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MAY, 1912]

The Gazette of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.,

28th March,

1912.

DEAR SIR,

I am desired by the Chancellor of the

Exchequer to acknowledge the receipt of

your letter forwarding a copy of a Memorial

submitted to his predecessor in 1907 by the

Council of the Incorporated Law Society of

Ireland, on

the subject Tof

the Annual

Certificate Duty payable by Solicitors

in

Ireland.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed),

J. T. DAVIES.

W. G. Wakely, Esq.,

Secretary,

The Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.

Treasury Chambers, Whitehall, S.W.,

15th April,

1912.

DEAR SIR,

With reference to your letter of the 27th

ultimo, asking for

the abolition of

the

Solicitors' Certificate Duty, I am desired by

the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that

he regrets that he does not see his way to

accede

to your

request.

It would be

impossible to confine such action to Ireland,

and to abolish the duty throughout the

United Kingdom would entail a considerable

loss of revenue.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed), H. P. HAMILTON.

W. G. Wakely, Esq.,

Secretary,

The Incorporated Law Society of Ireland.

Recent Decisions affecting Solicitors.

(Notes of decisions, whether in reported or

unreported cases, of interest to Solicitors, are

invited from Members.)

COURT OF APPEAL (ENGLAND).

(Before Cozens-Hardy, M.

R., Fl

etcher

Moulton and Buckley,

L

.JJ.)

Rakusen

v.

Ellis, Munday and Clarke.

March

19, 1912.

Solicitor after acting for one

party, acting for opponent in same dispute.

THIS was an appeal by the defendants, a

firm of Solicitors, from a decision of Mr.

Justice Warrington.

The plaintiff, in the case had moved for

an injunction to restrain the defendants from

acting as Solicitors for a company in certain

arbitration proceedings between the plaintiff

and the company, and for an order restrain–

ing the defendants from communicating to the

company confidential information obtained

from the plaintiff. The plaintiff was at one

time in the employment of the company, and

in June, 1911, the company gave notice to

determine his employment.

In September,

1911. the plaintiff consulted the defendants

with reference to this attempted dismissal of

himself, and he gave the particular partner

(Mr. Munday), who attended to his business,

confidential

information

relating'

to his

dispute with the company. In October, 1911,

the plaintiff changed his Solicitors, and

immediately afterwards he

issued a writ

against

the

company

for

damages

for

wrongful dismissal. That action was stayed

on the terms that the matter should be

referred to arbitration. This arbitration was

proceeded with,

and

the company had

recently changed its Solicitors, and retained

Messrs. Ellis, Munday and Clarke (the present

appellants) to act for it. Thus, these Solicitors

after acting first for the plaintiff in this

dispute, were now employed to act for the

defendants. But Mr. Clarke was the only

partner who was proposing to act for the

defendants, and Mr. Munday offered an

undertaking not to communicate any con–

fidential

information obtained

from

the

plaintiff to Mr. Clarke.

The matter came

before Mr. Justice Warrington on March 15,

1912. and he held that, apart from whether

there was any danger of the Solicitors com–

municating to the company any confidential

information given to them by the plaintiff,

the Court ought not to allow a firm of

Solicitors which had acted for a plaintiff in

a particular cause or matter to act sub–

sequently as Solicitors for the defendants ;

and he granted an injunction accordingly.

The defendants appealed, and the Court of

Appeal allowed the appeal.

The Master of the Rolls, in the course of

his judgment, said that he did not doubt for

a moment there might be cases where the

circumstances were such that a Solicitor

ought not to be allowed to act for the other

side because he could not clear his mind of

information' given to him confidentially by

his former client; but the Court ought to

treat each of these cases as a matter of

substance on

the particular

facts,

and