Community Competition Law
Dr. Alfred Gleiss, of the firm of Messrs Gleiss, Lutz,
Hootz, Hirsch & Partner, Stuttgart, Germany, delivered
lectures on Community Competition Law and on
Merger Control to members of the Society in the Bur-
lington Hotel, Dublin, on Saturday, 27 January 1973.
The following summary has been approved by Dr.
Gleiss.
(I) Survey on EEC Competition Law
(1) There is no general competition law of the
EEC. Articles 85 et seq. contain directly applicable
cartel law. In the fields of unfair competition and
patent law, trade mark law and the like, national law
will continue to apply which will be increasingly
influenced by Community Law.
(2) Besides the Community Cartel Law contained in
Articles 85 and 86, the national Cartel Laws remain in
force. The relation between EEC Cartel Law and
national Cartel Law shall be solved pursuant to Article
87 para 2 (e) by a Regulation or a Directive to be
issued by the Council. This has not, however, been
done yet.
(3) The Court of the European Communities in the
so-called "Preliminary Dyestuff decision" of 13 February
1969 has pronounced that the application of the EEC
Cartel Law does not exclude in principle the applica-
tion of national Cartel Law but that in any clash of
rules Community Law would have precedence. A
decision in a national proceeding must not be inconsis-
tent with a decision of the Commission. If the national
decision is passed after the Commission's decision the
national authority must "take account" of that of the
Commission. In the opposite case, the national authori-
ties "must take appropriate measures"—a somewhat
vague dictum.
Thus, because of the same facts, the national authori-
ties as well as the EEC Commission may conduct pro-
ceedings and levy fines.
(4) The Cartel Prohibition of Article 85 is applic-
able to all enterprises active within the EEC, no matter
where they are located. Article 85 is not applicable to
enterprises of the Coal and Steel Industry; so far, the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty
has precedence. It is applicable to agriculture with cer-
tain limitations.
(5) Restraint of trade is prohibited only, if it "per-
ceptibly" affects trade between Member States
r-.ndcompetition. As per the "Bagatelle Publication" of
the Commission, this will not be the case, if the market
shares do not exceed 5% and the total annual turn-
over of the participating enterprises is not more than
15 million units of account (one unit is about 45p).
(6) Article 85 does not distinguish between Horizon-
tal Cartels, i.e. such which are concluded between enter-
prises of the same economic level, and Vertical
"Cartels", i.e. agreements between enterprises of diffe-
rent economic levels (say manufacturer and dealer).
(7) The law relating to the so-called sole distributor-
ship agreements has undergone the greatest degree of
development. In the judgment
Grundig/Consten
of
1966, the
Court prohibited "absolute' 'territorial protec-
tion,
i.e. the guarantee given by the manufacturer, that
a sole distributor will be the only one who may import
goods into a specific territory and that third parties
shall not sell into this territory.
The group exemption of sole distributorship agree-
ments granted by the Commission's Regulation of 22
March 1967, called in brief Regulation 67/67, is of
great importance.
According to it, agreements between manufacturer
and dealer from different Member States are admissible,
if they contain exclusive obligations to deliver and
supply without any export prohibition.
In several individual Decisions, the Commission per-
mitted special distributorship systems, especially the
"selective distributorship system" of the Swiss watch
maker Omega. In this Decision, the Commission con-
sidered it a violation of Article 85, if in the agreements
between the manufacturer and the general agents the
number of the local retailers is limited, but it granted
an exemption under Article 85 para 3, especially, be-
cause technically highly developed and relatively ex-
pensive products were affected.
(8) In the field of "horizontal" cartels, the Com-
mission came—in spectacular proceedings—to several
decisions, especially in the
Quinine and the Dyestuff
Judgment of 14 July 1972
the Court defined the mean-
ing of the concerted practices with the formula of
"conscious practical co-operation". The objective paral-
lel behaviour of several enterprises is not
per
se
a con-
certed behaviour but an important indication.
(9) At the end of last year, the Commission granted
a group exemption agreement for specialization agree-
ments in the field of Horizontal Cartels. Previously in
several decisions, it had already exempted specialization
agreements, even if concluded by large enterprises. One
can conclude from this that the Commission is prepared
to accept such agreements, if effective competition
remains on the markets concerned. The Regulation on
Group (or: Block) Exemptions is applicable only, if
the products in none of the Member States exceed
market shares of more than 10% and the total turnover
of the participating enterprises does not exceed 150
million units of account.
(10) It results from the Commission's fundamental
Decision of 23 December 1971 in the
Henkel
/Colgate
case
that even merely factual restrictions of research
can be restraint of trade. This applies to all fields, in
which the competition is largely influenced by the re-
sults of research.
(11) In its "EEC Cooperation Publication" of 29
July 1968, the Commission has worked out rules for
enterprise cooperations, which do not violate Article
85.
(12)
Article 86
prohibits the abuse of market domin-
ance. In this connection there are three important
decisions of the Commission. The
GEMA-Decision
of
2 June 1971,
the Continental Can Decision
of 9 Decem-
ber 1971 and the
Decision against Zoja
of 20 December
1972. In the latter decision, the Commission has pro-
hibited a monopolist from refusing to supply a buyer.
I shall deal in a special lecture with the problem of
application of Article 86 to enterprise cooperation
(Continental Can).
(II) Merger Control Under Article 86
(1) The EEC Treaty does not contain regulations
which prohibit expressly the merger of enterprises. On
the contrary, the Commission again and again has
taken initiatives for creating larger units of enterprises,
"enterprises of European dimension". In 1971, e.g., it
published the draft of the statute of a European joint
stock company, in order to make a special legal form
available for mergers of enterprises from different
150




