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GAZETTE
SEPTEMBER
1992
should not imply such a term, and the plain-
tiff's action would therefore be dismissed.
Ambiorix Ltd and Ors v Minister for the
Environment and Ors Supreme Court 23 July
1991
PRACTICE - DISCOVERY - PRIVILEGE - CLAIM BY GOV-
ERNMENT DEPARTMENT FOR PUBLIC INTEREST IM-
MUNITY - WHETHER CONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAL
POWER - PRECEDENT - WHETHER DECISION OF SU-
PREME COURT SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED - Constitu-
tion, Article 34
The plaintiff companies, all engaged in prop-
erty development in Dublin, instituted pro-
ceedings seeking, inter alia, a declaration
that the Minister had acted ultra vires the
Urban Renewal Act 1986 in determining that
a site on George's Quay, Dublin, owned by
the fifth defendant Irish Life Assurance pic,
was a designated area under the 1986 Act. In
connection with the case, the plaintiffs sought
discovery of documents from the defendants,
including memoranda between civil serv-
ants and government Ministers as well as
correspondence between Irish Life and the
relevant government departments. The Min-
ister resisted the motion for discovery on the
grounds that discovery of the departmental
memoranda would impair the efficient op-
eration of the civil service and that the corre-
spondence from Irish Life and others, which
included financial information, had been
treated as confidential. Lardner J ordered
discovery. On appeal by the defendants
HELD
by the Supreme Court (Finlay CJ, Hederman,
McCarthy, O'Flaherty and Egan JJ) dismiss-
ing the appeal: (1) the suggested claim to
privilege in respect of the documents in
question ignored the constitutional basis on
which discovery is ordered in cases such as
the present; and it was for the judicial power,
not the executive, to determine whether cer-
tain documents be produced in evidence; (2)
where there was a conflict alleged between
the production of documents and the public
interest in confidentiality in the exercise of
the executive power, the resolution of the
conflict was also a matter for the judicial
branch, and thus there cannot be a general
class of documents for which any public
interest immunity from production can be
claimed; and any claim to 'class immunity'
would involve an interference with the right
of access of the citizen to the courts.
Murphy
v Dublin Corporation
[1972] IR 215 ap-
proved and followed. Dicta in
O'Keeffe vAn
Bord Pleanala
(Supreme Court, 15 February
1991) (1991) 9 ILT Digest 172 approved.
Conway v Rimmer
[1968] AC 910 consid-
ered; (3) in the absence of a claim that
production of the documents would affect
the safety and security of the State, the trial
judge had acted correctly in examining the
documents in question; (4) any issue of con-
fidentiality of financial information supplied
to the government departments could be
dealt with either by way of deletion of the
information under the direction of the court
or through restricting access to the legal
advisers for the plaintiffs; and in any event the
use of the discovered material for any pur-
pose extraneous to the proceed i ngs wou Id be
a contempt of court.
Chambers v An Bord Pleanala and Sandoz
(Ringaskiddy) Ltd Supreme Court 23 July 1991
PRACTICE - LOCUS STANDI - PLENARY PROCEEDINGS
- DECLARATION SOUGHT THAT PLANNING PERMIS-
SION ULTRA VIRES - WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVING
LOCUS STANDI - Local Government (Planning and De-
velopment) Act 1963, s.82(3)(a) - Local Government (Plan-
ning and Development) Act 1976, s.42
The plaintiffs instituted proceedings seeking
a declaration that the planning permission
granted by the defendant planning board to
the second defendant was ultra vires the
1963 Act, as amended. The plaintiffs were
residents in the area in which the second
defendant proposed to site its pharmaceuti-
cal plant in respect of which permission was
granted. S.82(3)(a) of the 1963 Act, as in-
serted by s.42 of the 1976 Act, provides that
proceedings challenging a planning permis-
sion must be brought within two months of
the grant of permission. The permission in
the instant case had been given on 24 July
1990 and the plaintiffs'- action was begun on
21 September 1990. The defendants sought
to have the action dismissed on the ground
that it was frivolous and vexatious or an
abuse of the process of the courts. Blayney J
dismissed this application. A preliminary is-
suewas then set down for action as towhether
the plaintiffs had locus standi to bring the
proceedings. The defendants argued, inter
alia, that the plaintiffs had no locus standi
since they had not participated at the hearing
before the defendant planning board and
that since the 1963 Act constituted a compre-
hensive code the plaintiffs should not be
permitted to raise matters in the proceedings
which they could have raised, but did not, at
the planning hearing. In the High Court,
Lavan J held that the plaintiffs had no locus
standi. On appeal by the plaintiffs
HELD
by
the Supreme Court (Finlay CJ, Hederman,
McCarthy, O'Flaherty and Egan JJ) allowing
the appeal: since the plaintiffs had instituted
the proceedings within the statutory time
period specified in the 1963 Act, and since
they were also aggrieved persons, in the
sense that the permission impacted on them
personally, they had locus standi to continue
the proceedings as part of the constitutional
right of access to the courts to litigate
justiciable issues. Dicta in
The State (Lynch)
v Cooney
[1983] ILRM 89; |1982] IR 337
applied.
