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217

HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN STRASBOURG AND LUXEMBOURG …

Rights, over the Council of Europe system but also over all rights guaranteed by

national constitutions.

21

But can we truly interpret the intention of Member States

as wanting to grant the Charter such vast supremacy over national and international

systems in case of parallel application? Doesn’t this opinion of CJEU go far beyond the

considerations of even the politicians pondering the federalization of the European

Union, which is itself a political question?

It is quite clear that the CJEU does not plan to abandon its position of one of the

chief driving forces of European integration, not even in a situation, where its decision

might – temporarily, let’s hope – result in a conflict among EU, Council of Europe

and member countries of both the regional organizations. It is clear, that through

its conclusions in opinion 2/2013, the CJEU will try to broaden its competence

within the EU, and then, and only then, the court will be more willing to accept

certain limitations by the ECtHR. For example, Halberstam is of the opinion that

the disputed CJEU jurisdiction in the field of common foreign and security policy

(Articles 23-46 TEU, Article 2 paragraph 4 TFEU) can be solved by the member

countries consenting to the CJEU having jurisdiction also over this field.

22

The first conclusions formulated in opinion 2/2013 are clear. Unclear, on the

other hand, are the consequences of Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Treaty on EU

remaining unfulfilled or even breached. How will the Union and the Member States

deal with the fact that by the Treaty of Lisbon, they made a promise that they cannot

fulfill? Alternatives to be discussed are many. One solution might be the planned,

however least wanted, review of EU primary law.

23

Another way might be to review

Protocol no. 8 to Article 6 paragraph 2 TEU, which might change the parameters,

under which the EU is eligible to accede to the Convention. It cannot be quite ruled

out that through mutual compromise many of the objections raised by the CJEU

against the accession agreement will be overcome by further agreements and the draft

agreement on accession to the Convention will be

de facto

revised to be mutually

acceptable. It is, of course, also possible that the entire plan of the EU acceding to

the Convention will be postponed indefinitely. A CJEU judge, prof. Jiří Malenovský,

admitted the possibility of so-called

shopping forum

model

,

24

in which each entity

21

Court of Justice of EU decision

Costa v. E.N.E.L

., 6/64;

Internationale Handelsgesellschaft

, 11/70;

Simmenthal

, 106/77;

Kreil

, C-285/88. KOMÁREK, J., AVBEJL, M. (ed-)

Constitutional Pluralism in

the European Union and Beyond.

Oxford: Oxford Hart Publishing, 2012, 452 pages.

22

HALBERSTAM, D.: Foreign Policy and the Luxembourg Court: How to Address a Key Roadblock to

EU Accession to the ECHR’. Available at

http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/foreign-policy-and-the-

luxembourg-court-how-to-address-a-key-roadblock-to-eu-accession-to-the-echr/#.VauzQvlFvIU).

23

HALBERSTAM, D.Foreign Policy and the Luxembourg Court: How to Address a Key Roadblock to

EU Accession to the ECHR’. Available at

http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/foreign-policy-and-the-

luxembourg-court-how-to-address-a-key-roadblock-to-eu-accession-to-the-echr/#.VauzQvlFvIU).

24

Speech by Prof. Jiří Malenovský, CJEU judge, titled „

Posudek 2/13 – původ, kontext, význam (Opinion 2/13

– origins, context, meaning

“, given at a conference taking place on 22. 5. 2015 titled “

Listina základních

práv Evropské unie: Pět let poté aneb jeden lidsko-právní katalog (ne)stačí? (Charter of Fundamental Rights of