 7 Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1962). 8 Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism (London: Faber & Faber, 1928). 9 Parsons, Structure, p. 77.

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positivistic and idealistic persp theories are inadequate formulati they both overlook significant e theoretical models. More specifica significant logic of means-ends s cognitive. For idealist theory, how and commitment to ultimate ends and values constitute the only significant and empirically real criterion of selection. According to Parsons, however, both these contradictory theories inevitably deny the possibility of agency and freedom to the human actor. In the positivist framework the dominance of rationalistic adaptation implies the denial of the subjective and internal component of action and/or the reduction of ends to the level of conditions. On the contrary, idealist theory conceives of action as a process of "emanation," of "self- expression" of ideal or normative factors. In this case the spatiotemporal phenomena are perceived only as symbolic modes of expression or embodiments of meanings. Idealist theory denies the reality of the tension between the norma- tive and conditional factors and leaves no space for the "effort" of individual agent. As against both positivist and idealist theories, Parsons suggests a voluntaristic action theory according to which both rationalistic and normative factors determine action. Consequently ends are not reduced to the level of conditions, and the tension between the conditional and normative factors is recognized. Parsons maintains: While the voluntaristic type of theory involves a process of interaction between normative and conditional elements, at the idealistic pole the role of the conditional elements disappears, as correspondingly at the positivistic pole that of the normative disappears.10

Parsons's arrival at voluntaristic theory is primarily based

10 Ibid., p. 82.

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upon his critique of positivis Parsons, positivist action theo able dilemma. Positivism empha nation of human actions. Ratio choice of the most efficient means for the attainment of the end. Consequently positivist action theory cannot provide a positive account for the determination of ends themselves. The absence of an autonomous normative factor in the determina- tion of action limits the positivist framework to only two options. Either the ends are randomly distributed among the actors, or the ends are determined by the conditions of the situation. Utilitarianism follows the thesis of the randomness of ends, whereas theories emphasizing heredity and environ- ment reduce ends to the level of conditions. But, Parsons suggests, both these strategies are unacceptable. The utilitarian theory of random distribution of ends confronts the Hobbe- sian problem of order. In other words order is assumed by utilitarianism to be based upon coercion. Evidently, however, coercion cannot adequately explain the existence of order in society. On the other hand, the reduction of ends to the level of conditions removes any possibility of agency and freedom for the actors.11 It is partly due to the immanent contradictions of both positivism and idealism, Parsons claims, that a progressive movement toward a voluntaristic theory of action can be witnessed in modern political theory. Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber are representatives of this march toward voluntarism. According to voluntaristic theory, the normative selection of ends and means is not a negative or residual aspect of human actions. On the contrary, individual ends are primarily based upon a common normative culture and value system. Consequently ends are not randomly distributed, but instead are harmoniously defined by a common cultural consensus. Identity of the interests of

1 ' Ibid., pp. 47-89.

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individuals is, therefore, base framework. For Parsons voluntar autonomy of ends while it adequ order. Order becomes equivalent The insightful framework of t action theory is reinterpreted neofunctionalist writers includin his four-volume work, Theoretical searches for the presuppositional To borrow Kantian terminolog transcendental and universal con action. Rejecting positivist episte sizes the autonomy of presup empirical and observational state ander, the general logic of action t with more specific and particu political commitment, methodologi sitions, and model selection.12 On t the most general features and the s theory are located in two distinc of actions and order. Alexander claims that Parsons con- founded the problem of action with the problem of order. The question of action represents the problem of rationality, whic leads to two alternative forms of rationalistic and nonrationa- listic conceptions of action. It is clear that Alexander's rationalistic theory is the same as Parsonian positivist theory while his nonrationalism represents Parsons's normative action determination. However, Alexander further refines the con- cept of rationality and the rationalistic definition of action. In his words:

To presuppose that action is instrumentally rational is to assume that action is guided by ends of pure efficiency. In terms of the more differentiated terminology of goals and norms, it assumes

12 Jeffrey Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, vol. 1, Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 36-64.

