The Gazette 1973

who enters in pursuance of a bona fide claim of right

does not commit an offence.

The White Paper on Local Government Re-Organisa-

tion (Prl. 1572) which was laid before each house of

the Oireachtas in February, 1971 states as a bald fact on

Page 60 (Chapter 16. 6. 1.) "The Public have no

general or absolute right to be present at local authority

meetings; it is a matter for each local authority to

decide whether or not to admit them. . . . ". No

authority is given for this statement but in Street on

"Local Government" at page 75 Note (b) to Section 15

Local Government Act, 1902 states that the provisions

of the Procedure of Councils Order 1699 and Section

167 of the Grand Jury Act which made open to the

public all meetings relating to proposals are absolute

but their enactment indicates that the public have no

general right of admission.

The note refers to the case of Tenby

Corporation v.

Nason (1908) 1

Ch. 507. In that case the Defendant

claimed a right to attend meetings of the borough

Council of Tenby in any of three capacities :

(a) As a burgess of the Borough,

(b) as a Press Representative, and

The first claim was not pressed (and the second claim

does not concern us in this case but there is also a

reference to it at page 160 of the White Paper on

Local Government re-organisation). It was held on

Appeal confirming a lower Court decision by Cosens

Hardy M.R. at page 467 "I am clearly of opinion that

there is not such right as the Defendant claimed and

that no member of the public, be he burgess or not, has

a right to attend meetings of the Council unless by

express or implied permission of the Council itself."

Buckley L.J. at page 468 states "No person had simply

as a member of the public the right to say "open that

door I will come in". He goes on to say at page 469

"It seems to me that the burgess is not entitled to

say " I will come in and hear your deliberation".

That decision in Tenby Corporation v. Mason seems

to me to be still relevant in this country and I could

find no decisions or statutory provisions to the contrary.

With regard to the argument that the system of

admittance by ticket or invitation is not democratic

or in order, Section 62 of the Local Government Act,

1955 gives a local Authority power to make Standing

Orders for the regulation of its meetings and procedure.

In pursuance of this express Statutory authority the

Corporation of Dun Laoghaire have adopted such

Standing Orders on the 7th day of October, 1963 and

Standing Order no. 47 (page 9) regulates and specifies

the method of admittance of visitors which is the method

objected to by the Defendant. I can find no justifica-

tion for the argument that this method is either unlaw-

ful or undemocratic.

In view of the complexity of the law on the subject

the Defendants may have genuinely but mistakenly

believed that they had a right as citizens to enter the

meeting and although the actual method of entry re-

vealed a certain amount of clever planning I am dis-

posed to give them the benefit of the doubt on the

forcible entry charge and hold that they entered in

pursuance of a bona fide belief and I shall dismiss that

charge.

With regard to the charge of forcible occupation I

am satisfied that by their antics and interruptions in

the Council Chamber the Defendants prevented the

members of the Corporation from carrying on their

meeting as they were entitled to and furthermore they

did not desist from interfering and leave the building

peaceably when requested to do so firstly by the

Cathaoirleach and then by Sergeant Mulqueen who

was in uniform. I am perfectly satisfied that the De-

fendants entered the Town Hall with the express in-

tention of disrupting this meeting. They allege that they

were concerned with the housing needs of people in

the Dun Laoghaire Borough but I am sure that the

duly elected members of the Council are equally con-

cerned and I cannot see how premeditated publicity

stunts which prevent the democratically elected Coun-

cil from getting on with its business can further the

aims of the group which they represent. I am con-

cerned by the statement made in Court by one of the

Defendants that further meetings will be disrupted

adding "that they needed to be disrupted" I must

attempt to ensure that this threat will not materialise

as far as the Defendants are concerned and in addition

to the monetary penalty I shall impose for the offence

of forcible occupation on which they are being con-

victed I shall direct that each Defendant shall within

14 days enter into a bond in the Defendants Bond of

£100 and a surety of £100 to keep the peace and be of

good behaviour for a period of 12 months in default

of entering the bond 14 days imprisonment and the

following conditions shall be inserted in the bond.

1. Not to enter the Town Hall, Dun Laoghaire during

the duration of the bond, and

2. Not to picket, molest or interfere in any way, by

word or deed with any member, officer or em-

ployee of Dun Laoghaire Corporation when going to

or coming from any meeting of the Dun Laoghaire

Corporation.

[Attorney General v. Eugene Keogh and Aifan

Griffin—unreported. ]

The property qualifications for jurors and the limited

right of women to act as jurors are not unconstitu-

tional.

The women Plaintiffs are charged with obstructing

police officers in the due execution of their duty, and

have elected to have the charges against them tried by

a jury. However they fear that they would not get a

fair trial from a jury confined to property holders.

Accordingly they claim that some provisions of Section

2 and 3 of the Juries Act 1927 are inconsistent with the

Constitution and invalid, and request a Declaration

accordingly.

The questions to be answered are :

(1) Is there a presumption that the Juries Act 1927

is consistent with the Constitution?

Counsel for plaintiffs contend that the Juries Act

1927 was a Pre-Constitution Act, and therefore there

was no presumption of Constitutionalism in accordance

with

The State (Sheerin) v. Kennedy

(1966) l.R. The

Attorney-General contended that this Act was constitu-

tional as the People, in enacting the Constitution must

be presumed to have taken over the existing law, in-

cluding the 1927 Act, unless proved inconsistent with

the 1937 Constitution. However, O Dalaigh C.J. in

McMahon v. Attorney General

(1972) I.L.T.R. 106—

had stated that "the Constitution of Ireland does not

offer any presumption of Constitutionality to the

Statute Roll of Saorstat Eireann." Accordingly the con-

tention of the plaintiffs is well sustained, and

there is no

presumption of constitutionality in favour of the Juries

Act

1927.

164