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Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites

Final report

37

126 Failure of an overfill protection system places reliance on the tank to avoid the uncontrolled

loss of primary containment of hazardous substances. The adoption of appropriate design

standards should ensure tank integrity and suitable overflow and venting mechanisms.

Throughout the life of the tank, integrity of primary containment should be maintained through a

process of periodic inspection, maintenance and repair.

127 In addition to a dutyholder’s responsibility to review their DSEAR (Dangerous Substances and

Explosive Atmospheres Regulations) risk assessment on a regular basis (eg using the guidance in

Area classification for installations handling flammable fluids

(EI 15)

18

) there are also requirements to

undertake reviews if there is reason to believe that the risk assessment is no longer valid or if there

has been a significant change. Hazard and risk analysis may be required to ascertain appropriate

risk reduction measures through additional layers of protection, as described in the guidance

provided for Recommendation 1. DSEAR risk assessments should reflect the findings of the

LOPA assessments (see Appendix 2). The need for a suitable and sufficient risk assessment is an

ongoing duty and, as further understanding of the mechanisms of the incident becomes available

and if additional specific guidance is produced, there may be a need for further reviews. DSEAR

risk assessments and the measures to control identified risks should, in addition to any sector or

industry-specific guidance, take account of the general guidance contained by the HSE Approved

Code of Practice (ACOP) L138

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and where relevant the additional activity related DSEAR ACOPs:

Unloading petrol from road tankers

L133;

20

Design of plant equipment and workplaces

L134;

21

Storage of dangerous substances

L135;

22

Control and mitigation measures

L136;

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and

Safe maintenance, repair and cleaning procedures

L137.

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Reference should also be made to Appendix 2, paragraph 136 when considering the selection of

equipment and protective systems.

Part 3 Engineering against escalation

of loss of primary containment

MIIB Recommendation 11

Operators of Buncefield-type sites should review the classification of places within COMAH

sites where explosive atmospheres may occur and their selection of equipment and protective

systems (as required by the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations

2002). This review should take into account the likelihood of undetected loss of containment

and the possible extent of an explosive atmosphere following such an undetected loss of

containment. Operators in the wider fuel and chemicals industries should also consider such a

review, to take account of events at Buncefield.

MIIB Recommendation 12

Following on from Recommendation 11, operators of Buncefield-type sites should evaluate the

siting and/or suitable protection of emergency response facilities such as firefighting pumps,

lagoons or manual emergency switches.