GAZETTE
MARCH 1987
refused to make the conditional order
absolute and the Prosecutors appealed to
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court rejected the view of
the High Court that Order 99 Rule 15(e) con-
ferred on the Taxing Master the power to
tax without any Court order, as between
Solicitor and client in addition to the juris-
diction which he had to tax bills referred
under the 1849 Act. The Court noted that
the jurisdiction of the Rules Committee was
found in Section 36 of the Courts of Justice
Act 1924 and that the Eighth Schedule of
the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act of
1961 provided for the jurisdiction of the
Taxing Master.
Referring to
East Donegal Co-Operative -
v- The Attorney-General
(1970) IR 317 and
City View Press Ltd. and Another -v- An
Chomhairle Oiliuna and Others
(1980) IR
381 the Court held that while the powers
duties and functions of the Taxing Master
might be changed or extended by statute
and perhaps by rule of Court, the authority
to do so by rule of Court must derive from
the statute which creates the rule making
authority. There was no such enabling pro-
vision in section 36 of the 1924 Act. The
Court noted that the combined effect of
Sections 2 and 6 of the 1849 Act in respect
of a Bill of Costs for Solicitor and Client
charges duly delivered would appear to be
that:
(1)
The Solicitor cannot lawfully sue for
one month after delivery.
(2)
The client has a period of twelve
months within which to demand and
obtain taxation.
(3)
After the expiry of twelve months or
after payment of the amount of the
bill, then the Court may, if the special
circumstances of the case appear to
require the same, refer the bill to tax-
ation, provided the application to the
Court is made within twelve calendar
months after payment.
(4)
After the expiry of the latter period,
there is no statutory power to refer
for taxation.
The Prosecutors appeal was allowed.
The State (Gallagher Shatter) -v- de Valera,
Supreme Court, 20 December 1984 (per
McCarthy J.), (1986) ILRM 3.
John Buckley
COSTS
Solicitor and Client Bill -
Requirement of Superior Court Rules
The Plaintiff's father engaged the
Defendants to bring proceedings on behalf
of the Plaintiff who was under age at
the time, for damages for injuries sus-
tained in a motor accident. The Plaintiff
came of age during the course of the
proceedings.
The Defendant had advised the Plaintiff's
father and later the Plaintiff herself that over
and above the party and party costs which
he would recover from the other side there
would be certain Solicitor and Client costs
payable by the Plaintiff. The proceedings
were settled for the sum of £19,000. When
the Defendant received the settlement
cheque he deducted £1,500 in respect of
such costs and sent on the balance of
£17,500 to the Plaintiff. The Defendant
claimed that at the time of the settlement
the Plaintiff had agreed to this figure of
£ 1,500 for Solicitor and Client costs but the
Plaintiff denied this. The Plaintiff sought
particulars of the fees in July 1984 from the
Defendant who declined to furnish parti-
culars unless the Plaintiff agreed to pay the
fees payable to the Legal Costs Accountant
for preparing the bill. After the intervention
of the Law Society the Plaintiff furnished in
September 1984, a document stated to be
"a
Bill of professional fees, outlay and
V.A.T. Orla Smyth in account with Thomas
Montgomery & Son." The Law Society
advised the Plaintiff that she could either
have this bill taxed or could insist on being
furnished with an itemised Bill of Costs and
if she decided on the latter course she could
not be billed with the fees due to the Legal
Costs Accountant.
After an interval of a little over a year the
Plaintiff's father wrote on her behalf seeking
an itemised bill and the Defendant again
sought payment of the Legal Costs
Accountant's fees.
On 16 April 1986 the Plaintiff signed a
requisition to tax under Order 90 Rule 15(e)
of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1962 but
no taxation could take place without an
order of the Court in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court in the State (Gallagher
Shatter) -v- De Valera (1986) ILRM.3, The
Plaintiff issued a Special Summons seeking
an order pursuant to Section 2 of the
Attorneys and Solicitors (Ireland) Act 1849
referring the Bill to taxation and seeking the
furnishing of a detailed Bill of Costs for
taxation.