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that goals are calculated to achiev in the most efficient manner external conditions.13

Similarly, the question of order represents the problem of the aggregation of actions/individuals, which can take the form of sociological nominalism or sociological realism. Influenced by the Parsonian theory of voluntarism, Alexander defends a multidimensional theory of action which is based upon the reciprocal interaction and interpénétration of the rational and nonrational orientations which can reconcile order with the agency and freedom of individual actors. Alexander's ultimate solution to the question of freedom is similar to the Parsonian solution: normative commitments guarantee freedom because they are internal orientations and not external impositions. Applying his theoretical logic to the history of classical sociological theory, Alexander analyzes the antinomies of rationalism and nonrationalism in Marxist and Durkheimian traditions,14 and arrives at a theoretical synthesis of Marx and Durkheim in Weberian thought.15 Weber's multidimensional theory of action and rationality is further developed in Parsons's voluntaristic theory of action, which represents a truly multidimensional action theory.16 Richard Munch, another advocate of neofunctionalism, has explicated the Kantian premises of Parsons's voluntaristic theory. Like Alexander, Munch insists upon the interpénétra- tion of rational and normative factors in Parsonian theory of action. According to Munch, Parsonian theory is ultimately a sociological Kantianism because it is in Kant's theory that the interpénétration of empirical and structural (transcendental) 13 Ibid., p. 72. '* Jeffrey Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, vol. 2, The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). '"Jettrey Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, vol. 3, The Classical Attempt at Theoretical Synthesis: Max Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 16 Jeffrey Alexander, Theoretical Logic in Sociology, vol. 4, The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

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factors constitutes the possibility aesthetic experience. Munch writes:

A correct understanding of Talcott P from the assumption of a fundam structure and method between the t critical philosophy .... The Parsoni problem of social order . . . lies ins interpénétration of distinct subsyste interpénétration is a derivative of philosophy.17 According to Kant, the man sense impressions can turn int objective knowledge through the tal forms of intuition and cate Similarly, the condition of the poss action is the interpénétration of t imperatives (law of duty) and th inclinations and the empirical co Kant rejected philosophical utilit Parsons rejected sociological utilita existence of a common normative s constraining space for the ratio action. Consequently, specific agree with the logic of efficiency of the legitimate possible altern their choice of both means and ends of the action.18

The Conservative Cast: The Reduction of Freedom to Order

The foregoing analysis made it clear that Parsons's explica- tion of multidimensional theory of action and rationality

17 Richard Munch, "Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action I," American Journal of Sociology 86 (1981): 709. 10 Ibid., pp. 709-739.

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constitutes a fundamental an sociological thought. Howeve Parsonian functionalism and recent neofunctionalism, I believe, lies more in the type of questions they have posed rather than the answers they have provided. Voluntaristic theory, in other words, is intended to be a critique of reductionistic, materialistic or rationalistic action theory. The theory, however, fails to demonstrate either the concept of multidimensionality or the notion of agency and freedom of the actors. Before attempting a substantive critique of neofunctionalistic action theory it may be appropriate to pose, briefly, a historical criticism. According to Parsons, eighteenth- century philosophy and social theory is characterized by an undifferentiated and inconsistent combination of positivist and idealist theories. However, due to increasing theoretical differentiation it is in the nineteenth century that pure positivist theories are articulated and contrasted with idealist theories. As Parsons says: In the eighteenth century the elements which go to make up this positivistic current were often and to a large extent synthesized with others so that it would scarcely be proper to call the system as a whole positivistic . . . with the course of the nineteenth century the two have become increasingly distinct, and that in the countries of western civilization the positivistic has, until lately, become increasing predominant.19 However, it seems to the author that this characterization of the chronological order of the theories of positivism and idealism is mistaken. On the contrary, any serious investigation of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment easily dem- onstrates the dominance of an extreme positivistic, rationalis- tic, and utilitarian action theory. One need only remember the most systematic expression of the French Enlightenment, Hol- bach's The System of Nature.20 However, the significant point in

