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transfer to the Irish Transport and General Workers'
Union was an infringement of his constitutional rights.
Mr. Justice Walsh, who delivered the unanimous
judgment, said the union was a British-based one but
was the holder of a negotiation licence granted under
Part II of the Trade Union Act, 1941, and affiliated
to the Irish Congress of Trade Unions.
Mr. Murphy became a member of the National Union
of Vehicle Builders in 1958 when employed in Lincoln
and Nolans' motor assembly business. He afterwards
worked for Motor Manufacturers' Ltd., at Naas Road,
Dublin, and the N.U.V.B. was the only one catering
for workers in that industry employed by Motor Manu-
facturers Ltd.
In March or April 1970, Mr. Murphy and a number
of fellow-workers applied for membership of the Marine
Port and General Workers' Union being dissatisfied
with the N.U.V.B. for reasons which did not affect the
decision in this appeal.
On inquiry, the Marine Port and General Workers'
Union was told by the N.U.V.B. that there was an
objection to the transfer on the grounds that they
catered sufficiently for Mr. Murphy and his fellow-
workers but if there was any bona fide reason why the
men should wish to join the other union they would be
prepared to have another look at the matter. In the
result, the M.P.G.W.U. did not accept the application
of Mr. Murphy and the others for membership.
Mr. Justice Walsh said that in May, 1970, Mr.
Murphy and 144 fellow-workers applied to the
I.T.G.W.U. for membership. This union notified the
N.U.V.B., who replied advising that they were objecting
to their members being accepted into the I.T.G.W.U.
pointing out that these members had already been
declined membership of the Marine Port and General
Workers' Union.
After further correspondence the applicants said the
reason they wanted to transfer was becausc they wished
to become members of an Irish-based trade union.
This was not accepted as a valid reason by the
N.U.V.B. who continued to object.
On June 16th, 1970, the general secretary of the
I.T.G.W.U. wrote to the defendant union stating that
it was proposed to accept the applications on the
grounds that no reasonable grounds had been put for-
ward to sustain the defendant union's objection. The
Irish organiser of the latter union then asked the execu-
tive council of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions to
intervene and the matter was ultimately referred to its
disputes committee which came to the conclusion that
the decision of the I.T.G.W.U. to enrol the men against
the objection of the N.U.V.B. was "contrary to good
trade union practice."
They recommended that the men be transferred back
to the defendant union. The disputes' committee also
noted that from the evidence available the acceptance
of transfers in any circumstances in the motor assembly
industry, without consent, did not appear to have been
the practice. It was clear however, that the disputes'
committee was also of opinion that the requirements of
good trade union practice was in itself sufficient to give
a decision in favour of the defendant union.
They also recommended that the latter union should
waive any question of imposing fines or disciplinary
action. In the result the I.T.G.W.U. accepted this
finding and transferred the members back to the de-
fendant union.
On November 20th, 1970, the general secretary of the
I.T.G.W.U. wrote to the Irish organiser of the de-
fendant union stating that in view of the fact that the
circumstances surrounding Motor Manufacturers Ltd.
case had now altered they trusted it would be in order
to have these transfers to the I.T.G.W.U. effected.
The defendant union replied on November 23rd
stating that in view of the fact that the I.T.G.W.U.
had notified Congress of its acceptance of the Disputes'
Committee's findings, no member of their union em-
ployed by Motor Manufacturers would be released to
join any other union.
No repudiation of Disputes Committee
Mr. Justice Walsh said the I.T.G.W.U. did not re-
pudiate its acceptancc of the findings of the Disputes'
Committee and it was quite clear that it would not
accept these men into membership unless the defendant
union gave its consent or was held by the Courts to be
wrongfully with-holding consent.
The constitutional right relied on by Mr. Murphy
was set out in Article 40, section 6, subsection 1 (iii)
which was the right of citizens to form associations
and unions.
It was claimed that the refusal of the defendant
union to consent to Mr. Murphy joining the other
union was an unconstitutional interference with his
guaranteed rights and amounted to coercion in that,
without such consent, if the I.T.G.W.U. were to accept
him they would be liable to expulsion from Congress
because of a breach of the Constitution of Congress.
It was submitted on behalf of Mr. Murphy that the
defendant union was in effect able to achieve what part
3 of the Trade Union Act, 1941, was held to be unable
to achieve—to compel him to remain a member of their
union.
Mr. Justice Walsh said he agreed with Murnaghan
J. who had held that before it could be established
that a person might agree to surrender or waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution it would have to be
shown that he had a clear knowledge of what he was
doing and with that knowledge deliberately and freely
decided to make such surrender or waiver. On the facts
in this case it was abundantly clear that no such
situation had ever been brought to the notice of Mr.
Murphy.
No constitutional right to choose union
Mr. Justice Walsh said that in the ordinary sense
there was no constitutional right to join the union of
one's choice. The constitutional guarantee was the
guarantee to form associations or unions, but in
ordinary circumstances before a person could join a
union or association already in existence he must be
entitled to do so either by law or by the rules of that
association or union, or by the consent of its members.
Mr. Justice Walsh went on : "In my view, the present
action is misconceived and the appeal should be
allowed." The I.T.G.W.U., he said, was obviously quite
willing to accept Mr. Murphy into membership—but
only provided they obtained the consent of the de-
fendant union.
In taking the men into their union originally without
that consent, the I.T.G.W.U. was exercising a right
which they were free to exercise and if such exercise
constituted a breach of the terms of their affiliation to
the Congress, it was for the I.T.G.W.U. to decide
whether they would accept the membership of Mr.
Murphy and jeopardise their affiliation with the Con-
gress, or elect to value their affiliation greater than their
desire to accept Mr. Murphy into membership.
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