ASSOCIATE Magazine FBINAA Q4-2023

FBINAA.ORG | Q4 2023

I n addressing this article and focus methodologies, we will first look at the early and sometimes the still currently accepted civilian instructional model of “Run, Hide, Fight”, highlight pivot points in the current instructional platform and then suggest some new terminology and methodologies that may lead to better overall understandability, implementation, better outcomes, with lower casualty rates as we are still experiencing ever increasing event mortality rates. In a recent FBI study, it was indicated that “[c]asualty counts are higher for 2021 (243) when compared with 2020 (164), indicating a 48% increase” (FBI Press Release, May 2022, para 2.). EARLY METHODOLOGY Run, Hide, Fight There are several concerns with this early (and sometimes cur rent) widely adopted methodology. 1. Run: Instructing civilians to “Run” creates a few (possible) negative concerns. a. Running can create a mass disorganized response akin to a stampede. b. Running can certainly draw attention from the shooter and cause an immediate target acquisition with attack response. c. Running can cause “group think” mentality where the group erroneously follows the lead and enters harm’s way (field of fire). d. Running alone does not provide any heightened safety methodology, in that groups in mass engaged in running can cause falls (immobility) and injuries adding to possible casualties. 2. Hide: Instructing civilians to hide can be a vague and shallow instruction methodology. a. Hiding alone cannot provide an assured measure of safety unless several key factors exist. 3. Fight: Instructing unarmed civilians to “Fight” an armed aggressor can lead to a diminishing outcome. a. Statistically, the mortality rate with an unarmed civilian(s) attempting to subdue (attack) an armed assailant is extremely high. b. Further, the success rate of an unarmed civilian attempting to subdue (attack) an armed assailant is extremely low. c. Thus, instructing civilians who may not have any formal training in tactics to “Fight” with some degree of success can be a losing proposition from the start. Statement of Fact: As we know as law enforcement professionals, in active aggressor events, the best strategy for civilians in the cri sis area/zone is to maintain their personal safety and successfully gain the needed time for responders to arrive. In crisis situations, due to psychophysical responses which in many cases are associated with heightened fear/safety responses,

As our fellow law enforcement profession als will attest, the methodology for virtually every facet in law enforcement is continu ally progressing and in many cases chang ing to meet the needs of our current mis sion. As professionals in the first responder community, we commonly reach out on an instructional platform to our respective communities to help guide them and or educate them in “what to do” in crisis situ ations. Though active shooter events have been documented since the mid 1700’s, more and more has been done nationally in our recent past to curtail these reoccur rences and to certainly reduce the overall casualty rates. Sadly, the deaths continue to increase noting that “[i]n 2021, the FBI designated 61 shootings as active shooter incidents. In these incidents, 103 people were killed and 140 wounded, excluding the shooters. For the period 2017–2021, active shooter incident data reveals an up ward trend. The number of active shooter incidents identified in 2021 represents a 52.5% increase from 2020 and a 96.8% in crease from 2017” (FBI Press Release, May 2022, para. 1). Authors’ note: This article signifies a discussion starter to refresh some of the previously held methodologies to better address our current environment. This article by no means seeks to degrade or denounce previous methodologies but to offer some alternative ideas to further enhance the civilian active shooter basic response.

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