19 Parsons, Structure, p. 61. 20 Paul-Henri T. Baron d'Holbach, The System of Nature (New York: Bergman, 1970).

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nineteenth-century social theory fact that after the romantic idealistic reaction to the rationalis- tic theory of the Enlightenment,21 subsequent systems of social theory have been characterized by different forms of combination and integration of the rationalistic and idealistic theories.22 With the exception of Jeremy Bentham23 one can hardly find a positivist like the eighteenth-century Enlighten- ment philosophers in nineteenth-century social theory. Al- though a historical critique may also pose questions about the novelty of Parsons's voluntaristic and multidimensional action general and transcendental presuppositional categories o action theory and for that reason does not imply any specific political standpoint. That is why Alexander finds the debat between conflict and consensus theorists with their correspond- ing politics outside the realm of a general action theory24 Thi implies that the analysis of power and domination considered to be a negative and residual issue in neofunction alism. However, neofunctionalism talks about instrumental and physical coercion in its theoretical framework. In fact, as noted, it is precisely the inadequacy of basing order upon coercion which leads voluntaristic theory to the affirmation o a collective and normative foundation of social order. One might ask why the analysis of physical domination belongs to the general level of action theory while the question of ideological domination is explicitly defined as lacking the generality of the categories of action theory. This is particu- larly surprising when we find the question of freedom and agency of actors the heart of both Parsonian voluntaristic theory, this paper does not aim at an historical analysis. Neofunctionalism in Alexander's sense deals with the 21 A representative work of romantic political theory is Friedrich von Schlegel, The Philosophy of History (London: Bohn, 1852). 22 Examples of the syntheses are Marxism, positivism, liberalism, and nihilism. 23 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Methuen, 1982). 24 Alexander, Positivism, pp. 50-55.

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theory and Alexander's neofun is intended to rescue the individual's freedom from the deterministic cast of both idealist and positivist persuasio The problem with this approach, however, is that it does extend the analysis of power to the level of normati commitment. In a purely arbitrary manner, neofunctionalis excludes the category of ideological and normative dominatio from its analytical framework. It is through negation an silence rather than any positive indication that neofunctional ism, like Parsonian functionalism, joins the conservati standpoint. An explicit analysis of the problem of freedom in Alexander's theoretical logic can be found in his defense of Parsonian voluntarism in his fourth volume. According to Alexander, there are two attempted solutions to the problem of freedom in Parsonian theory. The first solution founds individual freedom upon the unity of subject and object. The fact that normative culture is created by individuals implies both freedom of individuals and the necessity of social order. According to Alexander, this is a fundamentally false solution: The passage in which Parsons first sought to resolve this early ambiguity and move toward a more consistently collectivist stance reveals the difficulty of his early position. While it is his insight into the importance of supra-individual order that leads him to discard the individualistic positions, the reasons he offers for the collective status of normative elements indicate that he may, in fact, consider them external, or conditional, to the acting individual.25 What is here considered by Alexander as an external and conditional solution to the problem of freedom in Parsons is the fact that an individual is born within an already existing and objective normative order (social fact as exterior). This means that the collective normative order can be ideally considered as an element of condition. But Parsons's theory is