The State (Abenglen Properties Ltd)
v Dublin Corporation
[1982] ILRM 590;
[1984] IR 381 distinguished.
Semble:
the
issues raised by the defendants were more
appropriate to the substantive proceedings.
Dunleavy v Glen Abbey Ltd High Court 9
May 1991
TORT - BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY - EMPLOYER'S
LIABILITY - FACTORY REGULATIONS - MANUAL HAN-
DLING - WHETHER A 'PROCESS' WITHIN REGULA-
TIONS - WHETHER BREACH OF DUTY ESTABLISHED -
WHETHER CAUSATIVE FACTOR IN ACCIDENT - Facto-
ries Act 1955
(Manual Labour) (Maximum Weights and
Transport) Regulations 1972, Regs.3, 6, 7
The plaintiff was an employee of the defend-
ant company, and about half of his duties
involved carrying and lifting loads into and in
the company's factory premises. On the oc-
casion giving rise to the proceedings, nine
cartons of metal fasteners arried at the com-
pany's premises in a van, the cartons being
stored on a pallet in the van. The plaintiff
went for the fork-lift truck in the premises to
lift the cartons from the van, but its battery
was dead. The plaintiff then proceeded to lift
the cartons manually from the van with the
help of the van driver. Each carton was small,
being 57 cm x 24 cm x 23 cm, but weighed
between 35 and 42 kilos. They lifted four of
the cartons in this way, but with the fifth
carton the van driver let go, the plaintiff was
jerked by the weight and he suffered a back
injury. The plaintiff claimed damages in neg-
ligence and breach of statutory duty. It was
accepted that the plaintiff had regularly com-
plained that the fork-lift truck was inopera-
tive from time to time and that he not re-
ceived manual handling training.
HELD
by
Barron J finding for the plaintiff: (1) since the
plaintiff was employed by the defendant
company in activity which normally included
the manual transport of loads, and was there-
fore of more than a minimal duration, and
since that employment was carried on in a
factory, he was engaged in a 'process' within
the meaning of Reg.3 of the 1972 Regula-
tions.
Nurse vMorganite Crucible Ltd
[ 1989]
AC 692 approved; (2) the defendant had not
provided the plaintiff with manual handling
training, and was thus in breach of Reg.6 of
the 1972 Regulations; and, since it was aware
that the fork-lift truck was inoperative from
time to time, it was also in breach of Reg.7,
which required that, so far as is reasonably
practicable, suitable mechanical devices be
used to avoid the necessity for manual trans-
port of loads; (3) as to whether the breaches
of statutory duty were causative factors in the
accident, it was agreed that the plaintiff was
using the proper posture for lifting and load-
ing weights, so that the failure to provide
training on this point was not a causative
factor in the accident; (4) while there might
be a tendency to assume that the proper way
to perform the task was obvious or involved
common sense by the employee, this ignored
the need for the Regulations which applied in
the instant case; and if the plaintiff had re-
ceived the training required by the 1972
Regulations he would have learned that, in
addition to good posture, in some circum-
stances it is better to take the entire load than
to share it and that a load should sometimes
be broken up; and if he had had such training
he would have approached his task in a
different manner; and on this basis there was
a causative link between the breach of statu-
tory duty and the accident; (5) there was no
question of contributory negligence, having
regard to the plaintiff's good posture and lack
of training; (6) while the injury received did
not at first appear to be particularly serious, a
congenital weakness in the plaintiff's back
made him more susceptible to prolonged
injury, and the medical evidence indicated
that he should not engage in repetitive bend-
ing or heavy lifting; and in the circumstances
an award of 15,000 general damages was
appropriate.
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