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unrealistic. Another direction which may be more hopeful for international law because
of some willingness on the part of states, since such solution would not bind them
to receive and provide protection to forced migrants on their territories, would be to
emphasize and stipulate the responsibility of states for situations within their borders.
Under such circumstances a potential duty of the state to accept the assistance of other
states in the case of domestic conflict would be appropriate and forced migration may
be prevented or at least reduced. However, the recent conception of state sovereignty
makes such possibility relevant only in the very distant future (any considerations of
redefining the conception go beyond the scope of this book).
High numbers of improper refugees occurring in the territory of various states is a
reality. From a humanitarian perspective it would be desirable to claim that the only
possible solution would be the adoption of a complex international legal regulation
of their situation; only such regulation would provide a guarantee of their protection
outside their countries of origin in case they cannot return back. However, this
perspective is not necessarily what the states wish to rely on. On the other hand, if
states do not intend to fortify their frontiers, build walls and furnish them with barbed
wires, they have to look for some reasonable solution. Maybe such solution could be
directed to their own territories so that their own citizens need not flee, or to more
extensive assistance provided to their neighbours.