25 Alexander, Antinomies, p. 36.

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in fact an attempt to rescue the category of condition. In resolving upon the unity of subject and ob According to Parsons, although e the normative system is not exter Parsons writes: ... for what are, to one actor, non-normative means and conditions, are explicable in part, at least, only in terms of the action of others in the system.26 But for Alexander, this is a fallacious argument. He argues that all collective elements, both material and ideal ones, at some point originated from the activities of individual human beings. The second attempt of the resolution of the problems of freedom in Parsons is fully approved by Alexander. This is the ultimate solution of voluntarism in Alexander's words: Although any ideal element may be external to the individual, in the sense that it is part of the extra individual environment, it is not external in the concrete sense. For the concrete empirical actor, the location of determinate ideal elements is within: they are internal to action. This is the reason norms can affect action in a non-instrumental, non-coercive manner.27 At this point, the problem of freedom is solved for neofunctionalism. Normative elements are internal, they are internalized by the individual actor so that the individual performs his roles willingly and not through external coercion. Freedom is defined as internal commitment and lack of external coercion. But this is by no means a satisfactory solution to the problem of agency and freedom. The fact that order is partly based upon the internal commitments and normative beliefs of the actor does not preclude the existence of domination, power, and manipulation. The so-called debate between consensus

26 Parsons. Structure, d. 50. - m 27 Alexander, Modern Reconstruction, p. 37.

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and conflict models is based normative persuasion with au freedom. For conflict theory repression and coercion. For c order cannot be entirely expl to the affirmation of freedom and the denial of domination as the basis of order. But both perspectives miss the important fact that the highest form of domination, influence, and power can be found in the control and manipulation of ideology, cultural beliefs, and educational institutions.28 A genuine multidimensional theory of action which asserts the interpén- étration of instrumental action and symbolic interactions must analyze the significance of strategic action in cultural forma- tions. In other words, the reality of dominated normative commitment is a logical possibility of the interpénétration of instrumental logic of domination and the normative system of communication. In this way a general theory of social action should deal with the bearings of distorted communication upon the question of agency, freedom, and voluntarism.29 Naturally, if the possibility and reality of symbolic domination and ideological violence is excluded, the equation of freedom and order will seem theoretically plausible. That is why neofunctionalism reduces the question of the actor's freedom to the problem of social order and identifies conformity and internal commitment to the collective norms with freedom and agency. Functionalist and neofunctionalist theory of freedom and agency follows the early-nineteenth-century conservative romantic political philosophy. According to this theory, no abstract definition of freedom is possible. Instead, concrete freedom is defined in terms of the historical condition of culture and the spirit of the nation. In other words, tradition and collective normative order represent freedom and agency.

28 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974). 29 See Habermas, Knowledge.

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Order requires common moral c freedom is identified with orde with chaos, normlessness, and rev the influence of this romantic Durkheim. The critique of an affirmation of the romantic theor freedom.31 However, nineteent political philosophy have offered theories of freedom and agency. conservative identification of freedom with normative internal- ization is the utilitarian theory of freedom and liberty. This liberalist standpoint, which historically precedes the romantic tradition, was originated in the writings of the Enlightenment philosophers.32 British liberalism and utilitarianism in the nineteenth century merely reaffirmed the basic propositions of the theory. According to this theory, freedom is applicable only to the realm of means and not to the realm of ends. In other words, humans are absolutely devoid of freedom of will. On the contrary, will is always predetermined. However, given the will, the individual may or may not be able to realize his or her will. It is at this point that the concept of liberty becomes significant. Liberty refers to a specific social condition in which the arbitrary social barriers to the realization of the individual's will are eliminated. A constraint on this state of liberty is considered to be justified if it is intended to limit the realization of a will harmful to others. Contrary to the conservative rejection of the possibility of domination, the liberalist theory systematically presents the possibility of domination at the level of means and founds its critical politics on the twin premises of the sacredness of individual subjective 30 An example of the classic conservative theory of freedom is Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955). 31 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976). 32 See, for example, Claude A. Helvetius, A Treatise on Man: His Intellectual Faculties and Education (New York: Burt Franklin, 1969).

