GAZETTE
' APRIL 1990
Solicitor's charging lien -
priorities and practice
The solicitor's general retaining lien - to hold documents of a client
until paid his costs - is a straightforward form of security. The only
real risks lie either in parting with possession without expressly
preserving the solicitor's rights or, as in the recent case of
Re
Galdan Properties
Ltd.,
1
a Court finding as a matter of law that no
lien was created. Far more problematic is the charging lien: the right
to apply to the Court to charge with the solicitor's costs property
recovered or preserved through the solicitor's efforts. Two recent
Irish cases
Fitzpatrick -v- DAF Sales Ltd.
2
and
Larkin -v- Groeger
3
illustrate the risks involved in failing to act swiftly to preserve such
rights and the danger of losing priority even if swift action is taken.
Statute and C ommon Law
The matter is somewhat compli-
cated by the fact that there are two
separate bases for the solicitor's
right: (i) the inherent jurisdiction of
the Court at common law to pro-
tect the solicitor: (ii) the statutory
right contained in Section 3 of the
Legal Practitioners (Ireland) Act,
1876 to apply to the Court for a
Charging Order. In
Re Born;
Curnock -v- Born
4
it was held that
the statutory right should be re-
garded merely as a convenient
method of enforcing the common
law lien. It is not the only method
of enforcement:
In Campbell -v-
Campbell
5
the solicitor's claim
was so vaguely worded that it
" . . . there ere two separate
bases for the solicitor's
[lien]
"
could be regarded either as a claim
under the statute or at common
law: the Court of Appeal treated
the application as one at common
law and granted the relief sought.
Whether the two forms of relief can
be regarded as identical is doubtful:
for example, it has been held that
Section 3 is wide enough to cover
property of every kind, including
real property, which could not be
charged at common law.
6
In
practice, however, any application
to enforce a lien would probably be
treated as an application under
Section 3.
When the Right Arises
It has been stated
7
that the term
lien in respect of a solicitor's charge
for costs is misleading, in that lien
implies possession, whereas the
solicitor, without the Court's
intervention, may have no fund or
By
Christopher Doyle
Barrister-at-Law
property in his possession. As a
logical extension of this, it has been
held that no right comes into exist-
ence until the solicitor seeks the
Court's assistance.
In James Bibby
Ltd. -v- Woods and Howard
8
a
judgment debtor appealed against
the making of a garnishee order
absolute on the ground that his
solicitor at the hearing claimed
(through the Debtor) that his lien
for costs had priority. The appeal
was dismissed on the ground that
at the time the absolute order was
made the solicitor had neither
sought nor been granted a charging
order and accordingly had no right
to set against the judgment
creditors.
In Fitzpatrick -v- DAF
Sales Ltd.,
O'Hanlon J. followed
James
Bibby
in making a
conditional order of garnishee ab-
solute notwithstanding the judg-
ment debtor's objection that his
solicitor's lien had priority.
These judgments raise a number
of difficulties. In the first place, the
solicitor was not a party to the
hearing in either case, and each
Court had grave doubts as to
whether the judgment debtor had
any right to be heard. If the solicitor
had appeared in his own right,
would the result have been any
different?
James Bibby
appears to
hold that a solicitor who had not
applied for a charging order could
not be heard at all. It was argued
in
Fitzpatrick
that
James Bibby
" . . . a solicitor who seeks to
intervene without having
obtained a charging order is
on grave risk
conflicts wijth earlier English
authorities* but in fact nearly all of
these ft/ere cases where the
solicitor had been granted, or at
least applied for, a charging order.
However, there are two Irish Circuit
Court decisions,
Fleming
-v-
Ironmonger and Lord Herbert
9
and
Temple Press Ltd. -v- Blogh
10
where a conditional order of
garnishee was discharged on a
solicitor's objection that his lien for
costs had priority, although from
the reports it does not appear that
either had applied for a charging
order. On the face of it, these cases
cannot be reconciled with
James
Bibby
and therefore must be taken
to have been overruled by
Fitzpatrick.
As a further complica-
tion, in
Fitzpatrick,
O'Hanlon J.
Christopher Doyle.
85