Agency and Freedom in Neo-Functionalist Action

ACTION THEORY 779

upon his critique of positivis Parsons, positivist action theo able dilemma. Positivism empha nation of human actions. Ratio choice of the most efficient means for the attainment of the end. Consequently positivist action theory cannot provide a positive account for the determination of ends themselves. The absence of an autonomous normative factor in the determina- tion of action limits the positivist framework to only two options. Either the ends are randomly distributed among the actors, or the ends are determined by the conditions of the situation. Utilitarianism follows the thesis of the randomness of ends, whereas theories emphasizing heredity and environ- ment reduce ends to the level of conditions. But, Parsons suggests, both these strategies are unacceptable. The utilitarian theory of random distribution of ends confronts the Hobbe- sian problem of order. In other words order is assumed by utilitarianism to be based upon coercion. Evidently, however, coercion cannot adequately explain the existence of order in society. On the other hand, the reduction of ends to the level of conditions removes any possibility of agency and freedom for the actors.11 It is partly due to the immanent contradictions of both positivism and idealism, Parsons claims, that a progressive movement toward a voluntaristic theory of action can be witnessed in modern political theory. Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber are representatives of this march toward voluntarism. According to voluntaristic theory, the normative selection of ends and means is not a negative or residual aspect of human actions. On the contrary, individual ends are primarily based upon a common normative culture and value system. Consequently ends are not randomly distributed, but instead are harmoniously defined by a common cultural consensus. Identity of the interests of

1 ' Ibid., pp. 47-89.

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