Agency and Freedom in Neo-Functionalist Action

ACTION THEORY 799

and properly, human subjects the subject of their actions. I subjectivity refers to the autonomy.54 In agreement w structuralism, Althusser emp while determined by social str are the authors of their action is precisely this illusion of the the decentered subjects. As w very much aware of the fact t and values of society by i freedom for those individua indication of freedom in neo explicitly the necessary requir external determination. In oth and structuralism emphasizes nation of the internalized nor for neofunctionalism the ass rule-believing individual is freedom, whereas for structur evidence for rejection of the of individual actors. Basing the concept of agency and freedom upon the principle of autonomy, we can locate the common theoretical error of structuralist and functionalist action theories. It is the reificatory and excessively deterministic common premise of both structuralism and functionalism which should be criti- cized. Individuals are not passive embodiments of social roles and the followers of clearly defined and determining rules. On the contrary, rule-following is accompanied by rule-defining, rule-redefining, and rule-exploiting practices of individuals in their concrete conflictual interactions.55 One of the best 54 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: NLB, 1971), pp 121-177. 55 One of the first systematic critiques of role theory can be found in Alain Touraine, Post-Industrial Society (New York: Random House, 1971).

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