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GAZETTE

OCTOBER 1981

Recent

Irish

Cases

CRIMINAL LAW

Conviction for murder quashed

because

statements

made

by

Appellant should not have been

admitted by the Trial Judge. Jury

should be asked to decide whether

Appellant's evidence that he had been

held against his wishes, as he

described, was or was not true.

The Appellant was tried in the

Central Criminal Court before a

Judge and Jury on the charge of

having murdered Miss V.C. He was

convicted and sentenced to penal

servitude for life. He appealed

directly to the Supreme Court in

exercise of his right so to do by

Article 34.4.3 of the Constitution

which expressly provided that the

Supreme Court, as the court of final

appeal, should, with such exceptions

and subject to such regulations as

might be prescribed by law, have

appellate jurisdiction

from all

decisions of the High Court; and that

the Central Criminal Court was the

name applied to the High Court when

exercising its criminal jurisdiction in

relation to the trial of offences, and a

verdict, arrived at in that Court by a

Jury on the trial of an indictable

offence was a decision of that Court.

The following were the relevant

facts: The body of V.C., it had

been stated, was found in her flat by

the Appellant, and another man, who

entered by means of a door key

which was lawfully in the Appellant's

possession. A knife was embedded in

her chest and a scarf was tightly

bound around her neck.

On making the discovery, the

Appellant

phoned

999

and

subsequently the Gardai and an

ambulance arrived. It was stated that

the Appellant lived in a block of flats

which was owned by a Mr. M, a

brother-in-law of V.C. Mr. M.

employed the Appellant for odd jobs

in connection with the upkeep of the

flats and, at the time of the murder,

the Appellant had been engaged by

Mr. M. to paint and decorate, in his

spare time, the house in which V.C.

resided. The Appellant had stated

that he went to the house where V.C.

resided on a Sunday, to finish the

work he had commenced and Mr. D.

who accompanied him was to have

assisted him in finishing the work.

Following the arrival of the Gardai,

the Appellant was asked to go to

Irishtown Garda Station to make a

statement which he duly did, giving a

full and detailed account which was

reduced to writing and signed.

In his statement the Appellant said

he had gone to the house the previous

day, a Saturday, to do a small job in

connection with the electric wiring.

He said he later met Mr. D. and

arranged for his help in finishing the

work the following day. His

statement then outlined how when

they arrived at the house they

discovered the dead body of V.C.

At the trial the evidence was to the

effect that when the Appellant made

his statement and for a considerable

time after, no one entertained the

slightest suspicion that the Appellant

had been in any way involved in the

murder of V.C.

The Appellant remained on in

Irishtown Garda Station throughout

Sunday night and right into the

following (Monday) morning, being

subjected, throughout, to successive

bouts of questioning by different

groups of gardai, and at no time

being afforded an opportunity of

sleeping or resting.

Seven telephonic inquiries, from

his wife, friends and family were

made while he was there, and they

were never communicated to him and

those inquiring for him did not

receive any reliable information as to

what was happening to him.

In the early hours of the Monday

morning, he was again interviewed

and questioned. At 10 a.m. he was

transferred to the Donnybrook

Garda Station where the questioning

was resumed by other gardai. At 2

p.m. on the Monday afternoon a

Garda entered the room where he

was, the Appellant enquired whether

he was the garda who had taken his

fingerprints, and suddenly said: "I

killed V.C. I did it with a bit of cable.

1 stabbed her with a knife from the

kitchen table".

The Appellant was then seen by an

Inspector and agreed to make a

written statement. The Inspector

suggested he should have some sleep.

At about 6 p.m. on the Monday

evening he was awakened, cautioned

and he made a statment in which he

confessed to the killing of V.C. on the

previous Saturday.

Another statement was relied upon

by the prosecution. The Appellant

said to his brother in answer to a

question as to why he was not

coming home, "Because I did it".

This was in the presence of Gardai.

There was some conflict of evidence

as to whether he added "because I

killed her".

The Trial Judge stated that in his

view no question of unlawful custody

arose and having found that the

statements were voluntary, he

decided to admit them in evidence.

In the Supreme Court, O'Higgins,

C.J., and Walsh, J., considered the

principles laid down in

The People

v.

O'Brien

[1965] I.R. 142, in relation

to evidence, irregularly obtained. The

first of these principles was that

evidence obtained as a result of a

deliberate and conscious violation of

the Constitution should be excluded

unless there was some "extraordinary

excusing

circumstance"

which

warranted its admission.

The second principle was that in

relation to evidence obtained by

illegal means, short of a violation of

Constitutional rights, the presiding

Judge has a discretion to exclude

same where it appeared to him that

public policy, based on a balancing of

public

interest,

required

such

exclusion.

Held

(per O'Higgins, CJ., with a

concurring separate judgment by

Walsh J., and a separate concurring

judgment from Kenny J., with

reservations) in allowing the appeal

and quashing the conviction that:—

(1) The fact that the Appellant was

subjected for almost 22 hours to

sustained questioning, never had

an opportunity of communicating

with his family or friends, and

had never been permitted to rest

or sleep until he made an

admission of guilt, all amounted

to

such

circumstances

of

harassment and oppression as to

make it unjust and unfair to

admit in evidence anything he

said.

(2) The Trial Judge, in exercising his

discretion

to

admit

the

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