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interests and the necessity of l and politics.33 The second alter found in the scientistic and tec this standpoint, reflected in t August Comte, freedom and d realms of both means and ends. reduces the ends to the level of the means and finds the same logic applicable to both of them. Freedom is defined by the technocratic theory as the type of action which is based upon scientific knowledge and scientific principles.34 Authority becomes an authority over things and not over humans. A free act is based upon universal principles of science and consequently lacks any discretionary or arbitrary element. That is why industrial society is defined as the realm of freedom, whereas military society is identified as domination of humans over humans. Naturally, in the context of technocratic theory domination is defined as any deviation from the norm of scientism. Strangely enough, a structure of decision-making monopolized by the professional scientists and experts which excludes the rest of the society is conceived by technocratic theorists as perfectly free. As opposed to conservative romantic-functionalist, liberalist, and technocratic theories, there is an entirely different theoretical tradition which bases the concepts of freedom and agency upon the notion of autonomy. It is this approach to the question of agency and freedom which can provide the missing critical link to neofunctionalist action theory. Marxist and particularly neo-Marxist theories to a large extent follow the critical tradition of freedom as autonomy. That is another reason for the utility of a theoretical synthesis of neofunction- alist multidimensionality with the neo-Marxist concepts of ideology, fetishism, and alienation.

33 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (New York: Dutton, 1951). 34 Auguste Comte, Positive Philosophy (London: Bell, 1853), 2: 139-194.

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The first systematic formulati was presented by Immanuel Kan functionalism traces its own origi fails to note the Kantian insights should remember that in the autonomy, the idea of normati domination is not primarily a que of the norms, but instead is a q norm-formation and the modes of relation between the actor and the ends of the action. Consequently, the idea of freedom as autonomy should be considered and specified as a significant component of a general theory of action. Munch's emphasis on the Kantian premises of Parsonian multidimensional voluntaristic theory is very much to the point. One should not think, however, that Kant's interpéné- tration of utilitarian and moral orientations is only a philosophical practice unaccompanied by parallel sociological insights. Kant as a point of transition between Enlightenment and romanticism combines both orientations in his sociological writings, including The Idea for a Universal History55 and Perpetual Peace.56 In his epoch-creating masterpiece, The Critique of Practical Reason,57 Kant attempts a radical analysis of human freedom and morality. Criticizing the utilitarian reduction of ethics and morality to the instrumental rationality of individual inclina- tions and interests, and rejecting the constitution of ethical laws on the basis of the idea of sympathy, Kant differentiates between natural causation (conditional causation) and the causation of freedom.38 According to Kant, the principle and the reality of freedom is the transcendental condition of the possibility of morality. What distinguishes natural causation 35 Immanuel Kant, "The Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," in On History, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). ao Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (Mew York: uoiumoia university rress, ìyayj. 57 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: Liberal Arts Fress, iy5b). **Ibid., pp. 43-51.

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from the causation of freedom is not the material and the content but the form of moral laws. Morality is based upon the causation of freedom because it is constituted by the principle of autonomy.39 Autonomy implies that the moral law which shapes the actor's will is the product of the moral subject himself. In other words, practical reason is the author of its own principle, the principle of freedom. In basing morality and freedom on the principle of autonomy, Kant transcends and criticizes the definition of freedom and morality on the basis of its internal specification. Nearly two centuries ago, Kant criticized the later neofunctionalist equation of freedom with "internal motivation" in the following words: In the question of freedom which lies at the foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them, it is really not at all a question of whether the causality determined by a natural law is necessary through determining grounds lying within or without the subject, or whether, if they lie within him, they are in instinct or in grounds of determination thought by reason. If their determining conceptions themselves have the ground of their existence in time, and more particularly, in the antecedent state and there again in a preceding state . . ., and if they are without exception internal, and if they do not have mechanical causality but a psychological causality ... as such, their being is under necessitating conditions of the past time which are no longer in his power when he acts . . . and if the freedom of our will were nothing else than . . . psychological ... it would in essence be no better than the freedom of a turnspit, which once wound up also carries out the motion of itself.40 Kant's critique of the neofunctionalist theory of freedom as internal motivation is profound and directly relevant. In fact, the norms of instrumental rationality, efficiency, and scientific knowledge are also internal to the individual actors. One should not forget that the situation of the action is very different from the rational orientation or rational criterion of selection. For neofunctionalism, however, the internal orientation of

