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251

CYIL 7 ȍ2016Ȏ

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF ARMED DRONES…

doubt that complex characteristics of modern warfare do not always easily fit into

the established framework”.

58

Furthermore, he emphasizes that, instead of creating

new categories such as “new wars”, we should be rather concerned with the law that

applies and how the new features of war that we observe are affected by the law.

59

4. Conclusion

It is acknowledged that current conflicts are extremely complex and difficult to

classify as to what legal paradigm should be applied. A correct determination of the

applicable legal paradigm is of importance for a number of areas related to conduct

of hostilities, such as use of force or detention. On the other hand, difficulties

surrounding classification of conflicts are not entirely new and specific to the new

technologies such as drones.

It is apparent that in practice precise answers to the challenges surrounding the

use of armed drones are not easily answerable because in the majority of publicly

known cases we are lacking relevant factual information. Not surprisingly, both UN

Special Rapporteurs recently addressing the issue of the use of drones, Mr. Christof

Heyns

60

and Mr. Ben Emmerson,

61

have generally called for a greater clarity and

transparency of the factual and legal issues related to the use of drones.

Complementary, from a strict legal point of view, it has to be understood that

answers cannot be found in the LOAC only, as it often includes the right of third

sovereign states. Therefore, the use of drones usually encompasses areas related to

ius

ad bellum

, law of neutrality etc. A comprehensive approach entailing legal and policy

analysis on a case by case basis is desirable for any assessment of the legality of the

use of drones.

Nowadays, drones are so contested because of the quantity of their use and

because of the unclear legal character of the conflicts in which they are being used

(namely Yemen or Pakistan). On the other hand, it is not the technology or lack of

applicable rules that we should be afraid of, but rather us – persons/human beings/

decision-making bodies – who sometimes intentionally blur well established legal

regimes when foreseen results are perceived as unfavorable to our strategic interests.

Such behavior may result in two consequences. The short and directly apparent

one that Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg observed is that, “if a state pretends that an

armed conflict is not in existence when manifestly it is, this may result in unnecessary

58

William B. Boothby,

Conflict Law: the Influence of NewWeapons Technology, Human Rights and Emerging

Actors

, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014, p. 36.

59

Ibid

., p. 42.

60

A/HRC/26/36, UN GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary

executions, Christof Heyns, 2014.

61

A/HRC/25/29, UN GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human

rights and fundamentals freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, 2014.