GAZETTE
AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 199*.
incidental to or consequential upon
their express objects. If acquiring prem-
ises suitable for their statutory pur-
poses entailed undertaking to act as
custodians of chattels contained therein
this could reasonably be regarded as
falling within their incidental or conse-
quential powers.
Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 161
Sean McAnarney and Deirdre
McAnarney v. John Hanrahan and T.E.
Potterton Ltd; High Court (Costello J)
16 July 1993
Negligence - Negligent misstatement -
Representations made by auctioneer acting
on behalf of vendor to prospective purchas-
ers - Whether auctioneer owed duty of care
to purchasers - Price at which freehold re-
version pertaining to leasehold licensed
premises could be purchased - Assessment
of damages in cases of negligent misstate-
ment - Mental distress caused by
misrepresentation
Facts The defendants were auction-
eers who had been engaged to sell
licensed premises which were held un-
der a lease for 31 years which
commenced on 13 November 1958. The
plaintiffs arrived late for the auction
and were told by the first named defen-
dant that a bid of £54,000 had been
made but the property had then been
withdrawn. He informed them that
there had been negotiations with the
landlords and that the freehold interest
could be purchased for £3,000 or less. In
fact no bid of £54,000 had been made
and no negotiations with the landlords
concerning the purchase of the freehold
had taken place. On the basis of these
representations the plaintiffs eventu-
ally agreed in December 1984 to
purchase the premises for £45,000.
When the plaintiffs decided to sell the
premises in 1986 they were advised that
they should purchase the freehold.
However, the landlords demanded
£40,000. The plaintiffs could not raise
this amount and initiated proceedings
against the defendants for negligence.
The plaintiffs remained in possession of
the premises after the expiration of the
lease without paying rent. In 1991 they
purchased the freehold for £30,000 and
later that year sold the premises for
£80,000.
Held by Costello J in finding the defen-
dants negligent and awarding damages
to the plaintiffs: (1) The first named de-
fendant took it upon himself to give an
opinion regarding the purchase of the
freehold. He should have known that
the plaintiffs would place reliance on
what he told them, particularly as he
had expressly stated that negotiations
had already taken place with the land-
lords. This gave rise to a special rela-
tionship between the plaintiffs and the
first named defendant which imposed
a duty of care on the latter in respect of
the giving of the information. By failing
to find out what price the landlords
would require for their interest the first
named defendant breached this duty of
care.
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller &
Partners Ltd
[1964] AC 465 applied and
Bank of Ireland v. Smith
[1966] IR 646
distinguished. (2) The method for as-
sessing damages in cases of negligent
misstatement is analogous to that used
in respect of the tort of deceit. The dam-
ages are calculated so as to put the
plaintiff in the position he would have
been in if the representation had not
been made to him. Thus where a plain-
tiff has been induced to enter into a
contract for the purchase of land by a
negligent misstatement, the normal
measure of damages is the price paid for
the land less its actual value at the time
of purchase. (3) Accordingly the plain-
tiffs were not entitled to damages of
£27,000 in respect of the supposed loss
of bargain caused by the difference be-
tween what had been represented as the
price of the freehold interest and what
it had actually cost to purchase. Instead
the plaintiffs were entitled to £5,000 as
the premises were worth approxi-
mately £40,000 at the time when they
paid £45,000 for them. (4) The cost of
refurbishing the premises was not re-
coverable by way of special damages
because it would have been incurrred
any way and was not a consequence of
the defendants' negligence. (5) In suit-
able cases damages for negligent
misstatement could take into account
mental distress caused to the plaintiff.
However, any distress caused by the
defendants here could not be measured
in any meaningful way and the justice
of the case did not require that the dam-
ages should be increased.
Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 210
C.R. v. An Bord Uchtála: High Court
(Morris J) 28 June 1993
Family Law - Adoption - Judicial Review
- Application for particulars to make trace-
able the connection between entry in
Adopted Children's Register and corre-
sponding entry in Registry of Births -
Refusal by board to furnish information -
Particulars not to be given except by order
of court or board - Whether board has obli-
gation to determine such application -
Whether blanket policy of refusal - Whether
board considered relevant information to
2
enable it exercise its discretion - Whether
function of board may be delegated to adop-
tion society - Adoption Act 1952, section
22 - Adoption Act 1976, section 8
Facts The applicant was adopted some
years prior to his signing of the
Adopted Children's Register which
had the effect of regularising his adop-
tion. He wished to find out more about
his natural parents and applied to the
respondents for information to make
traceable the connection between the
.entry relating to him in the Adopted
Children's Register and the corre-
sponding entry in the Registry of Births
pursuant to section 22 of the Adoption
Act 1952. He sought to obtain his origi-
nal birth certificate. The board refused
his application for reasons of confiden-
tiality and stated that it would not
depart from its practice of not provid-
ing for any right of access to birth
records by adopted persons. The board
made no enquiry as to the merits of the
application but advised the applicant to
contact the adoption society. The appli-
cant sought an order of
certiorari
quashing the purported decision by the
respondents and an order of
mandamus
requiring them to carry out their obliga-
tion to determine the issue of the
applicant's entitlement to the particu-
lars sought. It was submitted that upon
an application being made pursuant to
section 22 of the Adoption Act 1952 for
information contained in the index, the
board has an obligation to determine
that application in a proper manner and
not upon the basis of a blanket policy of
refusal, nor could they delegate to an
adoption society the function vested in
them.
Held by Morris J in granting the reliefs
sought: (1) As no effort had been made
by the respondents to decide the appli-
cation on its individual merits such
determination, as there was, fell short of
the obligation imposed by section 22 of
the Adoption Act 1952. (2) The matter
should be sent back to the adoption
board to determine the applicant's ap-
plication. The result of this deter-
mination was a matter exclusively for
the board. (3) In order for the respon-
dents to be satisfied that in any parti-
cular case it is proper to release such
information it would be necessary to
screen any applicant and the parent he
is attempting to trace. (4) The board,
while retaining full seisin of the matter,
ought to seek the assistance and advice
of the adoption society in the matter
prior to making a decision. (5) The de-
cision to furnish or withhold any in-
formation must be that of the board.
Reported at [1994] 1 ILRM 217