39 Ibid., pp. 52-85. 40 Ibid., pp. 99-101.

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instrumental rationality reduces eliminates the realm of freedom a this inconsistency in the neofun question of freedom, the fundame action is not the identity of o functionalism) and freedom, but and freedom. This implies that we definition of freedom from intern such a conclusion is based upon a so a transcendental, approach to th order to clarify the antinomy of f we should follow Durkheimian in theory. According to Kant, the e edge and morality fail to explain character of both objective know both human knowledge and m individual's experience of the consequences of practical action, th and the imperative nature of explained. Consequently, for Kan edge of the world and moral transcendental structure of mind which is not derived from the individual's experience or inclinations.41 However, as Durk- heim emphasized, Kantian theory failed to see (a) the historical variety of systems of knowledge and morality and (b) the similarity and commonality of the ideas and values of the members of the same society or cultural group.42 In Durkheim's theory, therefore, the necessity and universality of human norms and values are due to the fact that they are shared by the members of the society. In other words, the necessity of normative beliefs is derived from the cultural system and tradition of the society. In this theory, internaliza- tion of norms and values is precisely due to the fact that the

41 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Modern Library, 1958). 42 Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 152-297.

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individual is not the author of his or her ultimate ends.43 Normative order, in other words, contradicts the assumption of the autonomy of the individual actor. Order requires commonality of values and the internalization of the social values by the individual. Therefore, neofunctionalist action theory leads to an assertion of the antinomy of order and freedom. We can see that both the Kantian transcendental theory of freedom and the Durkheimian version of Kant's moral theory provide a different picture of the neofunctionalist theory öf freedom and agency. If we define agency and freedom in terms of the Kantian concept of autonomy, then neofunction- alism leaves no space for agency and freedom in general, or for symbolic violence and ideological domination in particular. Posing the question of freedom and agency in terms of autonomy, therefore, confronts us with three sets of questions. The first relates to the distribution of resources and strategic power in terms of the conditions of social action for different groups of actors. Naturally, issues like inequality of opportu- nity and alternative courses of action open to the actors are directly relevant to the question of freedom. Both direct coercion (forcing individuals against their will) and situational coercion (leaving no option to the actor but to subjugate) belong to the instrumental level of domination.44 The second question relates to the issue of hegemony, cultural violence of various groups, and ideological manipulations. In this case the question of domination relates to the internalized ends of the actors.45 Ideological domination represents a situation of control of the means of theoretical and ideological practice by the members of the dominant groups (class, gender, religious or social groups, etc.). Contrary to the methodology of pluralist political theory or what is called behaviorism, one can 43 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 1938). 44 Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Modern Library, 1936). ™ An example ot this line ot analysis is Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1977).

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794 SOCIAL RESEARCH

legitimately and rationally talk ab tion even in a situation of consens One way of deciphering dom structure of discourse, includin society. If, for example, spec normative alternatives are syste public discourse while others enj public, cultural violence and i reality.47 Obviously, an important type of domination is the relation the normative propositions. Last existence of domination and sy level of socialization of indivi moment of the birth. This final i levels of domination. As Bourdie ideals and alternatives are arbitr imposing an arbitrary princi constitutes symbolic violence.48 It culture and tradition through t which is a universal preconditio readily compatible with the nor levels of problems are not even t On the contrary, neofunctionalis when they are, indeed, systemat tioned.

Deterministic Tendency in Neofunctionalism

Surprisingly, however, functionalism and neofunctionalism are too deterministic in their outlook on human actions. It is true that functionalism tries to affirm and save the actor's 46 Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). 47 Habermas, Knowledge. 48 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction m Education, Society and Culture (London: Sage, 1977), pp. 1-69.

