CYIL 2015

REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY for all human beings” 32 and at the same time to the entirety of humanity in the sense of metaphysical cosmology. Thus, human dignity is more a concept of philosophy (and religion) but with strong legal implications, 33 as the concept of human dignity is revived especially in the process of juridication (be it in the legislative or judiciary sphere). In the case of the definition of reproductive rights there was a possibility to enumerate at least specific rights as being part of that concept (e.g. the right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of children, interdiction of forced sterilization). However, the concept of human dignity is (at least in legal texts) very vague. In the attempt to define human dignity there are only two possibilities: either to expose a deep philosophical argumentation 34 of the concept of human dignity, or to restraint oneself to the legal perspective and to present this concept without any clear and accurate path. 35 In the clash of these two approaches, human dignity comes out as a sort of “treasure hunt”, especially when it comes to the judiciary. 36 However, for the purposes of this article, there must be at least a delicate flavour of the philosophical perception of human dignity. Without any specification of the concept of human dignity, the process of the interconnection between reproductive rights and human dignity would be totally impaired. Some would object that in choosing just one perception of human dignity, we are eliminating others. And this is perhaps the crucial point of the legal discourse on human dignity. It is difficult to accept that in a multicultural society where every opinion or conviction has its place of existence, there could be a “totalitarian” position of only “one” perception of human dignity. However, in this regard the search for the truth is clear. As the human being and humanity are a unique and at the same time universal conception, there 32 CHAPMAN, Audrey R. Human dignity, Bioethics and Human Rights, in Health Care, Bioethics and Law, 3 Amsterdam Law Forum, (2011), p. 4. 33 One may argue, that every era has its own proper philosophy trends, from Ancient Socratic, Medieval Christian, Voltairian, Kant-Hegelian to post-modern philosophy nowadays. Would it thus mean that the concept of human dignity and its content depend on the particular approach of prevailing current philosophical trend? If yes, even today’s conception of human dignity and human rights cannot claim to be the universal and right/proper one. 34 E.g. Glensy presents different points of view on dignity, going through Cicero, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Federalists, Schachter, Pope Benedict XVI and others. See: GLENSY, Rex D., The Right to Dignity. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 43.1 – Fall 2011, p. 65-142. 35 UN Charter, “the dignity and worth of the human person”; UDHR, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. Charter of the Human Rights of the EU, “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” (Art. 1). 36 McCrudden says: “The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation, increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. See McCRUDDEN, Christopher. Human Dignity and Judical Interpretation of Human Right. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 (2008), p. 655-724.

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