GAZETTE
MARCH 1981
Travelling
Hopefully?
It may, as Robert Louis Stevenson once suggested, be better
to travel hopefully than to arrive, but is it better to pay
hopefully than to travel?
The collapse of Bray Travel Ltd., a leading tour
operator, following rapid departures from the scene of
other lesser fry, must throw this question into stark relief
and has already led to increasing demands for better
protection for the public against the loss of deposits or
other sums paid for holidays, which vanish with the
demise of the tour operator.
The collapse of any major trading company highlights
certain general flaws in our control of trading companies.
Apart from the basic weakness that major trading
companies are permitted to operate with minimal nominal
capital, there is no requirement that any particular
amount of paid-up capital should be maintained while a
company is trading, nor is there any obligation on a
parent company to accept liability for a subsidiary s
debts. With this background, the likelihood increases that
members of the public will suffer as a result of a failure of
a trading company, when that trading company is found
to be operating in an area of activity where profit margins
are by any normal standards extraordinarily small. It has
been authoritatively reported that the profit margins
hoped for by tour operators frequently do not exceed
10% and it is clear that the tour operators' business, like
modern-day insurance, has become largely a "money
business. Profit comes not only from the activity being
carried on, but from the investment income earned from
the monies paid by customers, in advance of their
holidays.
.
The tour operator is obliged to make commitments tor
hotels and for seats on charter airlines anything from six
months to a year in advance of the holiday period, which
calls for considerable expertise in anticipating likely
demand. Any unexpected drop in demand may have a
serious affect on the viability of the tour operator.
In such circumstances, the need for protection of the
monies paid in advance to the tour operator by the
holiday maker is obvious and it is strange that neither the
Trade Association nor legislation has, long ago, brought
effective measures into operation for the protection of
deposits. It is clear that a substantial bonding scheme is
required and it is suggested that, in the nature of the parti-
cular business, the individual bonding of tour operators
for very substantial sums is to be preferred to collective
bonding schemes. In addition, there is a strong case for a
rapid development of a "compensation fund" which could
be operated on a "trade-wide" basis, to cover the
immediate effects of the collapse of any tour operator on
individual travellers, whose particular holidays are
immediately affected by the collapse.
The Travel Reserve Fund Bill recently introduced in
the Dáil by Deputy Patrick Hegarty is, apart from its
obvious drafting defects, quite unsatisfactory. To confine,
as it does, the protection of the fund to customers of the
Irish Travel Agents' Association members alone suggests
that the aim of the legislation is as much the advance-
ment of the Association as the protection of the public.
The Bill, as introduced, confers a status on this Associa-
tion which ought not to be conferred on any group which
is not the subject of statutory control or regulation.
It is suggested that such a "compensation fund" might
be also used to compensate travellers who suffer unhappy
experiences on their package tour holidays. This second
aspect of protection for the travelling public has not as
yet been tackled comprehensively in the Republic of
Ireland. We have no equivalent of the Codes of Conduct
for tour operators and retail agents operated by the
Association of British Travel Agents and the arbitration
arrangements imposed in the Republic of Ireland on
individual travellers by the standard booking form of the
I.T.A.A. is unsatisfactory in many respects. Apart from
the fact that the arbitration cannot be conducted within
the context of a code of conduct, no arrangements were
made by the I.T.A.A. for the funding of the arbitration
scheme. The A.B.T.A. scheme provides for "a simple and
inexpensive method of arbitration whereby the claim may
be considered on documents alone". If the customer loses
on arbitration, he can only be required to pay twice the
deposit which, in the normal case, would be unlikely to
exceed £40. The I.T.A.A. have unilaterally provided that
an arbitrator is to be appointed by the President of the
Incorporated Law Society (without having consulted the
Law Society as to whether the President wished to be
involved in such an arrangement!) and has made no provi-
sion for any contribution, either by the Association or by
the tour operator concerned, towards the costs of the
arbitration. The arbitration can, therefore, be quite expen-
sive for a customer who is at risk of having the costs of
the arbitration awarded against him. The only redeeming
factor is that because the arbitration is not limited to
documents, the tour operator may be in difficulty in
producing witnesses from the hotels or transport authori-
ties concerned to refute the claims of the customer.
It is understood that the Director of Consumer Affairs
hopes to persuade the Irish Travel Agents' Association to
establish a code of conduct along lines similar to the
A.B.T.A. scheme in the near future. It is to be hoped that
the establishment of such a code of conduct will include
an arrangement whereby the costs of arbitration are
substantially funded by the I.T.A.A., so that the customer
is only at risk of suffering a relatively modest loss, in the
event of the arbitration going against him.
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