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ACTION THEORY 795

freedom in its analytical frame functionalist argument for f and passivity. If we accept framework, we are led to deny fact, however, is that humans are not as determined as the functionalist model actually implies. According to functionalist and neofunctionalist theories human actors are free because they have internalized the social and cultural norms and values of the society. In this perspective, humans play their roles on the basis of recognized mutual norms and follow the rules of society. These rules are structural forces which determine the actions of human individuals. We should remember that deviation from social rules and cultural norms are interprete by functionalists as indications of disorder and unfreedom. is clear that this deterministic tendency has been present diverse forms of functionalist theory. Needless to say, the mo common definition of functionalism identifies it with sociolo ical realism, according to which the individual is shaped a formed by an already existing social structure and tradition. this case the individual is merely an embodiment of socia relations and cultural norms. Individuals simply internalize th norms and follow them. It is one of the basic premises of this article that such a deterministic account of individual actions cannot be accepted. On the contrary, individuals are left with a wide range of options, ambiguities, and choices within the social and cultural framework. Instead of simply following the rules of social interaction, they play with the rules, use them against other rules, redefine the norms, and exploit the ambiguities of the rules in the context of conflict and dialogue with other members of the society. Tradition, rules, and norms, conse- quently, are not just constraints to obey but also resources to utilize. Such an approach rejects both individualist, nominalist, and liberalist reduction of society to individuals, and the structuralist, realist, reificatory, and functionalist reduction of individual to society. Conflict and power struggle over both

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796 SOCIAL RESEARCH

material and ideal interests ar interactions.49 Societal norms constrain individuals and are used by them in their ongoing conflict and power relations. Such a theoretical framework implies that actors are engaged in defining the norms and values of the society for their own material and ideal advantages. Consequently, the logic of the internalization of values is not free from the distortion of the categories of strategic and ideological domination. Further- more, actors are not automatons who simply follow the rules and norms of the society. Both ideological domination and freedom from social norms are flexible realities in the fluid spaces of material and symbolic conflicts of individuals with changing boundaries and maneuvers in between. It is probably in this paradoxical ambiguity of rules and norms that we should search for both autonomy and domination of individ- ual actors. To better clarify this issue, it may be useful to refer back to the neofunctionalist theory of action and freedom. As we noted for neofunctionalism, both historical materialism and historical idealism are false theoretical statements. Instead, neofunctionalism insists upon a multidimensional action theory in which normative institutions cannot be reduced to the instrumental and material structures of society. However, the arguments used by both functionalism and neofunctional- ism do not justify their claim. In fact, as claimed in the beginning of this paper, neofunctionalist theory is not a serious multidimensional theory. The reason for this inadequacy is to be found in the confusion between the relation of the individual to social structure and the relation of instrumental and normative structures of the society. I believe Parsonian voluntaristic action theory demonstrates that for an individual there are some normative concerns which limit and defy their utilitarian logic of purposive rational action. Consequently, for

49 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).

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ACTION THEORY 797

any individual the norms and from instrumental interests. H the level of the individual w about the relation between instance, the economic syste think of a situation in which t shaped and determined by conditions of society. But even each individual is shaped b purposive (instrumental) ration culturally defined ultimate no that the individual's action is n mental interests and selfish des lief in some moral categories c means and ends perceived by necessarily, the autonomy of t nomic structure of the society ism demonstrates the autonomy the level of an individual choice however, is the autonomy of c terial system of society. Neo serious defense of a multidime Contrary to both functionalis of the variants of the structura question of the autonomy of c instrumental structures. One tions of this structuralist prob in the recent works of Ma Lévi-Strauss's structural anth tural linguistics,52 Sahlins emp from the realm of practical Reason, Sahlins criticizes both M) One example of this alternative is Mar Vintage, 1977). 51 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthro ;>~ Ferdinande Saussure, Course in Genera

