CYIL 2015

PAVEL BUREŠ CYIL 6 ȍ2015Ȏ can be only one conception of human dignity. If there are other ones, this means either they are not the right ones, or they are not complete ones. 37 The concept of human dignity can evolve over time, and it certainly has evolved throughout history. However, there is one fundamental element of human dignity – freedom. “There is an unbreakable link between human freedom and human dignity”. 38 However, this freedom is not attached exclusively to individuals (in their existence with respect to State power), but to humanity, where every single person is a part of it. Von Geusau contends that dignity belongs to humanity and is inseparable from it. 39 If there is a rupture between freedom and truth, it undermines society itself. 40 Human dignity is a substance formed simultaneously by individual human liberty and the liberty of humanity (an over-all understanding of the human person). 41 It means that human beings are (by and through their existence) in relation to other human beings (and to humanity in its entirety) and are influencing (affecting and shaping) other human beings (and humanity) there. Spaemann contends that all of us are exploiting others as a means to reach other purposes. Nobody is in the system only as a means without being a purpose for itself. 42 Thus human dignity has to be understood in this over-all perception. To comprehend human dignity (and so human liberty) only as an opposition to State power would impair and deteriorate the concept and the substance of human dignity in its over all perception. The existence of State power, representing the society (and thus humanity) in the concept of human dignity is very essential. 43 Then this understanding of human dignity should play a big (though not even the biggest) role in human rights adjudication. This is valid not only for the “hard” human rights (right to life, prohibition of torture, or slavery) but to other “soft” human rights where there might be some limitation and interference of the State power. Human dignity in this over-all perception reflects the specific elements and issues of reproductive rights. 37 Having presented that, we do not want to usurpate the position of the only one and right one conception of human dignity. 38 VON GEUSAU, Alting., op. cit. p. 47. 39 Ibidem , p. 46. 40 Ibidem . 41 Clarke points out the Thomistic over-all perception of human being – esse in substancia and esse in relatio – being in the sense of substance and in the sense of relation. CLARKE, W.Norris. Osoba a Bytí. Krystal OP, Karmelitánské nakladatelství, 2007, 117 p. 42 SPAEMANN, Robert. Základní mravní pojmy a postoje. Nakladatelství Svoboda, Praha. 1995, p. 77 78. Spaemann goes on in concluding: „It is why Kant contended that the person has not a value, but dignity . Every value has its proper quantity and can be included in a comparative calculation. Unlike dignity, which is a characteristic. 43 In the right understanding of human dignity, society cannot limit the human liberty of individuals, but society helps human liberty flourish.

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