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insurgency was fueled in large part by the decision of the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA)—the transitional government set up by
the U.S. after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein—to dismiss Iraq’s
army and ban former members of the Baath Party from holding
government jobs.
The insurgents, often led by former Baath Party members, tar-
geted U.S. forces as well as Iraqi Shiites. Shiites retaliated, carrying
out murderous violence against their Sunni neighbors. Shiite mili-
tias also battled American soldiers. In addition, foreign fighters—
some linked to the terrorist organization al-Qaeda—slipped into
Iraq and carried out indiscriminate attacks against civilians. They
hoped to foment a civil war and thereby make Iraq ungovernable.
As the insurgency continued, the CPA and the Bush adminis-
tration were blamed for the many problems that occurred during
the reconstruction process. Electrical power was spotty in many
places, and people had to wait in long lines for food, clean water,
gasoline, and other necessities. The CPA pointed to its accomplish-
ments—rebuilding schools and hospitals; connecting water, power,
and telephone lines; clearing harbors and canals; and other proj-
ects. However, the slow pace of reconstruction angered many Iraqis
and fueled protests against the U.S. occupation. In the United
States, meanwhile, critics complained that the Bush administration
had created a detailed plan to win the war, but it had done scant
prewar planning of how to rebuild Iraq.
The administration was also widely criticized because its inspec-
tors had not turned up evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction—the original rationale for invading
Iraq. In June of 2003, a U.S. organization called the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG) took over the task of looking for the banned weapons.
In October, the ISG issued a preliminary report and its leader, for-
mer U.N. chief weapons inspector Dr. David Kay, told the U.S.
Senate that no stocks of prohibited chemical, biological, or nuclear
I
RAQ
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