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798 SOCIAL RESEARCH

materialism. Contrary to both th that all social facts are necessaril between sign and symbol, Sahlins their own internal logic and struct are to some extent arbitrary and c of social conditions. For instance, the binary structures of mind a interpreted to be a strategy to meanings of symbols in their inter the reduction of symbols to the lev and material content. However, for characterized by the existence o symbolic schema and the objective dimension of social action. One ca of multidimensionality applies to choice and social institutions.53 In spite of the difference of structuralist and neofunctional- ist formulations of multidimensionality, both theories are excessively deterministic. What is shared by both the structur- alist and neofunctionalist theories is the passive reduction of the individual to the cultural rules of the society. It should be noted that Sahlins's emphasis on the autonomy of culture from the realm of material structures is a statement at the level of social structures and does not pertain to the relation between the individual and social structures. For both functionalism and structuralism, the individual is ultimately an embodiment of social relations and social rules. Althusser's theory of ideology and subjectivity clearly formulates this theoretical premise. According to Althusser, human individuals are subject in the double sense of the term. They are in reality subject to the social conditions and culture of the society. In other words, humans are passive embodiments of social structures. However, in order to perform their roles effectively

59 Marshal Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

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ACTION THEORY 799

and properly, human subjects the subject of their actions. I subjectivity refers to the autonomy.54 In agreement w structuralism, Althusser emp while determined by social str are the authors of their action is precisely this illusion of the the decentered subjects. As w very much aware of the fact t and values of society by i freedom for those individua indication of freedom in neo explicitly the necessary requir external determination. In oth and structuralism emphasizes nation of the internalized nor for neofunctionalism the ass rule-believing individual is freedom, whereas for structur evidence for rejection of the of individual actors. Basing the concept of agency and freedom upon the principle of autonomy, we can locate the common theoretical error of structuralist and functionalist action theories. It is the reificatory and excessively deterministic common premise of both structuralism and functionalism which should be criti- cized. Individuals are not passive embodiments of social roles and the followers of clearly defined and determining rules. On the contrary, rule-following is accompanied by rule-defining, rule-redefining, and rule-exploiting practices of individuals in their concrete conflictual interactions.55 One of the best 54 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: NLB, 1971), pp 121-177. 55 One of the first systematic critiques of role theory can be found in Alain Touraine, Post-Industrial Society (New York: Random House, 1971).

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800 SOCIAL RESEARCH

formulations of such a nondeterministic formulations of action theory can be found in the writings of Pierre Bourdieu. In his brilliant work, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu tries to combine multidimensionality (with some materialistic tendency) with a nonreductionistic conception of the individual- culture relationship. In addition to his insistence upon the interchangeability of symbolic and material capitals,56 Bour- dieu provides two fundamental clues for a new theory of practice. The first is the principle of the ambiguity of rules and the possibility of alternative definitions and interpretations of the rules by individuals. Consequently, individuals, instead of passively and predictably following the cultural rules, are engaged in a strategic act of playing different rules against each other and using the ambiguities of cultural norms to choose among alternative courses of possible actions. The second issue is the category of temporality. According to Bourdieu, the mere fact of the structure of the epistemology of action theory is a distortion of the structure of the concrete acts of individuals. The gaze of the theorist upon the actions of individuals is predicated upon the completion of action. Consequently, the entire structure, process, and uncertainty of the effect of temporality of action is overlooked and a deterministic after-the-fact reconstruction of action is empha- sized. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Bourdieu's combination of the issues of rule ambiguity and temporality where he criticizes the deterministic theory of gift exchange in Marcel Mauss's functionalism.57 Bourdieu's great insights, however, are partly lost in his excessive emphasis on the concept of habitus. In fact, his notion of habitus paves the way for a return to the reductionistic framework he himself has so brilliantly criticized. It is in the new conception of cultural rules and tradition

56 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 159-198. 57 Ibid., pp. 1-30.

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