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GAZETTE

SEPTEMBER 1992

plaintiff had not exercised an independent

judgment on the correctness of the fee to

senior counsel; and it was to be presumed, in

the absence of contrary evidence, that a brief-

ing solicitor would do his duty conscien-

tiously and would consider the appropriate

level of fee payable; (2) having regard to the

transcript of the trial of the action, the Taxing

Master had not taken into account the actual

complexity of the case even though the ques-

tions put to the jury appeared to focus on the

issues of false imprisonment; (3) the Taxing

Master had erred in concluding that the fee

agreed with the senior counsel was a 'special

fee' within the meaning of 0.99, r.37(18) of

the 1986 Rules, and the briefing solicitor had

been correct to inform the plaintiff in advance

of the potential fee he might be exposed to if

the claim was unsuccessful; (4) the Taxing

Master shou Id have al lowed the pre-trial opi n-

ion under 0.99, r.37(18) having regard to the

complexity of the case.

Gormley v Ireland and Ors High Court 7

March 1991

PRACTICE — DISCOVERY — PRIVILEGE — GOVERN-

MENT DEPARTMENT COMMUNICATIONS — INTERN-

MENT OF PERSON — WHETHER MATERIAL PRIVI-

LEGED — COMMUNICATIONS WITH GARDAI.

The plaintiff, a clerical officer with the De-

partment of Posts and Telegraphs, was in-

terned pursuant to the Offences against the

State (Amendment) Act 1940 between July

1957 and November 1958. On release, he

was requested to sign a declaration to respect

the Constitution of Ireland and not to support

or assist any unlawful organisation. Between

1958 and 1983, the plaintiff declined to sign

this declaration and he was suspended as a

clerical officer. In 1983, he signed the decla-

ration and he was restored to his position. He

instituted proceedings claiming a salary with-

out regard to the interruption arising in his

suspension from duties. In the course of the

action, the defendants claimed privilege from

discovery of certain documents relating to the

plaintiff's internment and also in connection

with communications with the Gardai.

Held

by Murphy J ordering discovery of some

documents: (1) while some of the memo-

randa and letters prepared in connection with

the plaintiff's internment were confidential

and sensitive, they could not be regarded as

involving national security, and it was in the

public interest that they be disclosed for the

purposes of the proceedings; and likewise

documentation concerning the alleged re-

fusal of the plaintiff to sign the declaration

should also be disclosed, except for some

elements which concerned legal advice,

which should be pasted over; (2) certain

communications with the Gardai concerning

internment were highly confidential and while

they might be of some value to the plaintiff

they were in no sense fundamental to it and

discovery would not be ordered of these

documents.

Ambrose v CRegan Supreme Court 20 De-

cember 1991

PRACTICE — EVIDENCE — IRRELEVANT CONSIDERA-

TIONS—ROADTRAFFIC—WHETHER DRIVER OF CAR

HAVING CONSENT OF OWNER — TRIAL JUDGE TAK-

ING IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT

— Road Traffic Act 1961, s.118.

In 1974, the plaintiff was injured while a

passenger in the defendant's car which, at the

time, was being driven by the defendant's

son. The plaintiff issued proceedings against

the defendant, but the question of compensa-

tion was then addressed in the context of the

Agreement operated by the Motor Insurance

Bureau of Ireland (MIBI). The case ultimately

came before the High Court in 1990 on the

question as to whether the defendant's son

was driving with the defendant's consent

within s.118 of the 1961 Act. In holding that

the defendant's son had not been driving with

her consent, the trial judge (MacKenzie J)

stated that the plaintiff was ultimately entitled

to be compensated for his injuries and that the

case was an attempt by the MIBI to offload

responsibility onto the defendant. On appeal

by the plaintiff

Held

by the Supreme Court

(Finlay CJ, McCarthy and O'Flaherty JJ) al-

lowing the appeal: the trial judge had taken

into account irrelevant considerations in his

judgment; and although the evidence in the

case supported a conclusion one way or the

other, it was appropriate to order a re-trial of

the action bearing in mind that the onus lay

on the defendant todisprove consent.

Buckley

v Musgrave Brook Bond Ltd

11969] IR 440

followed.

Merriman v Dublin Corporation and Dublin

County Council High Court 29 November

1991

TORT — BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY — FAILURE

TO MAINTAIN SEWER— CONCURRENT WRONGDO-

ERS—WHETHER ESTABLISHED—Public Health (Irl) Act

1878, ss.2, 15

The plaintiff was injured when he fell into an

open gully on the side of a roadway. The

gully, road and adjacent housing had been

built by the Corporation in the Council's

administrative area, but the roadway had not

been taken in charge by the Council at the

time of the accident. A grill on the gully had

been removed at some unknown stage prior

to the plaintiff's accident. The gully consti-

tuted a 'sewer' within the meaning of s.2 of

the 1878 Act.

Held

by Costello finding for the

plaintiff against the Council only: (1) the

Corporation owed no duty of care at common

law to the plaintiff nor was it in breach of

statutory duty to the plaintiff either as sanitary

authority or as a road authority; (2) although

the Council had not taken in charge the road

in question, it was in breach of statutory duty

since the gully constituted a 'sewer' under s.2

of the 1878 Act and it was obliged to keep in

repair all sewers belonging to it under s. 15 of

the 1878 Act.

White v Hindly Local Board

LR

10 QB 219 applied; (3) although the Corpo-

ration had agreed with the Council to main-

tain the road in question until it was taken in

charge, this did not create any statutory obli-

gations towards third parties and so the de-

fendants were not 'concurrent wrongdoers'

under s.11 of the 1961 Act and the Council

was not therefore entitled to an indemnity

from the Corporation; (4) the plaintiff had not

been a candid witness in relation to the extent

of his injuries and having regard to the medi-

cal evidence he was entitled to £10,000 in

damages.

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