The Court accepted the Plaintiff's
evidence that she had been advised that she
would be liable for Solicitor and Client costs
up to a maximum of £1,500 but had not
agreed to pay the sum of £1,500. The Court
rejected the Defendants argument that the
Plaintiff was not entitled to the Order
because twelve months had elapsed since
the delivery of the bill in September 1984
and payment of the £ 1,500 several months
earlier. The Court referred to the
requirements of the Superior Court Rules,
Order 99 Rule 30(5) which provided that:
1. The Solicitor cannot lawfully sue for one
month after delivery.
2. The Client has a period of twelve months
within which to demand and obtain
taxation.
3. After the expiry of twelve months or
after payment of the amount of the bill,
then the Court may, if the special circum-
stances of the case appear to require the
same, refer the bill to taxation, provided
the application to the Court is made
within twelve calendar months after
payment.
4. After the expiration of the latter period,
there is no statutory power to refer for
taxation,
and noted the view of Buckley L. J. in the
case of
re Osborne and Osborne
(1913)
3 KB 862 where he stated " a Solicitor's bill
against his client for costs in an action in
which party and party costs are recoverable
against the opposite party ought to contain
the whole bill of the fees, charges and
disbursements in reference to the business
to which it relates and not merely a bill of
the extra costs chargeable as between
Solicitor and Client . . . a Solicitor should
deliver a bill of the whole costs giving his
Client credit for the sum received for party
and party costs. Accordingly in
Cobett -v-
Wood
(1908) 2 KB 4 20 it was decided in
this Court that a bill not containing the items
allowed on taxation between party and
party was not a sufficient bill within the
Solicitors A c t ." The Court held that the bill
furnished in this case by the Defendants
was not such a bill as constituted a bona fide
compliance with the 1 8 49 Act and
accordingly the provisions of Section 2
limiting the reference to taxation to
twelve months from the delivery of the
bill did not apply. Neither did the provisions
of Section 6 apply as no bill as was
envisaged by Section 2 had been paid by the
Plaintiff.
The Court accordingly directed the
Defendant to furnish to the Plaintiff a
detailed Bill of Costs and that on such
Bill being delivered it would be open to
the Plaintiff to have the Bill referred to
taxation.
Orla Smyth -v- William J. Montgomery The
High Court (per Blayney J.)
7
July 1986.
John Buckley
GUARANTEE
Bond — Rights of Surety — ObUgetione
of Creditor — Terms of Contrect
J. J. Murphy and Company Limited was
engaged in the warehousing of spirits and
beers which were liable to excise duty when
delivered from a warehouse. By Deed of
Bond executed under seal the defendant
bound itself to pay to the Minister for
Finance on behalf of the Revenue Com-
missioners the sum of £1.4 million con-
ditional upon the failure of J. J. Murphy and
Company Limited to pay the excise duties
chargeable in respect of spirits delivered
from bonded warehouses on which duty
was not paid on delivery but was deferred
for a period certain by agreement with the
Revenue Commissioners. The defendant
entered into a similar bond in respect of
excise duty on beer. Subsequently the
Revenue Commissioners
demanded
payment of, and obtained judgment in the
High Court for, the full sum of £504,416
being the total amount due in respect of the
spirits and beer. The accuracy of the total
was not in dispute.
Section 24 of the Excise Collection and
Management Act, 1841 (4 Vict. cap. 20)
provides inter alia that all goods and com-
modities in respect of which any excise duty
is imposed by law, and all materials for
producing such goods and commodities, in
the custody or possession of the person
carrying on such trade, or in the custody or
possession of any factor, agent or other
person in trust for or for the use of the
person carrying on such trade, shall be
chargeable with all excise duties which,
during the time of such custody or
possession shall have become chargeable or
be in arrears or owing from the person
carrying on such trade; and shall be subject
to all penalties and forfeitures which during
any such custody or possession shall be or
shall have been incurred by the person
carrying on such trade and all such goods
and materials shall remain liable to all such
duties, penalties and forfeitures; and it
should be lawful to levy thereon such duties,
penalties and forfeitures, and for that
ii